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LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION: 
MEDICAID, FEDERALISM & IMMIGRANTS 
MEDHA D. MAKHLOUF* 
Medicaid’s cooperative federalism structure gives states significant 
discretion to include or exclude various categories of noncitizens. 
This has created extreme geographic variability in noncitizens’ ac-
cess to health coverage. This Article describes federalism’s role in 
influencing state policies on noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid and 
its implications for national health policy. Although there are disa-
greements over the extent to which public funds should be used to 
subsidize noncitizen health coverage, this Article reveals that decen-
tralized policymaking on noncitizen access to Medicaid has weak-
ened national health policy by increasing wasteful spending and ex-
acerbating inequities in access to healthcare. It has failed to 
incentivize the type of state policy experimentation and replication 
that justifies federalism arrangements in other contexts. Rather, fed-
eralism has (1) enabled states to enact exclusionary policies that are 
ineffective and inhumane and (2) created barriers for states to enact 
inclusionary policies that advance the normative goals of health 
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policy. This Article concludes that noncitizen access to health cover-
age is best addressed through centralized policymaking. 
This Article contributes to scholarly conversations about federalism 
and healthcare by providing a case study to test the efficacy of feder-
alism arrangements in achieving equity for those who were left be-
hind by health reform. More broadly, it adds to the federalism litera-
ture by synthesizing insights from three fields that rarely comment on 
one another: health law, immigration law, and federalism theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, discussions of whether 
and how to expand healthcare access for noncitizens were already 
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mainstream.1 Then came the coronavirus pandemic. The tragic consequences 
and enormous risks of inequitable access to health coverage are undeniable. 
Noncitizen essential workers who are ineligible for publicly funded health 
insurance have faced particularly dire circumstances.2 For the vast majority 
of U.S. voters who disapprove of the Trump Administration’s response to 
the pandemic,3 health reform can no longer wait. For the first time since 
1996, when harsh restrictions were imposed on noncitizen eligibility for 
public benefits, there is a real possibility that laws excluding noncitizens 
from publicly funded health insurance will be reversed.4 
As health reform once again becomes a central focus of American 
politics—this time with formerly fringe ideas like a nationally-uniform, 
single-payer healthcare system enjoying significant popularity5—
determining how noncitizens residing in the United States should be included 
within that universe is increasingly urgent. However, this subject has eluded 
coherent policymaking due to the complexity of the laws governing 
noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded healthcare and the sheer number 
and diversity of noncitizen statuses. 
This Article is the first sustained treatment of the vitally important legal 
and policy question of the interactions among federalism, access to 
healthcare, and immigration.6 It explores salient themes in federalism 
 
 1  See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, What Would Giving Health Care to Undocumented Immigrants 
Mean?, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/health/undocumented-
immigrants-health-care.html. 
 2  See, e.g., Suzanne Gamboa, Undocumented Immigrants Without Health Care Were Among 
the ‘Essential Workers’ Felled by COVID-19, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 28, 2020, 10:40 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/blog/2020-08-27-rnc-updates-
n1238267/ncrd1238617#blogHeader; see also Immigrants as Essential Workers During COVID-
19: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Tom Jawetz, Vice President for Immigration Policy, Center for 
American Progress). 
 3  See Ashley Kirzinger, Audrey Kearney & Liz Hamel, Voters Are Souring on President 
Trump’s Handling of Coronavirus, with Implications for November, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 
17, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/voters-are-souring-on-president-trumps-handling-of-
coronavirus-with-implications-for-november. 
 4  Larry Levitt, Trump vs Biden on Health Care, JAMA HEALTH F. (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2770427 (describing President-elect 
Joseph R. Biden’s proposal to eliminate the five-year bar on lawful permanent residents’ eligibility 
for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program and to allow undocumented noncitizens 
to purchase unsubsidized coverage on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
Marketplaces). 
 5  Jonathan Oberlander, Lessons From the Long and Winding Road to Medicare for All, 109 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1497, 1497 (2019) (noting that single payer has moved to the “mainstream of 
American politics”). 
 6  I take inspiration from Laboratories of Destitution, David Super’s seminal case study of the 
relationship between federalism and anti-poverty policy. David A. Super, Laboratories of 
Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV 
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scholarship—including policy fragmentation, political inequity, and social 
exclusion—by examining how states react to federalism arrangements 
governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid. It provides a valuable case 
study on the efficacy of federalism arrangements for achieving social justice. 
In particular, it examines who gets left behind when Congress designates 
states to implement federal statutes, as in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).7 Finally, this Article adds to the growing 
literature analyzing federalism arrangements across a range of subjects in 
order to uncover trans-substantive insights about whether these 
arrangements are suited to achieving their stated policy goals. 
I use the term “excluded noncitizens” to describe the population of 
focus: low-income noncitizens who are ineligible for the major federally 
funded health coverage programs because of their immigration status and 
 
541, 547 (2008) (arguing that decentralized antipoverty policy has failed to encourage effective 
state policy experimentation and advocating for more centralized policymaking). However, the 
intersection of healthcare and immigration raises complex issues of economics, sovereignty, and 
justice that are unique and not presented as squarely in the anti-poverty context and in Super’s 
analysis. Health law scholars have generally bracketed federalism issues as they relate to 
noncitizens, if they are mentioned at all. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is 
Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1726 (2018) (noting that undocumented 
and some lawfully present noncitizens were left out of the ACA’s federalism-oriented Medicaid 
expansion); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver Under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
213, 228–29 (2019) (mentioning California’s withdrawal of a Section 1332 State Innovation 
Waiver application seeking to permit undocumented noncitizens to purchase unsubsidized 
Marketplace coverage as an example of limited waiver activity caused by uncertainty about the 
future of the ACA); Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid For All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 865 (2018) (including undocumented noncitizens among groups who may 
obtain access to health coverage through a state-level public option); id. at 863–64 (describing 
California and Oregon Section 1332 waiver applications that would improve access to health 
coverage for undocumented noncitizens among state strategies to use waivers to “open up access 
to new populations”). Recently, Wendy E. Parmet began the project of mapping the values at stake 
when state and federal action in the immigration and healthcare spheres intersect. Wendy E. Parmet, 
The Plenary Power Meets the Police Power: Federalism at the Intersection of Health & 
Immigration, 45 AM. J.L. & MED. 224, 225 (2019). In the extensive literature on immigration and 
federalism, scholars typically combine their analysis of Medicaid with other public benefit 
programs, and some of the most prominent articles were authored before the passage of the ACA. 
See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 733 (2013) 
(describing Congress’s delegation of authority to states to enact noncitizen-exclusionary public 
benefit laws); id. at 743 (describing state and local noncitizen-inclusionary laws providing a variety 
of services to undocumented noncitizens); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and 
the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1453, 1470 (1995) (including emergency medical costs among 
those incurred by states with disproportionate numbers of undocumented noncitizens); Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 586 
n.72 (2008) (using noncitizen exclusion from Medicaid as an example of how “states and localities 
bear much of the cost of absorbing immigrants”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? 
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 
506–09 (2001) (outlining the doctrine of state alienage restrictions in public benefit programs). 
 7  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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who have resided or intend to reside in the United States for the long term.8 
The federal government subsidizes health coverage for people with limited 
means in two major ways: by providing insurance through Medicaid and by 
subsidizing insurance purchased on the ACA Marketplaces.9 The meaning 
of “excluded noncitizen” differs depending on the program being discussed 
and, in the case of Medicaid, the state of residence. In all states, however, 
undocumented noncitizens and recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) are excluded from Medicaid and Marketplace subsidies.10 
In this Article, I focus on Medicaid because it is the primary means by which 
low-income households without access to affordable employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) obtain health coverage;11 it covers more than a quarter of the 
population;12 it is more economically efficient than subsidizing Marketplace 
 
 8  Research suggests that significant numbers of noncitizens who are not legally barred from 
access to subsidized health coverage nevertheless avoid it because of immigration-related concerns. 
I focus on this population in other publications. See Medha D. Makhlouf & Jasmine Sandhu, 
Immigrants and Interdependence: How the COVID-19 Pandemic Exposes the Folly of the New 
Public Charge Rule, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 146 (2020); Medha D. Makhlouf, The Public 
Charge Rule as Public Health Policy, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 177, 194–96 (2019).  
 9  See infra notes 206–12 and accompanying text. 
 10  Health Coverage of Immigrants, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2020), 
http://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/fact-sheet/health-coverage-of-immigrants (noting that 
“[u]ndocumented immigrants are not eligible to enroll in Medicaid or CHIP or to purchase coverage 
through the ACA Marketplaces” and “individuals with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) status are not considered lawfully present and remain ineligible for coverage options”). 
 11  See Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2020) (“Medicaid is the single largest source of health coverage in the United 
States.”). The cost of ESI to beneficiaries is subsidized by employers. Like some citizens, 
noncitizens may find even subsidized coverage to be unaffordable. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
supra note 10 (stating that lower average incomes among noncitizens make affording ESI 
challenging). Although some noncitizens who are excluded from Medicaid are eligible to purchase 
subsidized coverage on the Marketplaces, they are disproportionately likely, compared with 
citizens, to be uninsured even when they are eligible for Marketplace coverage. See id. (noting that 
nonelderly noncitizens are significantly more likely to be uninsured than nonelderly citizens and 
stating that many eligible noncitizens remain uninsured). It is likely that nonfinancial enrollment 
barriers that are unique to noncitizens play a role. See id. (noting that many eligible noncitizens 
remain uninsured because of barriers such as confusion about eligibility, difficulty navigating 
enrollment, and language and literacy challenges). Noncitizens with significant means but without 
access to ESI can purchase unsubsidized, non-Marketplace coverage on the individual market and 
are therefore not the subject of this Article. Cf. SAMANTHA ARTIGA & MARIA DIAZ, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH COVERAGE AND CARE OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 4 (2019), 
http://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-and-care-of-undocumented-
immigrants (“Undocumented immigrants can also purchase private coverage on the individual 
market outside of the ACA Marketplaces, although many may not be able to afford this coverage 
due to their limited incomes and lack of subsidies to offset the costs of this coverage.”). 
 12  See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP 
DATA BOOK 3 exhibit 1 (2019), https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/MACStats-
Medicaid-and-CHIP-Data-Book-December-2019.pdf (showing that Medicaid and CHIP covered 
29.3% of the U.S. population in 2018). 
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insurance purchases;13 and it is an important building block and comparator 
for policymakers seeking to expand publicly funded health insurance.14  
Medicaid’s cooperative federalism structure gives states significant 
discretion to make decisions about noncitizen eligibility. Federal law 
mandates Medicaid coverage of only a small category of noncitizens.15 
Beyond this floor, states may expand eligibility to additional groups of 
noncitizens using federal and state funds.16 However, just as there is a federal 
floor of noncitizen eligibility, there is also a ceiling or limit on how much 
states can expand Medicaid to noncitizens using federal funds.17 This ceiling 
excludes a substantial population of low-income noncitizens from access to 
affordable health insurance in all but a few states that fund Medicaid-like 
coverage themselves (typically in a piecemeal and restricted manner).18 I 
argue that this structure does not only create extreme geographic variability 
in noncitizens’ access to health coverage, but also (1) enables states to enact 
exclusionary policies that are ineffective and inhumane and (2) creates 
barriers for states to enact inclusionary policies that would advance the 
normative goals of health policy. This is consistent with prior research 
demonstrating how federalism can exacerbate inequity and hinder social 
citizenship.19 On balance, decentralized policymaking on immigrant access 
 
 13  See Susannah Luthi, ACA Subsidies Cost More per Person than Medicaid. Is That 
Sustainable?, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 8, 2018, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180808/NEWS/180809915/aca-subsidies-cost-more-
per-person-than-medicaid-is-that-sustainable (citing research indicating that state-based public and 
private market structures are more efficient than exchanges). 
 14  See Jamila Michener, Medicaid and the Policy Feedback Foundations for Universal 
Healthcare, 685 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 118 (2019) (“Given its size and scope, 
the future of any health care policy transformation likely pivots on the current-day status and effects 
of Medicaid policy.”).  
 15  See infra Section I.B; see also infra notes 134–55 and accompanying text. 
 16  See infra Sections I.B.3, I.C. 
 17  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2264–65 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (1996)) 
(requiring states participating in Medicaid to cover certain noncitizens and permitting them to 
determine the eligibility of other noncitizens); id. § 401(a), 110 Stat. at 2261 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1612(a)) (stating that non-qualified noncitizens are generally ineligible for federal public 
benefits); id. § 403, 110 Stat. at 2265 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a)) (describing five-year bar on 
benefits eligibility for qualified noncitizens generally and exceptions to it); Children’s Health 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, § 214, 123 Stat. 8, 56–57 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397gg(e)(1)(N) (2018)). 
 18  See infra Sections I.B.3, I.C; see also infra notes 130–33 and accompanying text. 
 19  See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY 
NET: FEDERALISM AND POVERTY 197, 207 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (demonstrating how federalism 
has permitted states to deviate from the standards and priorities of Medicaid in ways that are 
contrary to health policy goals); JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, 
FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL POLITICS 33–59 (2018) (describing how federalism in Medicaid 
generates geographical inequities and perpetuates systemic health disparities); Andrew Hammond, 
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to Medicaid has weakened national health policy. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the existing 
patchwork of noncitizen exclusion from Medicaid and the other, less 
efficient ways in which the U.S. government subsidizes healthcare for 
excluded noncitizens. This latter consideration is often missing from debates 
over whether immigrants should be eligible for publicly funded health 
insurance. Those who are opposed to expanding coverage for noncitizens on 
efficiency grounds may reconsider their position when confronted with 
information about how public funds are already used to subsidize healthcare 
for noncitizens and how we could do so more effectively.20  
Part II explains why the patchwork of noncitizen exclusion weakens 
national health policy. First, variability in healthcare access based on 
characteristics that are unrelated to medical need—like state of residence and 
immigration status—raises ethical concerns about healthcare equity, which 
scholars have identified as the emerging normative foundation of health law 
scholarship and healthcare regulation.21 Healthcare equity is about the fair 
distribution of healthcare resources, including publicly funded health 
coverage.22 The classical conception of equity contains two dimensions: 
horizontal and vertical.23 In the healthcare context, horizontal inequity 
occurs when residents of different states with the same medical needs do not 
 
Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1736–41 (2017) (discussing state-level 
inequities in the administration of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); Rebecca J. Kreitzer, 
Candis Watts Smith, Kellen A. Kane & Tracee M. Saunders, Affordable but Inaccessible? 
Contraception Deserts in the US States, J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. (forthcoming 2020) (assessing 
how differences in state administration of Title X programs leads to health inequity); Robert A. 
Schapiro, Unequal States, Unequal People: Fiscal Inequity and the Values of Federalism, 108 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (examining the role of fiscal federalism in creating inequities 
in education and health). 
 20  This information will not, of course, persuade those whose opposition to expanding health 
coverage for noncitizens is motivated by racism. See infra Section II.D.  
 21  See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, The Body Politic: Federalism as Feminism in Health Reform, 
11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 303, 311 (2018) (noting that healthcare equity has become 
a guiding principle of healthcare regulation and scholarship); Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as 
Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 50–51 (2014) (proposing a new “health justice” 
paradigm that reflects the socially conscious aims of the health law field). See generally DANIEL E. 
DAWES, 150 YEARS OF OBAMACARE (2016) (detailing the health equity movement and the passage 
of the ACA); JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 2 (2009) (arguing that health 
systems’ primary goal is to reduce disparities while using resources efficiently); Michael Marmot, 
Sharon Friel, Ruth Bell, Tanja AJ Houweling & Sebastian Taylor, Closing the Gap in a Generation: 
Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, 372 LANCET 1661, 1661–62 
(2008) (arguing that reducing health inequities is an ethical imperative and providing 
recommendations to that end). 
 22  See Anthony J. Culyer, Equity - Some Theory and Its Policy Implications, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 
275, 275 (2001) (analyzing the equitable distribution of healthcare resources in affluent societies). 
 23  Id. at 276 (“Horizontal equity requires the like treatment of like individuals and vertical 
equity requires the unlike treatment of unlike individuals, in proportion to the differences between 
them.”).  
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have the same access to healthcare resources, while vertical inequity occurs 
when noncitizen residents with greater healthcare needs have less access than 
citizens with lesser needs.24 Second, when states underprovide subsidized 
health coverage, individual and population health outcomes worsen, quality 
metrics suffer, and costs shift to the federal government and can increase. 
State decisions to exclude noncitizens from Medicaid in order to cut costs 
may be undermining the national health policy goal of improving the health 
system’s overall efficiency.25 Third, state control of Medicaid is a legacy of 
racial politics, which are linked to immigration politics.26 Exclusion of 
noncitizens from Medicaid disproportionately affects Latinx people and 
people of color.27 State policies that are shaped by antidemocratic values like 
racism or that exacerbate existing inequities in access to healthcare 
undermine the national health policy goal of achieving health equity. 
Part III analyzes federalism’s influence on the substance of state 
policies concerning noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, showing why 
federalism fails to meet the national health policy goals discussed in the 
previous Part. First, federalism enables states to enact exclusionary policies 
that are ineffective and inhumane. For example, the American Medical 
Association Journal of Ethics published an illustrated narrative about the 
tragedy of undocumented noncitizens with end-stage renal disease who live 
in states that do not authorize publicly funded coverage of routine outpatient 
dialysis, forcing patients into near-death situations before they can receive 
emergency treatment.28 Without a robust federal floor of Medicaid coverage 
for noncitizens, states like Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota, Virginia, 
 
 24  See, e.g., Barbara Starfield, The Hidden Inequity in Health Care, 10 INT’L J. FOR EQUITY 
HEALTH 1, 1 (2011) (summarizing the concept of equity in access to healthcare resources, including 
its horizontal and vertical dimensions); Culyer, supra note 22, at 276–77 (defining horizontal and 
vertical equity in general terms and in relation to health, healthcare needs, and financial 
contributions to healthcare). 
 25  See infra Sections II.B–C. 
 26  See, e.g., MICHENER, supra note 19 (“[A]mple research has confirmed that federalism 
bolsters one of the most antidemocratic forces in the American polity: racism.”); Hana E. Brown 
& Rachel Kahn Best, Logics of Redistribution: Determinants of Generosity in Three U.S. Social 
Welfare Programs, 60 SOC. PERSP. 786, 793 (2017) (noting that racial dynamics play a stronger 
role in programs where authority has been delegated to states); Ellen Reese, Elvia Ramirez & 
Vanesa Estrada-Correa, The Politics of Welfare Inclusion: Explaining State Variation in Legal 
Immigrants’ Welfare Rights, 56 SOC. PERSP. 97, 98 (2013) (“[M]any scholars suggest that the 
policies towards [legal immigrants] were shaped by wider attitudes toward the foreign-born 
population and its racial and ethnic make-up.”). 
 27  See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 269 (1996–1997) (“Because a 
majority of immigrants are people of color, alienage classifications all-too-frequently are employed 
as a proxy for race. Alienage discrimination . . . allows one to disproportionately disadvantage 
people of color.”). 
 28  Nathan A. Gray, Cruel Carousel: The Grim Grind of “Compassionate” Dialysis, 20 AMA 
J. ETHICS 778 (2018). 
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Wyoming, and Texas have faced no obstacle to imposing harsher limits on 
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid than are required under federal law.29 
Federalism empowers states to enact exclusionary policies guided by 
ideologies that are peripheral to health policy, including immigration 
restrictionism among other factors.  
Second, federalism creates barriers that inhibit states from enacting 
inclusionary policies that would advance the normative goals of health 
policy: equitable access to healthcare, and cost-effectiveness, defined as the 
benefits of better health and better care divided by cost.30 Fiscal capacity 
presents a major obstacle to states that want to expand Medicaid coverage 
for noncitizens.31 Poor baseline economic conditions can prevent states from 
taking advantage of federal options to expand coverage, which 
institutionalizes these decisions and inhibits future reform.32 Because most 
states are required to balance their budgets each year, unlike the federal 
government, programs supported by state funds are more vulnerable to 
changes in economic conditions.33 States may be forced to cut their Medicaid 
budgets and deny necessary care to enrollees who have few resources or 
alternative options.34 Predictably, only a handful of states have created state-
funded programs to expand noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid-like 
coverage.35 
 
 29  See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., TABLE: MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR 
IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES (2020) [hereinafter MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR 
IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES], http://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/med-
services-for-imms-in-states.pdf (outlining Medical Assistance Programs for immigrants in various 
states). 
 30  See infra notes 295–99 and accompanying text. See generally Sections II.B–C, III.B. 
 31  See Super, supra note 6, at 547 (noting that state and local governments cannot respond 
effectively to increased responsibility for antipoverty programs, because they may be affected by 
shrinking revenues, free-riding localities, and lack of increased federal funding). 
 32  See Reese et al., supra note 26, at 117 (finding that states with higher poverty rates were 
less likely to restore benefits for noncitizens using state funds after PRWORA); id. (finding that 
states’ past spending patterns on welfare programs for noncitizens predict future spending patterns).  
 33  See Jared Walczak, State Strategies for Closing FY 2020 with a Balanced Budget, TAX 
FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2020), http://taxfoundation.org/fy-2020-state-budgets-fy-2021-state-budgets 
(noting that “states are constrained in a way the federal government is not: revenues and 
expenditures must be aligned, and the longer they are out of balance, the more intractable the 
problem becomes”); cf. Super, supra note 6, at 547 (stating that economic conditions that increase 
poverty also affect state and local governments’ revenues). 
 34  See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 480 (2011) 
(citing, as an example, Arizona’s fiscally motivated decision to cut transplant services from its 
Medicaid program). 
 35  See Rebecca Adams, Undocumented Kids Get Health Care in Six States, D.C., CTR. FOR 
HEALTH JOURNALISM (Jan. 22, 2018), 
http://www.centerforhealthjournalism.org/fellowships/projects/undocumented-kids-get-health-
care-six-states-dc (describing how undocumented noncitizen children are eligible for publicly 
funded health coverage in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and 
Washington).  
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Part IV discusses the limits of federalism in the context of noncitizen 
eligibility for Medicaid, explaining why the currrent federalism structure 
fails to meet the goals of federalism itself. The conception of states as 
“laboratories” of democracy assumes that states design and conduct policy 
experiments in order to identify policies that accomplish their intended 
effects and that do not have counter-productive side effects.36 Successful 
experiments should serve as policy templates for other jurisdictions.37 
Medicaid’s structure has largely failed to incentivize this type of 
experimentation and replication.38 Many states, including several of the 
“new destination” states for noncitizens—Alabama, Tennessee, South 
Dakota, Nevada, Georgia, Kentucky, Idaho, Indiana, and Mississippi39—
have not elected federal options to expand Medicaid for noncitizens after 
adopting the federal baseline of restrictions set out in the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA), nor have they used state funds exclusively to expand coverage 
for excluded noncitizens.40 Policy reform has stagnated in these states 
despite shifting demographics and unmet healthcare needs among 
noncitizens residing there.41 The Article concludes by making a normative 
case for centralization of policy relating to noncitizen eligibility for 
subsidized health coverage. 
I 
EXCLUDING NONCITIZENS FROM MEDICAID: HOW TAXPAYERS PAY 
Public support for expanding subsidized health coverage for 
undocumented noncitizens—who make up the largest cohort of excluded 
noncitizens42—is middling.43 Those who oppose expansion typically 
 
 36  See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 638–
39 (2017) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
 37  Id. at 649–50 (describing the mechanisms by which policies spread across jurisdictions, 
including “policy learning,” a model wherein jurisdictions develop policy based on successes or 
failures in other jurisdictions). 
 38  See, e.g., Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1704 (“States have been limited in what they 
can accomplish alone in healthcare experimentation.”). 
 39  “New destination” states are those in which “the foreign-born population grew at or above 
twice the national rate between 2000 and 2009.” Aaron Terrazas, Immigrants in New-Destination 
States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-new-destination-states. They are listed in 
descending order of growth. Id. 
 40  See discussion infra Sections I.B.3, I.C. 
 41  See Terrazas, supra note 39 (“The foreign born in new-destination states were less likely 
than immigrants elsewhere to have health insurance.”). 
 42  See Health Coverage of Immigrants, supra note 10. 
 43  See Lawrence O. Gostin, Is Affording Undocumented Immigrants Health Coverage a 
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question why U.S. citizens should subsidize healthcare for noncitizens at 
all.44 However, they often overlook the little-known ways in which all 
taxpayers—noncitizens included—already pay for such care: through 
existing safety net programs, public health services, and federally qualified 
health centers (FQHC); through supplemental Medicaid payments to 
hospitals that serve a high proportion of uninsured low-income patients; and 
through grants intended to reimburse healthcare providers for 
uncompensated care provided to uninsured noncitizens.45 One might view 
these payments as a partial, institutional commitment to the “rescue 
principle” in healthcare,46 or as a pragmatic means of ensuring the financial 
 
Radical Proposal?, 322 JAMA 1438, 1438 (2019); Grace Sparks, CNN Poll: Democrats See 
Sanders as the Best to Handle Health Care, CNN (July 1, 2019, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2019/07/01/politics/cnn-poll-june-health-care/index.html (indicating that 
thirty-eight percent of survey respondents agreed that health insurance coverage provided by the 
government should be available to undocumented immigrants). 
 44  See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 27, 2019, 9:37 PM), 
http://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1144419410729242625?lang=en (“All Democrats just 
raised their hands for giving millions of illegal aliens unlimited healthcare. How about taking care 
of American Citizens first!?”). 
 45  See, e.g., Chris Conover, How American Citizens Finance $18.5 Billion in Health Care for 
Unauthorized Immigrants, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2018, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2018/02/26/how-american-citizens-finance-health-
care-for-undocumented-immigrants/#31213f9d12c4. 
 46  See Mark G. Kuczewski, Who is My Neighbor? A Communitarian Analysis of Access to 
Health Care for Immigrants, 32 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 327, 329 (2011) (defining the 
“rescue principle” as “anyone in immediate distress [should] not suffer and die in the street”); see 
also PATRICIA ILLINGWORTH & WENDY E. PARMET, THE HEALTH OF NEWCOMERS: 
IMMIGRATION, HEALTH POLICY, AND THE CASE FOR GLOBAL SOLIDARITY 182 (2017) (noting that 
since noncitizens are not fully excluded from the U.S. healthcare system, there is at least some 
health-related solidarity between citizens and noncitizens); Patrick Glen, Health Care and the 
Illegal Immigrant, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 197, 229 (2013) (discussing EMTALA and its underlying 
ethical principle that every person should receive medical treatment when it is necessary). Some 
might argue that this is an eroding principle, particularly with respect to noncitizens and people of 
color. High-profile members of the Trump Administration and the current President himself have 
openly questioned the humanity of noncitizens, reacted with indifference to glaring racial inequities 
in mortality from COVID-19, and encouraged violent policing that disproportionately kills people 
of color. See, e.g., Abigail Simon, People Are Angry President Trump Used This Word to Describe 
Undocumented Immigrants, TIME (June 19, 2018, 11:56 AM), http://time.com/5316087/donald-
trump-immigration-infest (reporting on reactions to Trump’s use of the word “infest” to describe 
the act of migration and a prior use of the word “animals” to refer to immigrants); Laura Barrón-
López, Trump Coronavirus Response Feeds Distrust in Black and Latino Communities, POLITICO 
(Apr. 21, 2020, 4:30 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/21/race-coronavirus-outreach-
197470 (noting statements by administration officials, including Surgeon General Jerome Adams); 
Sean Collins, Trump’s Policies Have Enabled Police Violence Against Black Americans, VOX 
(May 30, 2020, 3:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/identities/2020/5/30/21275588/trump-policing-
policies-doj-george-floyd-protests (“[S]ince his inauguration, Trump and his administration have 
worked to solidify a place for police violence in American life through both rhetoric and policy.”). 
In this environment, it may not be prudent to take for granted reimbusement mechanisms that cover 
excluded noncitizens, like Emergency Medicaid. However, I introduce the rescue principle as a 
value underlying existing programs at the time of their establishment.  
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viability of public and teaching hospitals and safeguarding public health.47 
Either way, the important question for politicians and the public is not 
whether we want to pay for such care, but how we want to do so. 
A review of the landscape of subsidized health coverage for noncitizens 
demonstrates an important point: Noncitizens are not—and have never 
been—completely excluded from subsidized health coverage programs. 
Social welfare programs designed to increase access to healthcare have long 
served noncitizens.48 The rationales for including noncitizens in publicly 
funded health insurance are based on achieving health policy goals relating 
to health-system efficiency and equity.49 Safety net programs and funding 
sources are intended to fill the gaps in our public health insurance system.50 
However, the existing patchwork of programs is woefully inadequate to meet 
the healthcare needs of many noncitizens.  
This Part describes the legal framework for noncitizen access to 
publicly funded health coverage. It begins with a discussion of terminology 
used throughout this Article. The next Section opens with a synopsis of the 
 
 47  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-603, MEDICAID: STATES’ USE AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS TO HOSPITALS 21 (2019) (finding that, nationally, 
Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments covered about half of the 
uncompensated care costs of the hospitals that received the payments); Health Headlines – March 
30, 2020, KING & SPALDING (Mar. 30, 2020), http://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/health-
headlines-march-30-2020 (describing new federal funding and program changes to protect public 
health during the COVID-19 pandemic, including approval of Emergency Medicaid waivers, new 
grants through the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund, approval of reimbursement 
for telehealth services provided by FQHCs, and a delay of planned Medicaid DSH cuts). 
 48  See Cybelle Fox, Unauthorized Welfare: The Origins of Immigrant Status Restrictions in 
American Social Policy, 102 J. AM. HIST. 1051, 1058–59 (2016) (describing the lack of federal 
alienage restrictions in social assistance programs between 1935 and 1971, a pattern that the 
introduction of Medicaid did not change); infra note 102; see also Fox, supra, at 1051 (describing 
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s reliance, in 1971, on the fact that most 
states’ public assistance programs did not restrict eligibility on the basis of citizenship or 
immigration status); Leighton Ku & Sheetal Matani, Left Out: Immigrants’ Access to Health Care 
and Insurance, 20 HEALTH AFF. 247, 247 (2001) (noting that before the passage of PRWORA in 
1996, “[h]istorically, legally admitted immigrants were eligible for Medicaid and other benefits on 
the same terms as citizens were”). 
 49  See Medha D. Makhlouf, Health Justice for Immigrants, 4 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 235, 265 
(2019) (noting that “exclusionary laws and policies based on immigration concerns make bad health 
policy” and asserting that “[f]rom a population health perspective, to ignore policies that reduce the 
public accessibility of health services is to ignore a major determinant of inequity”). 
 50  This pattern of using inefficient and unreliable “patches” to fill intentional gaps in primary 
public benefit programs is not exclusive to healthcare. For example, PRWORA slashed funding for 
Food Stamps, now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), even as it 
modestly increased funding for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), a less efficient 
program that funds the purchase of food commodities by emergency food pantries, food banks, 
soup kitchens, and shelters. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 633, 701 (2004) (“The agriculture committees cut the food stamp program $600 
million more deeply in PRWORA than the Republican leadership required so that they could buy 
commodities for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), which aids food banks and 
soup kitchens.”).  
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doctrines governing issues at the intersection of health law and immigration 
law. It then describes the history of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid and 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), focusing on the impact of 
PRWORA’s sweeping restrictions and its devolution of authority to states to 
make decisions about how to treat noncitizens. The final Section describes 
state-funded efforts to provide health coverage to noncitizens who are 
excluded from Medicaid and Marketplace subsidies. This collection of 
programs, each with its distinct logic for including or excluding various 
categories of people, creates the unique and threadbare patchwork of health 
coverage for noncitizens living in the United States. 
A. Terminology 
Terminology about noncitizen status is complex, and choices about 
terminology are often imbued with ideology. This Section provides an 
overview of the relevant categories of noncitizens that are used throughout 
this Article. For the most part, I use the language found in statutes or 
regulations. However, in some cases, relevant laws use different terms to 
refer to the same or overlapping categories of noncitizens. For example, 
PRWORA refers to a group of noncitizens of various statuses who are 
qualified to enroll in federally-funded public benefits using a term that is not 
found in immigration law. In other cases, common usages conflict with or 
do not have a legal definition but are so ubiquitous that they are unavoidable 
in a discussion of noncitizen access to publicly funded healthcare. Finally, 
where there are meaningful choices to be made about terminology, I opt for 
inclusive, humanizing language. 
I use the term “noncitizen” to refer to any person who is not a U.S. 
citizen. I opt for this term rather than the more common, colloquial term, 
“immigrant,” because “immigrant” (1) has a legal meaning that is narrower 
than a person who is not a U.S. citizen51 and (2) is used conversationally and 
in some scholarship to refer to naturalized U.S. citizens, i.e. people who are 
not “natural-born citizens” but who have become citizens through the 
naturalization process established in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
I prefer “noncitizen” to “alien” because, although the latter has a long 
history of usage and is found in federal immigration laws and state laws on 
a variety of matters, the term is increasingly recognized by local and state 
 
 51  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2012) (the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) broadly 
defines the term “immigrant” to mean “every alien except an alien who is within one of the 
[delineated] classes of nonimmigrant aliens”). “An illegal alien who entered the United States 
without inspection, for example, would be strictly defined as an immigrant under the INA . . . .” 
Immigrants and Refugees: What is an Immigrant or Refugee?, U.C. IRVINE LIBR., 
http://guides.lib.uci.edu/immigrants/whatis (last updated July 23, 2020, 6:39 PM). 
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policymakers as disparaging of noncitizens.52 Scholars have analyzed how 
use of the term “alien” has reinforced hostility toward noncitizens and, as 
immigration has changed the racial and ethnic composition of the country, 
become synonymous for noncitizen people of color.53 This effect is 
magnified by the current president’s vitriolic rhetoric about noncitizens—
and about noncitizens of color in particular54—coupled with his frequent and 
deliberate use of the term “illegal alien.”55 Given the normative bent of this 
Article, I eschew the ideologically loaded term, “alien,” in favor of the 
relatively neutral term, “noncitizen.” For example, even in discussions of the 
category “qualified alien,” which originated in the PRWORA, I use the term 
“qualified noncitizen” unless I am quoting the statute directly.  
For similar reasons, I use the term “undocumented” instead of 
“illegal.”56 To use the term “illegal” to refer to a person, as opposed to their 
actions, is literally dehumanizing. The foregoing also explains why I opt for 
“undocumented noncitizen” as opposed to “illegal alien,” “undocumented 
immigrant,” or any combination of those terms.  
Regarding the concept of “undocumented,” there is no precise 
definition.57 The term is not found in immigration law. Rather, it is used to 
refer to people who entered the country either (1) without inspection or (2) 
with authorization and inspection, but then violated the terms of their 
authorization.58 For example, one way to become undocumented is to remain 
 
 52  See Mihir Zaveri, This Lawmaker Wants to Remove the Words ‘Illegal Alien’ from the Law, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), http://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/colorado-illegal-
immigrants.html. Recently, the New York City Council voted to prohibit the use of “alien” in local 
laws, replacing it with “noncitizen.” Maya Rajamani, NYC Council Votes to Ban Phrases ‘Alien,’ 
‘Illegal Immigrant’ from All Local Laws, 1010 WINS (May 28, 2020, 3:30 PM), 
http://1010wins.radio.com/articles/nyc-council-bans-alien-illegal-immigrant-from-local-law. On 
the other hand, the Trump Administration’s Justice Department has urged federal prosecutors to 
use the term “illegal aliens” instead of “undocumented” in news releases. Zaveri, supra. Advocates 
for inclusive policies have long recognized the dehumanizing nature of the term “alien.” Id.  
 53  See Johnson, supra note 27, at 267 (summarizing concerns of scholars about the use of 
“alien” in immigration law). 
 54  See Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198–200 (2019) (discussing President Trump’s remarks on immigrants 
and immigration and noting that “[t]he President’s comments on immigration . . . strongly suggest 
that he views immigration as a cultural threat to the U.S.”). 
 55  Zaveri, supra note 52 (noting that President Trump used the term “illegal alien” at least five 
times during the February 2020 State of the Union address). 
 56  Use of the term “illegal immigrant” in local laws was also prohibited by the New York City 
Council’s action. Rajamani, supra note 52.  
 57  In general usage, the term “unauthorized” is often used interchangeably with undocumented. 
See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2015) (“[T]he 
approximately 11.5 million noncitizens in the United States without 
status . . . are often described as ‘illegal,’ ‘undocumented,’ or ‘unauthorized’ noncitizens.”). 
 58  See, e.g., id. (describing undocumented immigrants as those who have overstayed legal visas 
or entered the country without inspection); Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented 
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in the United States beyond the authorized period of stay for a tourist visa.59 
For many undocumented noncitizens, their status is temporary: They have 
held legal status in the past and may obtain legal status in the future, 
depending on the outcome of pending immigration applications.60  
In prior work, I described the complexity and number of noncitizen 
statuses as a “spectrum from ‘permanent’ to temporary to quasi-status to 
undocumented.’”61 In the following paragraphs, I will describe some of these 
statuses or categories of statuses that matter for determining eligibility for 
publicly funded health coverage. Lawful permanent residents (LPRs) have 
the most secure status among noncitizens and are on the path to U.S. 
citizenship.62 The government recognizes that LPRs plan to live indefinitely 
and permanently in the United States, as the name implies, and therefore 
accords more rights to this group than to other noncitizen groups.63   
A similar term, “lawfully present,” refers to a much broader group than 
LPRs, and was used in the ACA to describe noncitizens who are eligible to 
enroll in health coverage through the Health Insurance Marketplace and 
receive subsidies in the form of premium tax credits.64 As defined in 
regulations, “lawfully present” noncitizens include LPRs, a variety of 
persons with humanitarian statuses,65 applicants for certain humanitarian 
statuses, and some noncitizens without status whose removal from the 
 
Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 68–69 (2009) (same); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 n.14 (2015) 
(same). 
 59  One report estimates that forty percent of undocumented noncitizens living in the United 
States entered the country with authorization. MICHAEL A. RODRÍGUEZ, MARIA-ELENA YOUNG & 
STEVEN P. WALLACE, CREATING CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HEALTHY PEOPLE: STATE POLICIES 
THAT AFFECT THE HEALTH OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 3 (2015). 
 60  Id. 
 61  Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 292. Sociologist Tiffany Joseph has helpfully conceptualized 
documentation status categories as a continuum from citizens to undocumented noncitizens with 
“gray area” documentation statuses in between. The documentation status continuum helps to 
explain how the allocation of public benefits along the spectrum reinforces civic stratification. 
Tiffany D. Joseph, The Documentation Status Continuum: Citizenship and Increasing Stratification 
in American Life, CTR. FOR OPEN SCI. (2020).  
 62  See, e.g., Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR), U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanent-residents (last updated Oct. 22, 
2020). 
 63  See, e.g., id. (“LPRs may accept an offer of employment without special restrictions, own 
property, receive financial assistance at public colleges and universities, and join the Armed 
Forces.”).  
 64  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. § 
1411(a)(1) (2010). 
 65  Humanitarian, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian#:~:text=USCIS%20provides%20a%20number%20of,issues%
20and%20other%20urgent%20circumstances (last visited Aug. 11, 2020) (summarizing 
humanitarian statuses, which include refugee; asylum; battered spouse, children, and parents; 
victims of human trafficking and other crimes; Temporary Protected Status (TPS); Deferred 
Enforced Departure (DED); and other special situations).  
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country has been deferred—what I refer to as a “quasi-status.”66 
Yet another similar term, “lawfully residing in the United States,” is 
used in the context of Medicaid and CHIP. Since 2009, states have had the 
option to provide Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully residing noncitizen children 
and/or pregnant women who are otherwise ineligible for those programs.67 
The term is functionally equivalent to “lawfully present.”68  
The term “qualified alien” originates in PRWORA and encompasses a 
narrower group of noncitizens than “lawfully present” and “lawfully 
residing.” It refers to noncitizens who qualify for eligibility for Medicaid and 
CHIP.69 These include LPRs and certain humanitarian statuses: refugees, 
people granted asylum, people granted parole by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) for a period of at least one year, people granted 
withholding of deportation/removal, people granted conditional entry, 
Cuban and Haitian entrants, certain survivors of trafficking, and certain 
abused immigrants, their children, and their parents.70  
“Permanently residing in the United States under color of law” 
(PRUCOL) is another term that is used in the Medicaid context.71 It is not 
clearly defined in federal statutes or regulations but is generally understood 
to refer to noncitizens “actually living in the United Sates without any formal 
immigration status” and who have “the [federal immigration agency’s] tacit, 
if not explicit, permission to remain.”72 There is evidence that Congress 
intended for the term to be interpreted broadly,73 and courts in various 
jurisdictions have interpreted PRUCOL differently, creating an informal 
 
 66  See 45 C.F.R. § 152.2 (2018). The healthcare.gov website provides a clearer list of twenty-
eight immigration statuses that qualify for Marketplace coverage. Immigrants: Immigration Status 
and the Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/immigrants/immigration-
status (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).  
 67  See infra Section I.B.4.  
 68  See Letter from Cindy Mann, Director, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State 
Health Officials (July 1, 2010), http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-
downloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO10006.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Letter from Cindy Mann]. 
 69  The term applies to a variety of federally funded public benefit programs, but Medicaid and 
CHIP are the only relevant programs for this Article’s purposes. 
 70  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, § 
431(b), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2274 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1641(b)); see also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 211, 122 Stat. 5044, 5063 (2008) (adding certain survivors of 
trafficking to the definition of “qualified alien”). A detailed discussion of qualified noncitizen 
statuses is provided in Section I.B. 
 71  See, e.g., Medicaid for Immigrants Who Are Not Permanent Residents (Do Not Have “Green 
Cards”)-- PRUCOL and Temporary Non-Immigrant Eligibility, N.Y. HEALTH ACCESS, 
http://www.wnylc.com/health/entry/33/#PRUCOL (last updated Sept. 29, 2020). 
 72  See Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens’ Access to Public Benefits: Flawed 
Premise, Unnecessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475, 1488 (1995). 
 73  Calvo, supra note 73, at 412 (“According to the House report on the bill, Congress intended 
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services interpret this phrase broadly so as to include aliens 
residing in the United States pursuant to immigration law, policy or practice.”).  
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zone of state policymaking.74 Prior to PRWORA, PRUCOL signified a 
category of noncitizens who were eligible for Medicaid.75 By creating the 
new category of qualified noncitizens, PRWORA essentially eliminated 
usage of PRUCOL in Medicaid.76 However, some states continue to use the 
term to describe noncitizens who may qualify for state-funded benefits.77  
B. Federal Framework 
This Section illustrates how, over time, the federal government has 
become increasingly influential in regulating and financing healthcare, yet 
has devolved considerable power and discretion to states to govern 
noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded health insurance. As Professor 
Wendy Parmet notes in her authoritative analysis of the roles of the federal 
and state governments as they relate to policies at the intersection of health 
and immigration, regulation of both health law and immigration law is 
“complex and dynamic.”78 While matters relating to health are traditionally 
within the domain of state and local governments,79 matters relating to 
immigration are theoretically within the exclusive domain of the federal 
government.80 The “messy” reality is that each level of government has a 
role in regulating matters at the intersection of health and immigration 
 
 74  See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576–77 n.33 (2d Cir. 1985) (defining PRUCOL 
to include fifteen categories of noncitizens, including those “residing in the United States with the 
knowledge and permission of the [INS] and whose departure from the United States the INS does 
not contemplate enforcing” (alteration in original)); Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1459–
60 (9th Cir. 1985) (“‘[P]ermanently residing . . . under color of law’ rests on two factors: first, an 
official determination by the INS that an alien is legitimately present in the country and, second, a 
determination that the alien is legitimately present for an indefinite period of time.”). See generally 
Janet M. Calvo, Alien Status Restrictions on Eligibility for Federally Funded Assistance Programs, 
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 411–16 (1987–88) (discussing judicial interpretations of 
PRUCOL). 
 75  The Second Circuit, in Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), derived from 45 
C.F.R. § 233.50 a doctrine that required states to provide public benefits to certain categories of 
noncitizens. See Holley, 553 F.2d at 848–51. The doctrine outlined in Holley would come to be 
referred to as PRUCOL. See Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-
Immigrant Provisions of the “Contract with America” Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043, 1046 & n.14 
(2001–02) (citing Holley in explaining the origins of the PRUCOL doctrine). 
 76  See Costich, supra note 75, at 1053 (“The PRWORA defines ‘qualified aliens’ . . . in a 
manner that abolishes the PRUCOL doctrine.”). 
 77  See, e.g., infra note 320 (describing health coverage for PRUCOL noncitizens in California).  
 78  Parmet, supra note 6, at 225–26. 
 79  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (holding that the power to enact 
health laws belongs to the states). 
 80  See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) 
(“The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to 
our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.”). 
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policy.81  
The doctrinal foundation of states’ authority to enact laws to preserve 
and protect the safety, health, welfare, and morals of the community is 
known as the “police power.”82 Although the traditional presumption of state 
primacy in matters relating to health retains some influence in healthcare 
policy and constitutional jurisprudence,83 federal authority to regulate health 
insurance is undisputed.84 Debates over the preservation of states’ roles are 
not based on considerations about the primary function of each level of 
government with respect to health insurance regulation and finance, typical 
of “separate spheres” federalism; rather, they are mainly about policy 
disagreements.85  
Laws regulating noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded healthcare sit 
at the nexus of two doctrinal traditions. They are not “immigration laws” per 
se as they do not regulate core immigration concerns such as admission and 
removal.86 Rather, they may be considered alienage laws, which regulate 
noncitizens’ rights and responsibilities once they are residing within the 
 
 81  Parmet, supra note 6, at 232. In the earliest colonial governments, localities were deemed 
responsible for caring for indigent people in their territory under the “doctrine of local care.” 
MICHENER, supra note 19, at 34. However, even then, when the tradition of local primacy in health-
related matters was strongest, certain health-related matters involving immigrants were shunted to 
a central authority when local authorities determined that they were beyond the scope of the 
locality’s ability to address them. For example, when “impoverished immigrants flooded seaport 
cities,” colonial localities could seek funds from the colonial treasury to provide for their basic 
needs. Id. at 34–35. Immigrants were among those characterized as the “unsettled” poor, which 
referred to people who had not settled in the locality but for whom it had nevertheless assumed 
responsibility. See id. at 35. The corollary to local responsibility for public assistance in the colonies 
(and later in the states prior to the establishment of the first comprehensive federal immigration law 
in 1882) was the authority to prohibit from settling or to expel persons who were dependent or 
likely to become dependent on public assistance. See Makhlouf, supra note 8, at 179–81 (describing 
the rights and responsibilities of colonial localities and states prior to 1882 relating to the provision 
of public assistance and the expulsion of people with few financial resources). States’ police powers 
also encompassed the ability to exclude immigrants from admission for public health reasons. See 
Parmet, supra note 6, at 228. 
 82  See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) at 203 (noting various exercises of the police power, including quarantine, inspection, and 
health laws); Parmet, supra note 6, at 227–28 nn.28–31.  
 83  See Parmet, supra note 6, at 228.  
 84  See Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of 
Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 345 (1970) (discussing the 
federal government’s cemented role in health matters after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid); 
Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 464 (“If Congress were to federalize Medicaid, the Spending Clause 
clearly provides the enumerated power to do so, just as it does for Medicare.”). 
 85  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1724 (“[W]e should be wary of arguments for 
federalism or states’ rights that are couched in constitutional arguments when they are really 
arguments about policy disagreements and statutory design.”). 
 86  See Parmet, supra note 6, at 229–30 (distinguishing “‘alienage laws,’ which regulate the 
rights and responsibilities of non-citizens who live within the U.S. from ‘immigration laws,’ which 
regulate admissibility, deportability, registration, and immigration enforcement”). 
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country. Alienage laws use citizenship or immigration status as the basis for 
treating residents differently, such as excluding them from eligibility for 
Medicaid.87  
In constitutional challenges to laws relating to noncitizens’ access to 
publicly funded healthcare programs, courts have cited various bases for 
their decisions—not only because such laws sit at this nexus, but also 
because they are heavily regulated and complex fields.88 While it is true that 
the plenary power and police power doctrines have eroded over time, they 
remain influential in shaping the creation and interpretation of laws at the 
intersection of health and immigration.89 For example, courts have relied on 
the federal exclusivity principle of the plenary power doctrine to strike down 
alienage restrictions in state-funded healthcare programs.90 Such analyses 
are particularly apt when these state laws actually regulate immigration by 
imposing unequal burdens on noncitizens as compared with citizens.91 In 
general, however, the interjection of immigration-policy motives into what 
is essentially a health-policy matter has proven unnecessary and unhelpful 
for achieving national health policy goals. 
 
 87  See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 618 (2013).  
 88  See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976) (“Congress has no constitutional duty to 
provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens . . . .”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (“State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely 
because of their alienage conflict with . . . overriding national policies in an area constitutionally 
entrusted to the Federal Government.”); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. 
Supp. 755, 783–84 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the provision excluding undocumented 
noncitizens from receiving services from community health centers is preempted by the Public 
Health Service Act). 
 89  See Parmet, supra note 6, at 228–29 (describing how states have retained significant 
discretion in implementing federal healthcare laws as a result of the police power’s influence on 
federal healthcare legislation and federal lawmakers’ rhetoric); id. at 226–27 (describing how the 
plenary power doctrine is the basis for a bifurcated equal protection jurisprudence of equal 
protection claims brought by noncitizens); see also infra note 441. 
 90  See Kurti v. Maricopa Cty., 33 P.3d 499, 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (striking down eligibility 
requirements for healthcare benefits that excluded certain noncitizens in Arizona because the state-
law requirements could not withstand strict scrutiny); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1243 (Md. 
2006) (applying strict scrutiny and awarding healthcare benefits to noncitizens in Maryland because 
the eligibility requirements “discriminated in the provision of State-funded medical assistance 
benefits based on an alienage classification or sub-classification”); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 
754 N.E.2d 1085, 1094 (N.Y. 2001) (“Plaintiffs urge this Court to adopt strict scrutiny because 
section 122 [New York state Medicaid eligibility requirements] creates classifications based on 
alienage. The State argues that section 122 implements Federal immigration policy and therefore 
must merely withstand rational basis scrutiny. We agree with plaintiffs.”); see also Graham, 403 
U.S. at 378–81 (discussing the federal exclusivity principle in the context of cash assistance welfare 
programs); Commonwealth of Pa., Office of the Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter (Dec. 9, 1996) (binding 
opinion applying strict scrutiny and preserving lawfully present noncitizen eligibility for a state-
funded healthcare program). 
 91  Graham considered state statutes imposing alienage restrictions on cash assistance benefits. 
403 U.S. at 366. The Court noted that the states stipulated that the residency requirements 
“discourage[d] entry into or continued residency in the State [by noncitizens].” Id. at 379.  
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1. Origin of Exclusions 
The Social Security Act of 1935 is the cornerstone of the modern, 
federal social welfare system in the United States. It created a national 
system of retirement benefits and unemployment insurance and established 
the mechanism by which states receive federal funds to provide a range of 
public assistance.92 This Act was the foundation for the creation of Medicare, 
a health insurance program for aged Social Security recipients, and 
Medicaid, a health insurance program for low-income people, in 1965.93  
While Medicare has always enjoyed popular approval, Medicaid has 
long been “burdened by the stigma of public assistance.”94 Upon its 
establishment, Medicaid was widely regarded as an extension of existing, 
state-centric “welfare medicine” programs, such as Kerr-Mills.95 Although 
both programs are funded primarily through federal income taxes, public 
misperceptions of the funding sources have contributed to the idea of distinct 
programs for distinct populations: there is a belief that Medicare is funded 
solely through employer payroll taxes and premiums paid by beneficiaries.96 
Medicaid, on the other hand, is jointly funded by the state and federal 
governments, and state funding comes primarily from state general fund 
appropriations.97 The federal government provides matching funds to states 
at the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rate to provide 
medical assistance to certain categories of low-income people.98  
While Medicare can be described as a type of national health insurance 
on account of its “uniform national standards for eligibility and benefits,” 
 
 92  See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 269–70 (1982). 
 93  Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286. The beneficiaries 
and services covered by Medicare have expanded significantly since its founding. See, e.g., Social 
Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec.  201(b)(1), 299I,  86 Stat. 1329, 1370–74, 
1463–64 (expanding eligibility to people under the age of sixty-five with long-term disabilities and 
people with end-stage renal disease). 
 94  STARR, supra note 92, at 370.  
 95  Id. at 369 (describing Medicaid as “expanded assistance to the states for medical care for 
the poor”). Medicaid has been criticized as both “under-theorized and underfunded.” Huberfeld, 
supra note 34, at 432. In establishing Medicaid, Congress did not explicitly grapple with the 
humanitarian, solidaristic, or other possible justifications for federal funding of healthcare for low-
income people; rather, it “built on what came before; the program was remarkably path dependent.” 
Id. at 449. 
 96  See David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and 
Popular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873, 923 (2014) (describing public beliefs about the 
self-sufficiency of social insurance programs like Medicare and the reality of how their 
redistributive nature has been concealed); id. at 928 (“The myth of self-sufficiency of first-tier 
programs [like Medicare], along with the appeal of the populations they serve, has resulted in 
considerable political strength, low stigma for beneficiaries, and generally respectful, deferential 
program administration.”). 
 97  ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42640, MEDICAID FINANCING AND 
EXPENDITURES 1–4 (2015). 
 98  Id. 
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Medicaid cannot be characterized as uniform because of the considerable 
flexibility that states have to design and implement the program.99 Although 
states are required to provide Medicaid to applicants who fall within 
mandatory coverage groups, the number of which has increased over time, 
states make their own decisions about whether to take advantage of federal 
matching funds to expand coverage to additional groups.100  
Given the distinct characters of Medicare and Medicaid, it is not 
surprising that each program’s restrictions on noncitizen eligibility evolved 
differently. The law governing Medicare eligibility has always contained 
alienage restrictions.101 Medicaid, by contrast, did not initially have any 
federal restriction on noncitizen eligibility.102 Rather, it required states to 
cover “all individuals” who fell within the mandatory coverage groups, 
without reference to citizenship or immigration status.103 In 1971, only eight 
states had alienage-based eligibility restrictions for any federally funded 
welfare programs.104 Most states provided Medicaid to all otherwise eligible 
people, without regard to citizenship or immigration status.105 
 
 99  STARR, supra note 92, at 370. 
 100  See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N (MACPAC), MANDATORY AND 
OPTIONAL ENROLLEES AND SERVICES IN MEDICAID 5 tbl.1-1 (2017) (summarizing mandatory and 
optional Medicaid eligibility groups).  
 101  Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 103(4), 79 Stat. 286, 333 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2(a)(3)(B)) (relating to alienage restrictions in Part A 
eligibility); id. at § 1836 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395o) (relating to alienage 
restrictions in Part B eligibility). The Supreme Court affirmed the federal government’s authority 
to impose a five-year bar on Medicare eligibility for lawful permanent residents in Mathews v. Diaz, 
stating that “Congress may decide that as the alien’s tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his 
claim to an equal share of that munificence.” 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 102  See Sharon F. Carton, The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien Eligibility for 
Public Benefits, 14 NOVA L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1990) (“It was only in the 1970s that states began 
to restrict eligibility for state-administered federal programs such as [Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children] or welfare.”); Steven Sacco & Sarika Saxena, Permanently Residing Under 
Color of Law: A Practitioner’s Guide to an Ambiguous Doctrine, 23 CUNY L. REV. 364, 369 
(2020) (citing Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1211 (2d Cir. 1992)) (“Between the original 
enactment of Medicaid in 1965 and 1973, there were actually no [federal] citizenship-based 
restrictions on Medicaid . . . .”); Charles Wheeler, Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits: Part I, 88-
11 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1988) (“Twenty years ago there were no restrictions on alien access to 
public benefits.”). 
 103  Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1902(a)(10), 79 Stat. 286, 345. 
Regulations promulgated in 1971 clarified that there was no federal limit on noncitizen eligibility 
for Medicaid. 45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1972). States were explicitly authorized, and in some cases 
required, to provide Medicaid to individuals “without regard to citizenship status,” a group that 
included undocumented immigrants. Id. 
 104  See Citizenship and Alienage, 38 Fed. Reg. 16911 (June 27, 1973). 
 105  See, e.g., Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 1181–82 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that “[f]rom 
Medicaid’s inception in 1965 until the promulgation of the Secretary’s alienage requirement in 
1973, New York State provided federally participating Medicaid benefits to all otherwise eligible 
aliens”); see also Fox, supra note 48, at 1053 (noting that “[s]tates were free to enact their own 
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It was not until 1973 that the federal government began to make 
centralized policy on immigrant eligibility for Medicaid. That year, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—the federal agency 
that administered Medicaid at the time—promulgated a regulation imposing 
the first alienage-based restriction on Medicaid, mandating the exclusion of 
undocumented immigrants.106 In 1986, a federal district court invalidated the 
regulation, holding that it had no statutory basis.107 In part to respond to this 
decision, Congress passed a law codifying the exclusion of certain 
noncitizens from Medicaid, namely those who were not LPRs or 
PRUCOL.108 The law also created a waiver of the alienage restriction in 
Medicaid for coverage of emergency services, known as Emergency 
Medicaid.109 
2. The Emergency Medicaid Exception  
Emergency Medicaid authorizes federal reimbursement to states for 
“such care and services [that] are necessary for the treatment of an 
emergency medical condition” for people who would be eligible for 
Medicaid but for the alienage restriction, including undocumented 
noncitizens.110 In all fifty states, Emergency Medicaid authorizes payments 
for care and services related to childbirth (labor and delivery), but not 
prenatal care.111 States then reimburse healthcare providers—typically 
hospitals—that provide such care and services.112 Emergency Medicaid is 
not intended to cover preventive healthcare or follow-up care for patients 
discharged from the hospital after treatment of an emergency medical 
 
alienage-based restrictions on jointly funded programs, but in 1970 only Texas required Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children . . . and Medicaid recipients to be U.S. citizens” and stating that 
“Arizona and eight other states barred noncitizens from some of their other welfare programs, but 
the vast majority of states did not ask applicants about their legal status”). 
 106  45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1974).  
 107  Lewis, 663 F. Supp. 1164. 
 108  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 
2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (providing that, with the exception of Emergency 
Medicaid, “no payment may be made to a State under this section for medical assistance furnished 
to an alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing 
in the United States under color of law”). 
 109  Id. 
 110  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9406(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(1)–(3) (2018). 
 111  C. Annette DuBard & Mark W. Massing, Trends in Emergency Medicaid Expenditures for 
Recent and Undocumented Immigrants, 297 JAMA 1085, 1085–86 (2007) (“Federal funds cannot 
be applied toward Medicaid coverage of any services that fall outside of this definition, such as 
routine prenatal care.”). 
 112  MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N (MACPAC), THE MEDICAID FEE-FOR-
SERVICE PROVIDER PAYMENT PROCESS 3 (2018), http://www.macpac.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Medicaid-Fee-For-Service-Provider-Payment-Process.pdf. 
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condition.113 
Since Emergency Medicaid is available to noncitizens excluded from 
Medicaid eligibility, and states have options to expand or restrict Medicaid 
to noncitizens, the types of noncitizens who qualify for it in each state vary. 
For example, a Texas resident who became an LPR through marriage six 
years ago would not qualify for Medicaid because of their immigration 
status.114 However, if they suffered a traumatic injury, they would likely 
qualify for Emergency Medicaid to reimburse their providers for treatment 
received in the emergency room, but not for follow-up care.115 By contrast, 
a Pennsylvania resident in the same situation would qualify for Medicaid, 
which would cover the emergency room visit, hospitalization (if necessary), 
and any follow-up care.116 
Depending on the state, Emergency Medicaid can look like health 
insurance. In some states, residents can apply for Emergency Medicaid 
coverage in advance of treatment;117 in others, residents can only apply after 
receiving treatment for an emergency medical condition or labor and 
 
 113  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 380 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting congressional intent that 
Emergency Medicaid only cover “medical care that is strictly of an emergency nature”). 
 114  See Texas Medicaid, BENEFITS.GOV, http://www.benefits.gov/benefit/1640 (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2020) (listing Texas’s eligibility requirements). Because Texas did not expand Medicaid 
under the ACA, eligibility is very restrictive for non-disabled, non-elderly U.S. citizen adults as 
well. However, such a person could qualify under the Medicaid for Parents and Caretaker Relatives 
Program, 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 366.707, .713 (2020), if their income is low enough. See Texas 
Works Handbook: C-100, Income Limits and Proration Charts: C-131.2 Medically Needy and 
Parents and Caretaker Relatives Medicaid, TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 1, 2020), 
http://hhs.texas.gov/laws-regulations/handbooks/twh/part-c-appendix/c-100-income-limits-
proration-charts#C131.2 (indicating an income limit of $285 per month for a two-parent family of 
four, for example, which is equivalent to 13% of the Federal Poverty Level). The LPR described 
here would not qualify for the program under § 366.713(3). See Texas Works Handbook: A-300, 
Citizenship: A-342 TANF and Medical Programs Alien Status Eligibility Charts: Chart C, TEX. 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 1, 2020), http://hhs.texas.gov/laws-
regulations/handbooks/twh/part-a-determining-eligibility/section-300-citizenship#A342. 
 115  Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual § 4.3.1, TEX. MEDICAID & HEALTHCARE 
PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 2020), http://www.tmhp.com/Manuals_HTML1/TMPPM/Current/index.html 
(click “Section 4: Client Eligibility” dropdown, then click “4.3 Restricted Medicaid Coverage” 
dropdown, then click “4.3.1 Emergency Only” hyperlink) (specifying services covered). 
 116  Medical Assistance Eligibility Handbook § 322.31–.311, PA. DEP’T HUM. SERVS., 
http://services.dpw.state.pa.us/oimpolicymanuals/ma/Medical_Assistance_Handbook.htm (last 
updated Oct. 5, 2018) (in left-hand sidebar, under “Contents,” click “322 Citizen Noncitizen” 
dropdown, then click “322.3 Non-Citizen Status” dropdown, then click “322.31_Qualified_Non-
Citizens” hyperlink) (describing LPR eligibility for Medicaid after completing the five-year bar). 
Because Pennsylvania has expanded Medicaid, the LPR in this situation would qualify with a 
higher income, up to 138% of the FPL. 
 117  See, e.g., Medicaid for the Treatment of an Emergency Medical Condition (“Emergency 
Medicaid”), N.Y.C. HUM. RESOURCES ADMIN., DEP’T SOC. SERVS. (2016), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ochia/downloads/pdf/fly-957-emergency-medicaid-english.pdf 
(noting New Yorkers’ ability to pre-apply for Emergency Medicaid and obtain coverage for twelve-
month periods). 
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delivery.118 States have significant discretion to define, within certain limits, 
the “emergency medical conditions” (EMCs) that will be covered by 
Emergency Medicaid. There is enormous variation in the types of conditions 
that states have deemed to fall within the federal statutory definition. For 
example, only twelve states and the District of Columbia characterize End 
Stage Kidney Disease (ESKD) as an EMC.119 An estimated 6000 
undocumented noncitizens have ESKD.120 The standard treatment option for 
ESKD is thrice-weekly dialysis or a kidney transplant.121 Emergency 
Medicaid does not cover organ transplants or antirejection medications,122 
but the states that have recognized ESKD as an EMC enable Medicaid-
ineligible noncitizens to receive routine dialysis rather than wait until they 
are “in nearly critical condition” to obtain it on an emergency basis.123 
Studies have found that “[u]ndocumented immigrants with ESKD that rely 
on emergency-only hemodialysis describe significant physical and 
psychosocial distress”; that they spend “tenfold more time in the hospital and 
less time in the outpatient setting compared with those receiving standard 
hemodialysis”; and that their mortality is fourteen times higher than those 
receiving the standard treatment.124 
It is fairly simple for a state to begin classifying ESKD as an EMC. The 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
generally defer to state interpretations of the term “EMC.”125 They have not 
contested state requests for reimbursement of dialysis treatment through 
 
 118  See, e.g. Texas Medicaid Provider Procedures Manual, supra note 115, § 4.3.1 (noting that 
in Texas, “[c]ertification for emergency Medicaid occurs after the services have been provided”). 
 119  See Lilia Cervantes, William Mundo & Neil R. Powe, The Status of Provision of Standard 
Outpatient Dialysis for US Undocumented Immigrants with ESKD, 14 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y 
NEPHROLOGY 1258, 1259 (2019); see also Carolyn Crist, Scheduled Dialysis for Undocumented 
Immigrants Saves Money and Lives, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2018, 11:19 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-immigrants-dialysis/sched…is-for-undocumented-
immigrants-saves-money-and-lives-idUSKCN1OR17Z.  
 120  David Ansell, Kristen Pallok, Marieli D. Guzman, Marycarmen Flores & Jose Oberholzer, 
Illinois Law Opens Door to Kidney Transplants for Undocumented Immigrants, 34 HEALTH AFF. 
781, 783 (2015).  
 121  Id. (transplant); Crist, supra note 119 (thrice-weekly dialysis). 
 122  Vanessa Grubbs, Undocumented Immigrants and Kidney Transplant: Costs and 
Controversy, 33 HEALTH AFF. 332, 334 (2014) (noting that Emergency Medicaid does not pay for 
transplants); Emergency Medical Coverage for Noncitizens, ILL. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 21, 
2003), http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=19608 (“Organ transplants and related services, 
such as anti-rejection drugs are not covered under this program.”); Medicaid for the Treatment of 
an Emergency Medical Condition Fact Sheet, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/emergency_medical_condition_faq.htm (last 
updated Dec. 2013). 
 123  See Cervantes et al., supra note 119, at 1258. 
 124  Id.  
 125  Id. at 1259.  
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Emergency Medicaid.126 Colorado’s Department of Health Care Policy and 
Financing recently announced a policy change that will enable its residents 
with ESKD to obtain Emergency Medicaid coverage for routine dialysis.127 
However, states need not pass a law or even submit a State Plan Amendment 
in order to cover a broader range of conditions under Emergency 
Medicaid.128 The state agency administering Medicaid could simply begin 
interpreting the term EMC more broadly, so long as the interpretation can be 
justified as reasonable under the federal definition.  
3. Increasing Exclusion Under PRWORA 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996 (PRWORA) heralded a new era of restrictions on noncitizen 
eligibility for public benefits, and PRWORA is the framework for the laws 
governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid today.129 Anti-poor and anti-
immigrant animus collided in 1996 to impose dramatic restrictions on 
noncitizen eligibility for public benefits, including Medicaid.130 PRWORA 
limited eligibility for federal public benefits to citizens and “qualified 
aliens,” a term first used in the Act.131 Noncitizens who do not have statuses 
that fall within the definition of “qualified alien” are generally ineligible for 
Medicaid.132 Undocumented noncitizens were already barred from Medicaid, 
but PRWORA provided an opportunity for lawmakers to clarify the limited 
 
 126  Id. 
 127  See COLO. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE POLICY & FIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: 
EMERGENCY MEDICAID & END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE POLICY 1–3 (2019), 
http://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/ESRD%20Emergency%20Medicaid%20FAQ
%20Updated%201-31-19.pdf.  
 128  See Eilis O’Neill, Transplants a Cheaper, Better Option for Undocumented Immigrants with 
Kidney Failure, NPR (May 12, 2019, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2019/05/12/721800514/transplants-a-cheaper-better-option-for-
undocumented-immigrants-with-kidney-fail (describing how some states, like Washington, are 
“quietly expanding” Emergency Medicaid coverage to include scheduled, rather than emergency-
only, dialysis). 
 129  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 8 
U.S.C.). 
 130  See Amanda Levinson, Immigrants and Welfare Use, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Aug. 1, 
2002), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-and-welfare-use (noting that 
“[a]pproximately 935,000 noncitizens lost benefits due to the passage of the [PRWORA]” and “[a]t 
the time of PRWORA’s passage in 1996, immigrants represented 15 percent of all welfare 
recipients in the U.S.,” but “[b]y 1999, that number dropped to 12 percent”). 
 131  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261–62 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. and 8 
U.S.C. § 1611) (stating that only qualified noncitizens are eligible for federal public benefits); id. 
§ 431, § 431, 110 Stat. at 431 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1641) (defining “qualified alien”). 
 132  8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2018); see Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 249–54, for an overview of 
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid. 
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scope of services eligible for reimbursement under Emergency Medicaid.133  
PRWORA created a new, lower federal “ceiling” of Medicaid 
eligibility for lawfully present noncitizens, who were hit the hardest by its 
restrictions. Many previously eligible, lawfully present noncitizens were 
barred from eligibility, and even qualified noncitizens faced a new barrier to 
eligibility: the five-year bar. Qualified noncitizens are generally barred from 
eligibility for federal public benefits for five years,134 although individuals 
holding certain statuses are exempt from this bar.135 
TABLE 1. PRE- AND POST-PRWORA ELIGIBILITY OF SELECTED CATEGORIES 
OF NONCITIZENS FOR MEDICAID136 
 
Broad Categories of Noncitizens Pre-PRWORA Post-PRWORA 
Lawful permanent residents (LPRs), 
generally 
Eligible.137 LPRs with 40 or more qualifying work 
quarters are eligible.138 
States have the option to provide to: 
(1) LPRs with fewer than 40 qualifying work 
quarters who arrived before August 22, 
1996;139 and 
(2) LPRs with fewer than 40 qualifying work 
quarters who arrived on or after August 22, 
1996, and who have held LPR status for at 
least 5 years.140 
 
Refugees and asylees (including former Eligible.141 Eligible for first 7 years; state option after 7 
 
 133  Emergency Medicaid, discussed infra in Section I.B.2, was not affected by PRWORA’s new 
restrictions. However, the PRWORA House conferees emphasized that the types of services to be 
covered under Emergency Medicaid are very limited. H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 380 (1996) (Conf. 
Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2768 (noting that “[t]he allowance for emergency 
medical services under Medicaid is very narrow” and that “[t]he conferees intend[ed] that it only 
apply to medical care that is strictly of an emergency nature, such as medical treatment administered 
in an emergency room, critical care unit, or intensive care unit” and did not intend it to include or 
cover “prenatal or delivery care assistance that is not strictly of an emergency nature”). 
 134  8 U.S.C. § 1613 (2018). 
 135  Id. § 1613(b) (listing categories of qualified noncitizens who are exempt from the five-year 
bar). 
 136  Id. § 1612(b) (governing eligibility of qualified noncitizens for Medicaid). 
 137  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 
2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (limiting participation in Medicaid to U.S. citizens, 
LPRs, and PRUCOL noncitizens). 
 138  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(B) (noting, however, that a quarter of work is not counted if it 
occurred after 1996 and the noncitizen received a federal means-tested public benefit during that 
period). 
 139  See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1); see also id. § 1612(b)(2)(B) (requiring coverage of LPRs with 
40 or more qualifying work quarters). 
 140  See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1); see also id. § 1612(b)(2)(B); id. § 1613 (2010) (imposing five-
year bar on qualified aliens who enter after enactment). 
 141  Refugees and asylees without LPR status were considered PRUCOL. See Boswell, supra 
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refugees and asylees with LPR status)  years.142 
Veterans and noncitizens on active duty 
(a subgroup of LPRs) 
Eligible.143 Eligible.144 
Persons residing in the United States 
under color of law (PRUCOL)  
Eligible.145 Emergency Medicaid only.146 
Lawfully present noncitizens in a 
temporary status (e.g., tourists, 
students, temporary workers) 
Emergency Medicaid 
only.147 
Emergency Medicaid only.148 
Undocumented Emergency Medicaid 
only.149 
Emergency Medicaid only.150 
 
Section 402(b) of PRWORA created a federal “floor” of Medicaid 
coverage by requiring states that participate in Medicaid to include select 
categories of noncitizens. In general, these include: 
• LPRs with 40 or more qualifying work quarters;151 
 
note 72, at 1488. Therefore, they were eligible under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)). 
 142  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 143  As LPRs, these individuals qualify under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)). 
 144  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(C). 
 145  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 
2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (limiting participation in Medicaid to U.S. citizens, 
LPRs, and PRUCOL noncitizens). 
 146  See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (1996) (defining qualified alien and not including a category of 
PRUCOL noncitizens); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (1996) (describing the Emergency Medicaid 
exception from the restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits for non-qualified aliens); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (1996) (mechanism of reimbursement). 
 147  Although the definition of “PRUCOL” is imprecise, people with temporary status do not fit 
the definition of a “person [] in the United States with the INS’s tacit, if not explicit, permission to 
remain [permanently].” Boswell, supra note 72, at 1488. Rather, they have explicit permission to 
remain temporarily. New York’s interpretation of PRUCOL aligns with this understanding. See, 
e.g., Medicaid for Immigrants Who Are Not Permanent Residents (Do Not Have “Green Cards”)— 
PRUCOL and Temporary Non-Immigrant Eligibility, supra note 71 (stating that persons who 
entered with a temporary visa and have not filed for permanent immigration status or relief are not 
considered PRUCOL); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (providing the mechanism of 
reimbursement for emergency medical care). 
 148 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (1996) (defining qualified alien to include LPRs, along with other 
limited categories, but not including a general category of lawfully present noncitizens who are not 
LPRs); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (describing the Emergency Medicaid exception from the 
restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits for non-qualified aliens); 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396b(v)(2)(A). In 2009, however, Congress passed a law giving states the option to cover lawfully 
residing children and/or pregnant women through Medicaid. See infra Section I.B.4. 
 149  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 
2057 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1982)) (limiting participation in Medicaid to U.S. citizens, 
LPRs, and PRUCOL noncitizens). 
 150  See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (defining qualified alien to include, among others, LPRs but not 
undocumented noncitizens); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (describing the Emergency Medicaid 
exception from the restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits for non-qualified aliens); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1396b(v)(2)(A). 
 151  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(B) (2018). 
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• Qualified noncitizens with a military connection;152 
• Certain humanitarian immigrants within seven years of receiving 
such status;153  
• Certain noncitizen American Indians;154 and  
• Noncitizens receiving Medicaid based on Supplemental Security 
Income.155 
 
PRWORA did not create anything close to a uniform national policy on 
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid.156 It devolved considerable authority to 
the states to restrict noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid between the statutory 
floor and ceiling. States now had the authority to make critical decisions 
about whether to impose restrictions on various categories of noncitizens in 
Medicaid, including qualified noncitizens.157 They were not merely 
incorporated into a federal scheme; they were given broad discretion within 
the federal scheme to create wide-ranging policies on noncitizen eligibility 
for Medicaid. For example, states can expand or restrict eligibility for 
Medicaid to LPRs who do not otherwise fall into one of the mandatory 
noncitizen coverage groups.158 Another example is that states can extend or 
bar Medicaid eligibility to humanitarian immigrants after their first seven 
years in such status.159  
As a result of this new discretion, shortly after PRWORA became 
effective, Louisiana and Wyoming barred most LPRs from Medicaid 
eligibility entirely.160 Currently, Wyoming and Texas have the most 
restrictive noncitizen eligibility criteria for Medicaid, setting eligibility at or 
near the federal floor of Medicaid coverage: LPRs who entered the country 
on or after August 22, 1996—the date PRWORA was enacted—are 
 
 152  Id. § 1612(b)(2)(C). 
 153  Id. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i) (describing this group as “refugees and asylees”). 
 154  Id. § 1612(b)(2)(E). 
 155  Id. § 1612(b)(2)(F). Noncitizen eligibility for SSI is described in § 1612(a). 
 156  See generally WENDY ZIMMERMANN & KAREN C. TUMLIN, URBAN INST., PATCHWORK 
POLICIES: STATE ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS UNDER WELFARE REFORM (1999), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/69586/309007-Patchwork-Policies-State-
Assistance-for-Immigrants-under-Welfare-Reform.PDF. 
 157  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (2018).  
 158  8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1) (authorizing states to determine eligibility for qualified noncitizens); 
8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2) (describing mandatory coverage categories); 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(1) (defining 
“qualified alien” to include LPRs). PRWORA does not permit states to extend Medicaid eligibility 
to LPRs who arrived after PRWORA was enacted, who have not held qualified status for at least 
five years, and who do not otherwise fall into one of the mandatory noncitizen coverage groups. 8 
U.S.C. § 1613 (imposing five-year bar on public benefits eligibility for qualified noncitizens who 
entered the United States after PRWORA was enacted). 
 159  See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(2)(A)(i) (listing time-limited exceptions to a state’s authority to 
determine eligibility for Medicaid). 
 160  Wishnie, supra note 6, at 495 n.9.  
2020.11.09. MAKHLOUF. LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2020  10:25 AM 
December 2020] LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION  129 
 
generally ineligible for Medicaid, even after completing the five-year bar, 
unless they have credit for forty quarters of work history in the United 
States.161 Wyoming went a step further than Texas by excluding even those 
LPRs who entered the country before August 22, 1996—that is, it went no 
higher than the federal floor of Medicaid coverage.162 
States were also authorized to impose restrictive criteria on noncitizens 
that were previously unknown in the Medicaid program, such as durational 
residency requirements and time limits.163 They also had virtually free reign 
to impose alienage-based restrictions on public benefits that are funded and 
administered solely by state governments, subject only to a federally 
imposed floor that is even lower than the floor for Medicaid described above 
and, in the case of discrimination against LPRs, to equal protection 
principles.164 
4. State Options to Expand Coverage for Children and Pregnant Women 
In the years following PRWORA’s implementation, the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) gave 
states the option to cover lawfully residing children and/or pregnant women 
through Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), a 
program with a higher overall income threshold than Medicaid.165 These are 
 
 161  MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note 29, 
at 5. Both states have elected options to slightly expand Medicaid eligibility: Wyoming has elected 
the option to expand Medicaid to lawfully residing pregnant women. Id. at 5. Texas has elected to 
expand Medicaid and CHIP to lawfully residing children and is one of the largest beneficiaries of 
reimbursement through the CHIP unborn child option, which provides maternity care to pregnant 
people regardless of citizenship or immigration status. Id.; Julia Belluz & Nina Martin, The 
Extraordinary Danger of Being Pregnant and Uninsured in Texas, VOX (Dec. 19, 2019), 
http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/12/6/20995227/women-health-care-maternal-
mortality-insurance-texas (“CHIP Perinate [in Texas] provides benefits to about 33,000 women a 
month, regardless of their immigration status, up to 202 percent of the federal poverty level.”). 
Nevertheless, the limitations of the program and barriers to access mean that “Texas [still] has the 
highest rate of uninsured women of reproductive age in the country . . . In some counties, mainly 
along the Mexico border, that estimate approaches 40 percent.” Id. 
 162  See Table 6 Qualified Immigration Status – Wyoming Eligibility Online Manual, WYO. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH (Mar. 1 2016), http://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/ecom/tables/table6 (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2020). 
 163  See Wishnie, supra note 6, at 495 n.9 (describing Connecticut’s six-month residency 
requirement, Washington’s twelve-month residency requirement, and Indiana’s two-year eligibility 
limit for Medicaid that applied to noncitizens only). 
 164  See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2018) (allowing states “to determine the eligibility for any State 
public benefits” except as provided in § 1622(b)); id. § 1622(b) (providing exceptions for, among 
others, certain noncitizens who are subject to withholding of deportation for the first five years they 
hold such status, certain refugees and asylees for the first five years they hold such status, LPRs 
with 40 or more qualifying work quarters, and certain veterans); infra Section III.A. 
 165  Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, § 
214, 123 Stat. 8, 56–57 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397gg(e)(1)(N) (2018)); see 
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known as the Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act (ICHIA) 
options because they were initially proposed in a Senate bill by that name in 
2007.166 The ICHIA options restored eligibility for federally funded health 
coverage to a subset of noncitizens who had been eligible for Medicaid pre-
PRWORA: children and/or pregnant women who are LPRs and subject to 
the five-year bar or who have a non-qualified lawful status.167  The ICHIA 
options enjoyed broad, bipartisan support from both houses of Congress, the 
National Governors Association, and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures.168 Advocates for the ICHIA options were motivated to address 
the disparity in health coverage between citizen and noncitizen children 
caused by PRWORA’s alienage restrictions, which was impacting 
noncitizen children’s health as well as healthcare system efficiency.169 Many 
treatable conditions affecting children and pregnant women can be addressed 
in a cost-effective manner through primary and preventive care, which 
Medicaid and CHIP cover.170 Although the ICHIA options were a positive 
development from a health policy perspective, they contribute to the 
geographic variability of noncitizen access to health coverage because not 
all states have elected them.  
In order to elect one or both ICHIA options, a state must submit a state 
plan amendment under the Medicaid program or under the Medicaid and 
CHIP programs to CMS.171 The state must specify whether it is electing the 
option for pregnant women, for children, or for both.172 States receive 
funding at an enhanced federal matching rate for individuals served by CHIP 
or for CHIP-funded Medicaid expansions, including noncitizens.173 
 
2010 Letter from Cindy Mann, supra note 68, at 1; Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibility Limits 
for Children as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 1, 2020), 
http://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-and-chip-income-eligibility-limits-for-
children-as-a-percent-of-the-federal-poverty-level (showing that CHIP has a higher overall income 
threshold than Medicaid).  
 166  Legal Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2007, S. 764, 110th Cong. § 2 
(2007).  
 167  See supra Table 1. 
 168  See e.g., LEIGHTON KU, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, REDUCING DISPARITIES 
IN HEALTH COVERAGE FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANT CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN 3–4 (2007), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-20-07health2.pdf. 
 169 See id. at 2–3 (describing disparities in access to care faced by immigrant children and 
suggesting that health insurance coverage can ameliorate these disparities). 
 170  See Mara Youdelman, Q&A on ICHIA: The Legal Immigrant Children’s Health 
Improvement Act, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 3 (June 2013), http://healthlaw.org/resource/q-a-
the-legal-immigrant-childrens-health-improvement-act. 
 171  2010 Letter from Cindy Mann, supra note 68, at 5. 
 172  Id. 
 173  See id. (noting that children eligible for Medicaid or CHIP under the CHIPRA § 214 option 
are considered “targeted low-income children,” who are eligible for the enhanced federal matching 
rate). However, because CHIP is a fixed block grant, a state would not receive more funding at the 
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Currently, the enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (eFMAP) 
for CHIP ranges from 76.50% in Wyoming to 95.93% in Mississippi.174 
States that have elected the option to expand CHIP to lawfully residing 
pregnant women receive funding at the Medicaid match rate.175 Federal 
matching rates for Medicaid and CHIP are designed to induce and enable 
states to expand their publicly funded health programs or maintain them 
during recessions.176 
As of January 2020, thirty-five states have adopted the ICHIA option to 
expand Medicaid coverage to lawfully residing children, and twenty-four of 
those states have also expanded CHIP to this population.177 In twenty states, 
lawfully residing children became eligible for Medicaid and/or CHIP shortly 
after CHIPRA was enacted, in 2009-2010.178 Political scientists have studied 
how temporal sequences of events and processes can explain policy 
trajectories.179 For example, Jacobs and Callaghan have found that states’ 
past policy decisions to expand access to Medicaid may have predisposed 
them to adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion.180 The mechanism explaining 
these policy outcomes is that established policies “generate both identities 
and groups that equate their interests with programmatic continuation and 
 
eFMAP after electing the ICHIA option unless it is not already using all its available federal CHIP 
funds or it is eligible for a shortfall funding source. See id. at 8–9; see also Tricia Brooks, CHIP 
Funding Has Been Extended, What’s Next for Children’s Health Coverage?, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG 
(Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180130.116879/full. 
 174  Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for CHIP, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/state-category/medicaid-chip/chip (follow “Enhanced Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for CHIP” and navigate to “Map,” ensuring that “FY 
2021” is selected in the “Timeframe” dropdown menu) (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). 
 175  NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., FACTS ABOUT FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STATES TO 
PROVIDE HEALTH COVERAGE TO IMMIGRANT CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN 5 (2010), 
http://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/2020-01/facts-about-federal-funding-for-states-to-
provide-health-coverage-to-immigrant-children-and-pregnant-women.pdf. 
 176  See Genevieve Kenney & Victoria Lynch, Monitoring Children’s Health Insurance 
Coverage Under CHIPRA Using Federal Surveys, in DATABASES FOR ESTIMATING HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN 66–67 (2010) (describing the role of eFMAP in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the ACA). 
 177  TRICIA BROOKS, LAUREN ROYGARDNER, SAMANTHA ARTIGA, OLIVIA PHAM & RACHEL 
DOLAN, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND CHIP ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT, AND COST 
SHARING POLICIES AS OF JANUARY 2020: FINDINGS FROM A 50-STATE SURVEY 37 tbl.2 (2020), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicaid-and-CHIP-Eligibility,-Enrollment-and-Cost-
Sharing-Policies-as-of-January-2020.pdf.  
178 JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, EXPANDING COVERAGE FOR 
RECENT IMMIGRANTS: CHIPRA GIVES STATES NEW OPTIONS 6–7 
(2010), http://research.policyarchive.org/96110.pdf. 
 179  See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 
14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 72–73 (2000). 
 180  Lawrence R. Jacobs & Timothy Callaghan, Why States Expand Medicaid: Party, Resources, 
and History, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1023, 1038 (2013).  
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expansion and generate resources to mobilize beneficiaries.”181 The term for 
this temporal process is “path dependence,” which, in the simplest terms, 
holds that “[i]nitial moves in a particular direction encourage further 
movement along the same path.”182 Early events or processes are more 
significant in influencing the development of future policies than later events 
or processes.183 Although a full analysis of whether path dependence is at 
work in states’ decisions to expand noncitizen eligibility would be beyond 
the scope of this Article, I highlight some data points in this Section 
suggesting that this may be the case.   
Fewer states have adopted the ICHIA option to expand Medicaid or 
CHIP coverage to lawfully residing pregnant women than have expanded 
coverage to lawfully residing children. Twenty-five states have expanded 
Medicaid to lawfully residing pregnant women, and three of those states 
(Colorado, New Jersey, and Virginia) have done the same for CHIP 
coverage.184 The trend in state adoptions of this option is similar to the 
pattern described for the ICHIA option for lawfully residing children. Most 
of the states that have elected the ICHIA option to expand Medicaid to 
lawfully residing pregnant women adopted it soon after CHIPRA was 
enacted.185 
Of the states that elected one or both ICHIA options shortly after 
CHIPRA was enacted, many were already using state funds to provide 
coverage to LPR children or pregnant women who were excluded from 
Medicaid because of the five-year bar.186 For these states, it should have been 
an easy decision to elect the ICHIA options from the perspective of 
maximizing net resources, taking advantage of the available federal 
matching funds to subsidize care for these populations. A somewhat 
surprising finding, however, is that several “very different and diverse 
states” that had not subsidized coverage of these populations using state 
 
 181  Id. at 1037; see also id. at 1038 (“[T]he policy trajectory of widening access may have 
generated identities, interests, and resources that predispose states—in conjunction with other 
factors—to support adoption of the [ACA’s] Medicaid expansion.”).  
 182  Pierson, supra note 178, at 74.  
 183  Id. at 75 (“[O]utcomes of early events or processes in the sequence are amplified, while later 
events or processes are dampened. . . . [E]arly stages in a sequence can place particular aspects of 
political systems onto distinct tracks, which are then reinforced through time.”). 
 184  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 38 tbl.4. 
 185  See JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, EXPANDING COVERAGE FOR RECENT 
IMMIGRANTS: CHIPRA GIVES STATES NEW OPTIONS 6–7 (2010), 
http://research.policyarchive.org/96110.pdf (noting that seventeen states adopted the ICHIA option 
for lawfully residing pregnant women between 2009 and 2010). 
 186  LEIGHTON KU & MARIELLEN JEWERS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., HEALTH CARE FOR 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES: CURRENT POLICIES AND ISSUES 5 (2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/COI-HealthCare.pdf (describing 
states’ reactions to the ICHIA option to cover legal permanent resident pregnant women following 
passage of CHIPRA).  
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funds elected to expand Medicaid to lawfully residing noncitizen children 
under the ICHIA option.187 These include Illinois, Iowa, Montana, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.188 This 
suggests that the infusion of federal funds via ICHIA made a difference in 
states’ ability to expand coverage to this population. One might infer that 
prior to ICHIA, they desired, but could not afford, to expand coverage to 
lawfully residing noncitizen children. These decisions were particularly 
noteworthy because they indicated the states’ willingness to commit funds 
to a Medicaid expansion for noncitizens during a recession.189 These 
expansions may demonstrate that even during an economic downturn, it is 
possible to obtain bipartisan support for efforts to fill healthcare coverage 
gaps.190  
Another finding is that the eFMAP for CHIP that applies to the ICHIA 
option for lawfully residing children has not generally induced states to adopt 
it if they are ideologically or otherwise opposed to it, much as political 
ideology has influenced some states to decline significant funding for 
expanding Medicaid under the ACA.191 Figure 1 is a map of states depicting 
whether they have elected one, both, or neither of the ICHIA options. Figure 
2 displays the eFMAP for each state. Notably, several states that would 
receive the “best deals” for adopting the ICHIA child option have not done 
so. These include Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Tennessee. 
FIGURE 1. STATES THAT HAVE ELECTED ONE OR BOTH ICHIA OPTIONS192 
[Printer: Insert Figure 1 here] 
FIGURE 2. ENHANCED FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (EFMAP) 
FOR CHIP, FY2020193 
[Printer: Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Perhaps indicating the role of path dependence, all seven of the 
jurisdictions that have created robust self-funded programs to provide health 
coverage for low-income undocumented noncitizens and DACA recipients 
 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. 
 189  See id. at 5–6. 
 190  Id. at 6.  
 191  See Charles Barrilleaux & Carlisle Rainey, The Politics of Need: Examining Governors’ 
Decisions to Oppose the “Obamacare” Medicaid Expansion, 14 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 437, 447–
49 (2014) (analyzing empirical data to show that political considerations had greater influence on 
state decisions to not adopt Medicaid expansion than considerations of need and economics).  
 192  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 13 fig.9. 
 193  Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for CHIP, supra note 174. 
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(which are discussed in the next Section) were among the earliest adopters 
of the ICHIA options.194 This may indicate a link between state decisions to 
expand Medicaid generally and state decisions to elect noncitizen-specific 
expansion options. 
Another option states can use to receive federal reimbursement for 
providing pregnancy-related care regardless of citizenship or immigration 
status is the “unborn child option.”195 In states that have elected this option, 
any person who is pregnant and otherwise qualifies for CHIP can receive 
subsidized, limited-scope coverage of prenatal care, labor, and delivery.196 
From the time the federal rulemaking for the unborn child option was 
announced, states understood it as a means to subsidize maternity care for 
undocumented noncitizens.197 At least some agency staff, on the other hand, 
did not seem to appreciate or did not want to acknowledge this use of the 
option until after states began submitting claims for reimbursement of 
services provided to pregnant undocumented noncitizens.198 This oversight 
by the federal government betrays the “incidental”—as opposed to 
intentional—nature of many federal policies relating to noncitizen access to 
Medicaid. 
As of January 2020, seventeen states have elected the CHIP unborn 
child option to provide limited-scope coverage to pregnant women, 
regardless of their citizenship or immigration status.199 In a curious twist, 
conservative political ideology favors CHIP expansion under the unborn 
 
 194  California, Washington, D.C., Massachusetts, New York, and Washington elected both 
ICHIA options in 2009. SULLIVAN, supra note 184, at 6–7. Illinois and Oregon elected the ICHIA 
Child option only in 2009, but already covered prenatal care for excluded noncitizens through the 
unborn child option. Id. 
 195  See State Children’s Health Insurance Program; Eligibility for Prenatal Care and Other 
Health Services for Unborn Children, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956, 61,974 (Oct. 2, 2002) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. § 457.10) (revising the definition of “child” to mean a person from conception through age 
19 for purposes of CHIP coverage). This revision was controversial, not only because pro-choice 
advocates considered it to be a step toward establishing legal personhood for fetuses, but also 
because it “put the unborn children of undocumented women in competition with already born 
children for diminishing SCHIP resources.” Patricia Gray, Unborn v. Undocumented: A Collision 
of Policy and Politics, HEALTH L. PERSP., Jan. 2008, at 1, 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/(PG)%20CHIP%20peri.pdf. 
 196  States have considerable flexibility to define pregnancy-related care and treatments to 
prevent complications in pregnancy if they elect the option, but postpartum services cannot be 
covered under the option because they are not provided to the child. 67 Fed. Reg. at 61,969. 
 197  See Gray, supra note 194, at 1–2.  
 198  See id. at 2 (describing how CMS initially denied Louisiana’s claim for reimbursement on 
the ground that “the federal enabling legislation does not authorize service to undocumented 
residents”). HHS states that the unborn child option avoids PRWORA’s prohibition on providing 
federal public benefits to certain noncitizens because “[A]n unborn child is not an alien, and the 
status of the child is not necessarily tied to the status of the mother.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 61,966. 
 199  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 40 tbl.3. Some states may restrict benefits under this 
option for certain income categories. See id. at 41–42. 
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child option: Half of the states that have adopted it are red states.200 It is 
possible that the option’s association with fetal personhood has dissuaded 
more blue states from adopting it.201  
Of the five states with the largest share of undocumented noncitizens, 
only California and Texas have elected this option.202 Indeed, California and 
Texas are the largest beneficiaries of the unborn child option, with nearly 
116,000 and 96,000 enrolled, respectively, in 2016.203 
Of the seventeen states that have adopted the unborn child option, seven 
have also elected the ICHIA option for expansion of full-scope Medicaid or 
CHIP coverage for lawfully residing pregnant women: Arkansas, California, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Washington, and Wisconsin.204 Four 
are blue states (California, Massachusetts,  Minnesota, Washington), and 
three are red states (Arkansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin).205 
Although a detailed analysis of the states’ motivations for making these 
choices is beyond the scope of this paper, the big picture seems to indicate 
that states do not always choose to adopt policies that maximize health 
system efficiency and equity, whether that is due to ideological, fiscal, or 
other reasons.206 
 
 200  This characterization is based on a state’s popular vote for the Democratic or Republican 
presidential candidate in the 2016 presidential election. See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Election 
Results, 270TOWIN, http://www.270towin.com/maps/2016-actual-electoral-map (last updated July 
20, 2017) (showing the winner of the popular vote in each state for the 2016 presidential election). 
Support for this option is part of a conservative strategy to consistently recognize unborn children 
as full human beings, with the goal of overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding 
that the decision whether or not to seek an abortion falls within the constitutional right of privacy). 
 201  See, e.g., ELIZABETH RICH, NAT’L FAMILY PLANNING & REPROD. HEALTH ASS’N, POLICY 
SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVING ACCESS TO COVERAGE FOR IMMIGRANTS 3 (2016), 
http://www.nationalfamilyplanning.org/file/documents—-policy-briefs/ImmigrationReport.pdf 
(“Health equity advocates . . . oppose this policy because . . . underlying the conferral of prenatal 
and maternity coverage is the notion that fetuses are functionally awarded personhood status and 
therefore rights to health care through the [unborn child option].”).  
 202  The states with the largest share of undocumented noncitizens in the population are Nevada 
(7.2%), California (6.8%), Texas (6.7%), New Jersey (6.2%), and Arizona (6.0%). PEW HISPANIC 
CTR., PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE 
TRENDS, 2010, at 15 tbl.5 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: 
NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS], http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/reports/133.pdf. California and Texas are also the only two of the top five 
states with the largest share of undocumented noncitizens in the workforce to have elected the 
unborn child option. The share is 9.7% in California and 9% in Texas. Id. at 21 tbl.A1. The other 
states in the top five are Nevada (10%), New Jersey (8.6%), and Arizona (7.4%). Id. 
 203  MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, FACT SHEET: STATE CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM (CHIP) 16–17 tbl.5 (2018), http://www.macpac.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/State-Childrens-Health-Insurance-Program-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
 204  BROOKS ET AL., supra note 177, at 40 tbl.3. 
 205  See 2016 Presidential Election Results, supra note 199. 
 206  See Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 179, at 1040 (finding that political party orientation, 
economic circumstances, previous policy trajectories, and administrative capacity influence states’ 
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5. Maintenance of Exclusions Under the ACA 
In 2010, after lengthy debate and compromise, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA)207 transformed health law and policy by 
moving the U.S. healthcare system closer to universal coverage. A key 
provision of the ACA created a new, mandatory category of Medicaid 
eligibility for adults with incomes up to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL).208 Until the passage of the ACA, states were required to cover only 
those adults who met both financial and categorical eligibility criteria. The 
latter criterion consisted of various categories of “deserving poor,” which 
have historically included families with dependent children, people with 
disabilities, people who are blind, and the elderly.209 The ACA’s attempt to 
create a new baseline of Medicaid coverage for low-income adults was a 
major shift in the law of publicly funded healthcare.210 However, a successful 
legal challenge rendered the Medicaid expansion optional for states, 
foreclosing a guarantee of near-universal coverage of low-income people 
through Medicaid.211 
 
decisions to expand Medicaid under the ACA); Joshua Meyer-Gutbrod, Between National 
Polarization and Local Ideology: The Impact of Partisan Competition on State Medicaid 
Expansion Decisions, 50 PUBLIUS 237, 238–39 (2019) (describing the role of strong inter-party 
competition in mitigating partisan decisionmaking among Republican-controlled states regarding 
Medicaid expansion under the ACA); Jamila Michener, Race, Politics, and the Affordable Care 
Act, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 547, 551 (2020) (describing studies that found racialized 
politics played a role in states’ decisions to expand Medicaid under the ACA). 
 207  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and I.R.C.). 
 208  ACA § 2001(a)(1)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018). This is the effective 
minimum income limit for Medicaid eligibility under the ACA expansion, taking into account a 
standard income disregard of five percentage points of the federal poverty level. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (establishing the 133% FPL income limit); 42 C.F.R. § 435.603(d)(4) 
(2019) (describing the 5% income disregard).  
 209  42 U.S.C. § 1396-1. Since the establishment of welfare medicine, Medicaid and its 
precursors were benefits restricted to the “deserving poor,” what some commentators describe as 
“poor plus.” See Nicole Huberfeld, NFIB v. Sebelius at 5, 12 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
48, 51 (2017).  
 210  See Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 450 (“Considering that the welfare/deserving poor/medical 
assistance connection dates to colonial America, this is a sea change.”); Super, supra note 96, at 
930 (suggesting that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was the most decisive move against the 
concept of the deserving poor in decades because it, “[a]part from undocumented immigrants, . . . 
recognizes all people’s need for health care—and on surprisingly equal terms”). 
 211  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012) (holding that states could 
not be penalized for failing to expand Medicaid). At the time of publication, the number of states 
that have not expanded Medicaid is small and declining. See Alex Smith, Missouri Voters Approve 
Medicaid Expansion Despite Resistance from Republican Leaders, NPR: SHOTS (Aug. 5, 2020, 
11:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/05/898899246/missouri-voters-
approve-medicaid-expansion-despite-resistance-from-republican-le (noting that thirty-eight states 
plus the District of Columbia had expanded Medicaid as of August 2020). The states that have held 
out on expanding Medicaid tend to be states with very high levels of uninsurance and large 
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Nevertheless, the ACA played a critical role in reducing the national 
uninsured rate from 15.5% to a historic low of 8.6% in 2016.212 It also 
represented a remarkable expansion of the federal government’s role in 
subsidizing health coverage for low- and middle-income people living in the 
United States. This occurred through two main mechanisms: the 
aforementioned Medicaid expansion, the costs of which are borne almost 
entirely by the federal government; and  new subsidies for income-qualifying 
consumers who purchase private health insurance on the ACA 
Marketplaces.213  
Despite its success with increasing access to health coverage, the ACA 
maintained PRWORA’s framework of alienage restrictions for Medicaid 
eligibility.214 The result is a nationally uniform policy of federal Medicaid 
exclusion for millions of noncitizens living in the United States, including 
undocumented noncitizens, recipients of DACA,215 and a handful of others; 
 
noncitizen populations, e.g., Texas and Florida. JENNIFER TOLBERT, KENDAL ORGERA, NATALIE 
SINGER & ANTHONY DAMICO, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FACTS ABOUT THE UNINSURED 
POPULATION 6, 14 tbl.A (2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Key-Facts-about-the-
Uninsured-Population; see infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 212  MATT BROADDUS & AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
UNINSURED RATE ROSE AGAIN IN 2019, FURTHER ERODING EARLIER PROGRESS 4 (2020), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/9-15-20health.pdf. 
 213  ACA § 1321, 124 Stat. at 186–87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041); id. §§ 1401(a), 10105(a)–
(c), 10108(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 213–19, 906, 914 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B); Huberfeld, 
supra note 34, at 432, 450–51; see also Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health 
Insurance Subsidies, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2020), http://www.kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-questions-about-health (“The ACA offers 
subsidies to reduce monthly premiums and out-of-pocket costs in an effort to expand access to 
affordable health insurance for moderate and low-income people . . . .”). 
 214  Some lawfully present but non-qualified noncitizens benefited from eligibility for the 
premium tax credits associated with health insurance purchases on the new ACA Marketplaces. 
Theoretically, lawfully present immigrants would also benefit from eligibility for Basic Health 
Programs (BHPs), established by ACA § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 18051. BHPs are health plans for 
individuals who earn slightly too much to qualify for Medicaid or who are lawfully present yet 
ineligible for Medicaid due to their immigration status. STAN DORN, MATTHEW BUETTGENS & 
CAITLIN CARROLL, HEALTH POLICY CTR., URBAN INST., USING THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM 
TO MAKE COVERAGE MORE AFFORDABLE TO LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: A PROMISING 
APPROACH FOR MANY STATES 1 (2011), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27596/412412-Using-the-Basic-Health-
Program-to-Make-Coverage-More-Affordable-to-Low-Income-Households-A-Promising-
Approach-for-Many-States.PDF. However, only two states—New York and Minnesota—have 
elected to establish Basic Health Programs. See, e.g., Basic Health Program, MEDICAID.GOV, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/basic-health-program/index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2020); see also 
Michelle Andrews, Few States Use Health Law Option for Low-Cost Plans, NPR: SHOTS (Feb. 2, 
2016, 10:33 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/02/02/465184081/few-states-
use-health-law-option-for-low-cost-plans (describing Basic Health Programs). 
 215  DACA is one category of deferred action, which is “a use of prosecutorial discretion to defer 
removal action against an individual for a certain period of time.” Consideration of Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., 
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and a patchwork of state policies governing Medicaid eligibility for lawfully 
present noncitizens. Although millions of people, many of them low-income, 
remain uninsured for reasons unrelated to legal eligibility for subsidized 
health coverage,216 low-income noncitizens are the only ones who are 
disqualified from Medicaid as a matter of law. In short, the progressive 
reform to universalize Medicaid eligibility for low-income people did not 
extend to noncitizens.  
The ACA did expand access to subsidized health coverage for a subset 
of noncitizens who are excluded from Medicaid through the subsidies 
offered for health insurance purchased on the Marketplace. Although the 
alienage criterion for Marketplace participation is complex, it is nationally 
uniform: only “lawfully present immigrants” are eligible.217 Noncitizens who 
are considered lawfully present and who earn income up to 400% of the FPL 
may benefit from the Marketplace’s subsidies.218 However, consumers 
 
http://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2020). Although deferred action is not technically an immigration status, it permits 
individuals who qualify to reside in the United States for a limited time period and, in some cases, 
provides work authorization. Id. Most individuals with deferred action are considered “lawfully 
present” in the United States and are therefore eligible for Marketplace coverage. Immigrants: 
Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/immigrants/lawfully-present-immigrants (last visited Aug. 10, 2020) 
(stating that lawfully present noncitizens can purchase insurance on the Health Insurance 
Marketplace); Immigrants: Immigration Status and the Marketplace, supra note 66 (listing 
Deferred Action Status among noncitizens who qualify to use the Marketplaces, and noting the 
exception for DACA recipients). DACA recipients, however, were specifically excluded from 
eligibility for those programs as ACA coverage was not deemed to fall within the intended scope 
of DACA status. See Fatma Marouf, Alienage Classifications and the Denial of Health Care to 
Dreamers, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1271, 1279–83 (2016). DACA recipients are effectively treated 
as undocumented immigrants for purposes of eligibility for federally funded health coverage 
programs. See Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, supra (noting that only 
lawfully present immigrants are eligible); Immigrants: Immigration Status and the Marketplace, 
supra note 66 (excluding DACA as an immigration status eligible for coverage). 
 216  Munira Z. Gunja & Sara R. Collins, Who Are the Remaining Uninsured, and Why Do They 
Lack Coverage?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 28, 2019), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/aug/who-are-remaining-
uninsured-and-why-do-they-lack-coverage (noting that despite the passage of the ACA, many 
people remain uninsured, and uninsured working-age adults are disproportionately low-income). 
 217  See Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, supra note 214. 
 218  I.R.C. 36B(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2018); Health Coverage of Immigrants, supra note 10. The ACA 
provides that individuals with income between 100% and 400% of the FPL are eligible for 
Marketplace subsidies. RACHEL GARFIELD, KENDAL ORGERA & ANTHONY DAMICO, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE GAP: UNINSURED POOR ADULTS IN STATES THAT DO NOT 
EXPAND MEDICAID 2 (2020), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Coverage-Gap-
Uninsured-Poor-Adults-in-States-that-Do-Not-Expand-Medicaid. It was presumed that individuals 
with income below 100% of the FPL would be eligible for Medicaid instead because of the 
mandatory expansion. See id. at 1. Congress realized, however, that some lawfully present 
noncitizens with income below 100% of the FPL would be barred from Medicaid because of their 
immigration status, and specially provided that such noncitizens could purchase subsidized 
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generally consider Marketplace coverage to be inferior to Medicaid because 
of cost-sharing obligations, even if they are subsidized.219 Some participants 
would qualify for premium-free “bronze” plans,220 but they would then be 
responsible for paying a higher deductible for costs associated with non-
preventive care.221  
Although some excluded noncitizens may be eligible for subsidized 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), it is unavailable or unaffordable to 
many.222 The federal government subsidizes the provision of ESI through a 
tax exclusion for employer and employee contributions to health insurance 
premiums.223 Noncitizens who work for employers that offer ESI are eligible 
 
Marketplace coverage. Sonya Schwartz, A Step Forward for Lawfully Present Immigrants Living 
in Poverty, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST.: CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAM. (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/2014/12/11/step-forward-covering-lawfully-present-immigrant-
families-living-poverty. When NFIB v. Sebelius decentralized the Medicaid expansion decision and 
some states chose not to expand Medicaid, it created a coverage gap for citizens and noncitizens 
who qualify for Medicaid and whose income is below 100% of the FPL but above the income limit 
for Medicaid in their state. GARFIELD ET AL., supra, at 1 (noting that the median income limit for 
Medicaid eligibility in non-expansion states is 40%). Oddly, this means that lawfully present 
noncitizens who live in non-expansion states, who are ineligible for Medicaid, and whose income 
falls in this range are in a better position than their citizen and Medicaid-eligible noncitizen 
counterparts: the former can purchase subsidized Marketplace coverage and the latter cannot. See 
Schwartz, supra.  
 219  See Aaron E. Carroll & Austin Frakt, Don’t Assume that Private Insurance Is Better than 
Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/upshot/dont-assume-
that-private-insurance-is-better-than-medicaid.html (describing a study that found that “poorer and 
sicker people — exactly the kind more likely to be on Medicaid — were slightly more likely to 
die” if they were enrolled in insurance that required cost sharing than if they were enrolled in 
insurance without cost sharing).  
 220  Rachel Fehr, Cynthia Cox & Matthew Rae, How Many of the Uninsured Can Purchase a 
Marketplace Plan for Free in 2020?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
http://www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/how-many-of-the-uninsured-can-purchase-a-
marketplace-plan-for-free-in-2020. 
 221  See Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance Subsidies, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2020), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-
care-reform-questions-about-health; Fehr et al., supra note 219. 
 222  See Health Coverage of Immigrants, supra note 10 (discussing low-income noncitizens’ 
limited access to ESI and, when it is offered, the challenge of affording it). 
 223  See Employee Benefits, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits (last updated 
Jan. 16, 2020) (discussing tax exclusions for employer contributions); Topic No. 502 Medical and 
Dental Expenses, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc502 (last 
updated June 26, 2020) (discussing tax exclusions for employee contributions). Employer 
contributions are not treated as wages, which are subject to payroll taxes. Tax Policy Center 
Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: Taxes and Health Care, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
(May 2020), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-
book/taxes_and_health_care_1.pdf (describing income tax exclusion for employee contributions to 
health insurance premiums and estimating that the exclusion from income and payroll taxes reduced 
government revenue by $273 billion in 2019).  
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to enroll on the same terms as citizens.224 The federal government is 
effectively subsidizing health insurance for these noncitizens through the 
federal tax exclusions on payroll and income tax. Notably, this group 
includes DACA recipients, who are ineligible for both Medicaid and 
Marketplace insurance because of their status.225 Other categories of lawfully 
present noncitizens whose ESI is subsidized through the tax exclusion may 
be ineligible for Medicaid but eligible for subsidized Marketplace 
coverage.226  
In addition to tax exclusions for employer health benefits, the federal 
government may subsidize health coverage for certain noncitizens on the 
same terms it does for citizens, through other deductions or exclusions.227 
These subsidies, while important, are unlikely to benefit the population of 
focus in this Article, low-income noncitizens who are excluded from 
Medicaid because of their immigration status, because they are designed for 
people for whom purchasing health insurance is an option. 
C. State-Funded Programs 
This Section describes state-funded programs that are intended to 
 
 224  However, noncitizens generally are more “often employed in low-wage jobs and industries 
that are less likely to offer employer-sponsored coverage.” See, e.g., Health Coverage of 
Immigrants, supra note 10. Undocumented noncitizens—who may make up approximately one 
quarter of the foreign-born population in the United States—are much less likely than citizens to 
be offered ESI. ARTIGA & DIAZ, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that undocumented noncitizens often 
work in low-wage positions that do not offer ESI); Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. 
Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Aug. 20, 2020), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants (finding 23% of immigrants in 2017 to be 
“unauthorized”). This may be because undocumented noncitizens lack work authorization and 
therefore work “off the books.” 
 225  KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY FACTS ON INDIVIDUALS ELIGIBLE FOR THE DEFERRED 
ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) PROGRAM 2 (2018), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-Key-Facts-on-Individuals-Eligible-for-the-DACA-
Program (noting Medicaid and Marketplace ineligibility); Immigrants: Immigration Status and the 
Marketplace, supra note 66 (noting Marketplace ineligibility).  
 226  These include, among others, temporary agricultural and non-agricultural workers, 
temporary specialty occupation workers, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients and 
applicants with employment authorization, asylum applicants with employment authorization, 
Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) recipients, applicants for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 
Deferred Action Status recipients (except DACA recipients), applicants for adjustment to LPR 
status, and LPRs, depending on their state of residence. Immigrants: Coverage for Lawfully Present 
Immigrants, supra note 214 (listing Medicaid-qualifying immigration statutes); Immigrants: 
Immigration Status and the Marketplace, supra note 66. Given that noncitizens are more likely to 
be low-income, they are less likely to take up ESI even when it is offered. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
supra note 10 (visually depicting in Figure 5 how noncitizens are more likely to be low-income). 
 227  See ALISON SISKIN & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43561, TREATMENT 
OF NONCITIZENS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 5 (2016); Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: 
Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: Taxes and Health Care, supra note 222, at 5–6 (discussing 
various subsidies besides the exclusion for employer contributions to health insurance). 
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subsidize health coverage for noncitizens who are excluded from Medicaid 
and/or premium tax credits associated with health insurance purchases on the 
ACA Marketplaces. This group may include undocumented noncitizens, 
DACA recipients, and, in some cases, lawfully present noncitizens who are 
otherwise excluded from Medicaid. As a general rule, PRWORA maintained 
state discretion to expand noncitizen eligibility for state-funded public 
benefits. However, it created an obstacle to enacting immigrant-inclusive 
policy in the form of  two interlocking provisions: (1) an express prohibition 
on most state- and locally-funded benefits for certain non-qualified 
noncitizens, including all undocumented noncitizens; and (2) a new 
requirement that states desiring to provide undocumented noncitizens with 
otherwise prohibited state or local benefits must authorize such provision 
through state law.228 
Six states— California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and 
Washington—and Washington, D.C., have created programs to provide 
health coverage for all children who reside in the jurisdiction regardless of 
immigration status, which includes otherwise excluded noncitizen 
children.229 Politically, all seven jurisdictions are Democratic strongholds, 
and all have elected to expand Medicaid.230 Although five states—California, 
Florida, Texas, New York, and New Jersey—are home to more than half of 
undocumented noncitizens living in the United States, twenty-two states 
have at least 100,000 undocumented noncitizen residents.231 Of the five 
states with the highest percentage of undocumented noncitizen residents,232 
only California has created a state-funded health coverage program for 
 
 228  8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (d) (2018). These provisions should not be read to require that a state 
legislature enact a statute to opt out of the prohibition on providing state and local benefits to 
undocumented noncitizens. Rather, “any state enactment with the force of law is [likely] sufficient 
to opt out of the federal prohibition.” David A. Super, Options for State and Local Governments to 
Aid Low-Income Immigrants 5 (May 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). For 
a detailed analysis of the requirements of section 1621(d), see id. at 3–8. 
 229  ERICA WILLIAMS, ERIC FIGUEROA & WESLEY THARPE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO IMMIGRANTS WHO ARE UNDOCUMENTED CAN HELP 
FAMILIES AND STATES PROSPER 15-16 (2019) [hereinafter CBPP REPORT], 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-21-19sfp.pdf. 
 230  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Democratic States Exceed Republican States by Four in 2018, 
GALLUP (Feb. 22, 2019), http://news.gallup.com/poll/247025/democratic-states-exceed-
republican-states-four-2018.aspx (classifying each state’s political party leaning and strength of 
lean); Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(July 27, 2020), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-
decisions-interactive-map. 
 231  CBPP REPORT, supra note 228, at 3.  
 232  See 2010 UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 
supra note 201, at 15 tbl.5 (identifying Nevada, California, Texas, New Jersey, and Arizona as the 
five states with the largest share of unauthorized immigrants in their population).  
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excluded noncitizens.233 Of the four states with the highest share of 
undocumented noncitizens in the workplace,234 again, only California is on 
this list.235 Using median household income as a measure of wealth, all seven 
jurisdictions are in the top half.236  
A review of state-funded health coverage programs for excluded 
noncitizens reveals significant diversity in program design. One 
commonality is that the programs in all seven jurisdictions treat income-
qualifying children as special, offering comprehensive health coverage to 
this population.237 However, some states define that category as people under 
age nineteen,238 and others as under age twenty-one. Going one step further, 
California began covering income-qualifying young adults ages nineteen to 
twenty-six in 2020.239 Health and immigration advocates, along with 
California Governor Gavin Newsom, see this expansion as an incremental 
step towards universal coverage of California residents.240 
The upper range of income eligibility for state programs varies 
considerably, as do policies relating to cost sharing by enrollees. For 
example, New York’s Child Health Plus program is available to all children 
 
 233  Bobby Allyn, California Is 1st State To Offer Health Benefits to Adult Undocumented 
Immigrants, NPR (July 10, 2019), http://www.npr.org/2019/07/10/740147546/california-first-
state-to-offer-health-benefits-to-adult-undocumented-immigrants. 
 234  U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Estimates by State, 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/interactives/u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-by-state 
(identifying Nevada, California, Texas, and New Jersey as the four states with the largest share of 
unauthorized immigrants in their workforce). 
 235  Id. 
 236  See Historical Income Tables: Households, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, tbl.H-8 (Sept. 8, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-
households.html (setting out data in current dollars). 
 237  See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note 
29, at 1–5. 
 238  See, e.g., About All Kids, ILL. DEP’T HEALTHCARE & FAM. SERVS., 
http://www.illinois.gov/hfs/MedicalPrograms/AllKids/Pages/about.aspx (last visited July 18, 
2020). 
 239  See S.B. 104, 2019-20 Reg. Sess., ch. 67 § 3 (Cal. 2019); see also Press Release, California 
Dep’t of Healthcare Servs., DHCS Expands Medi-Cal Young-Adult Eligibility, Restores Benefits, 
Adds Childhood-Trauma Screening in 2020 (Dec. 30, 2019), 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/publications/oc/Documents/2019/19-03-DHCS-
EXPANDS-YOUNG-ADULT-ELIGIBILITY.pdf (explaining that the coverage extension was 
designed to mimic the ACA provision that permits young adults up to age 26 to be covered by their 
parents’ private health insurance). 
 240  Sammy Caiola, Regardless of Immigration Status, All Low-Income Californians Up to Age 
26 Can Now Sign Up for Medi-Cal, CAPRADIO (Jan. 6, 2020), 
http://www.capradio.org/articles/2020/01/06/regardless-of-immigration-status-all-low-income-
californians-up-to-age-26-can-now-sign-up-for-medi-cal; Sammy Caiola, Young Undocumented 
Californians Cheer Promise of Health Benefits, NPR: SHOTS (July 11, 2019, 2:48 PM) [hereinafter 
Caiola, Promise of Health Benefits] http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/07/11/739536305/young-undocumented-californians-cheer-promise-of-health-
benefits. 
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regardless of immigration status or income.241 There is no cost sharing for 
households with income up to 160% FPL, and households with income up 
to 400% FPL have to pay a subsidized monthly premium on an income-based 
sliding scale ranging from $9 to $60 per child.242 Households with income at 
400% FPL and above can still receive coverage through the program at full 
cost.243 By contrast, Washington’s Apple Health for Kids has an income limit 
of 317% FPL.244 There is no cost sharing for households with income up to 
215% FPL.245 For households with an income between 215% FPL and 265% 
FPL, the monthly premium is $20 per child with a $40 family maximum.246 
For other households, the monthly premium is $30 per child with a $60 
family maximum.247 
Another way in which it appears states and the District of Columbia 
have sought to reduce costs is to limit adult eligibility for programs based on 
the type of medical service needed. The DC Healthcare Alliance, a locally 
funded program in Washington, D.C., covers basic primary and secondary 
services.248 The program does not cover vision, mental/behavioral health, 
and substance abuse services; non-emergency transportation services; long-
term care longer than thirty days; cosmetic surgery; open heart surgery; 
organ transplantation; and dental services costing more than $1000.249 New 
York, California, Illinois, and Oregon all use state funds to cover prenatal 
care for residents, regardless of citizenship or immigration status.250 
Massachusetts provides comprehensive coverage for pregnant residents with 
an income up to 200% FPL.251 Illinois’s program also covers kidney 
 
 241  Child Health Plus, N.Y.C. OFF. OF CITYWIDE HEALTH INS. ACCESS, 
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ochia/coverage-care/child-health-plus.page (last visited Aug. 3, 2020). 
 242  N.Y.C. OFFICE OF CITYWIDE HEALTH INS. ACCESS, CHILD HEALTH PLUS YEARLY INCOME 
ELIGIBILITY AND MONTHLY PREMIUMS (2020), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ochia/downloads/pdf/child_health_plus.pdf. At each income level, 
there is a maximum monthly premium for a household regardless of the number of children. For 
example, for households with income from 160–222% FPL, the maximum monthly premium is 
$27 per month, while it is $180 per month for a family with household income between 350–400% 
FPL. Id.  
 243  Id. 
 244  Health Care Services and Supports – Children, WASH. ST. HEALTH AUTHORITY, 
http://www.hca.wa.gov/health-care-services-supports/apple-health-medicaid-coverage/children 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2020); see also Federal Poverty Level (FPL), HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 245  Health Care Services and Supports – Children, supra note 244.  
 246  Id. 
 247  Id. 
 248  See Health Care Alliance, DC.GOV, http://dhcf.dc.gov/service/health-care-alliance (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
 249  Id. 
 250  MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note 29, 
at 1–2, 4. 
 251  Id. at 3. 
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transplants for people with end-stage renal disease,252 while California’s 
program also covers long-term care,253 dialysis,254 anti-rejection medication 
for organ transplant recipients,255 and breast and cervical cancer treatment.256 
It appears that these coverage limitations are a mechanism for states to 
conserve costs—in some cases, by excluding coverage of elective or 
expensive services; in others, by choosing to cover cost-effective services.  
It is clear that there is no template for state-funded programs covering 
excluded noncitizens. Given the unique fiscal environment and demographic 
composition of each state, along with the common fiscal constraint of a lack 
of federal funding, true experimentation in programs covering excluded 
noncitizens at the state level has been thwarted. Likewise, no clear lessons 
have emerged from the last two-and-a-half decades of state policymaking on 
publicly funded health coverage for noncitizens in general. States that want 
to expand coverage for health policy reasons are forced to ration limited 
resources, experimenting with ever-narrower categories of eligibility. This 
patchwork of state policies on coverage and exclusion of noncitizens means 
that for low-income noncitizens, the only certainty is that access to 
healthcare is uncertain. What is inevitable, however, is the patchwork’s link 
with undesirable policy outcomes. 
II 
PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING PATCHWORK OF EXCLUSION 
All states have either already confronted or may soon confront the 
reality that a meaningful percentage of state residents lack access to 
affordable insurance because they are legally barred from eligibility for 
federal subsidies because of their immigration status. Undocumented 
noncitizens live in every state.257 Demographic trends indicate that certain 
states with historically low numbers of undocumented noncitizens have 
 
 252  See Ansell et al., supra note 120, at 782, 785.  
 253  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14007.2, 14.007.65 (West 2018). 
 254  See Eilis O’Neill, ‘It’s a Terrible Existence’: The Crisis of Emergency Dialysis Care for 
Undocumented Immigrants, NATION (July 8, 2019), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/archive/dialysis-health-immigration (noting that California 
“decided to define kidney failure as a ‘permanent emergency’ covered by Medicaid, allowing all 
patients to qualify for regular dialysis, paid for by state taxpayers”). 
 255  See WELF. & INST. § 14132.70; Letter No. 11-02 from Toby Douglas, Director, Cal. Dep’t 
of Health Care Servs., to All County Welfare Directors, All County Administrative Officers, All 
County Medi-Cal Program Specialists/Liaisons, All County Health Executives, All County Mental 
Health Directors, at 2 (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-
cal/eligibility/letters/Documents/c11-02.pdf. 
 256  See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 104161-104163 (discussing California’s state-
funded Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program).  
 257  2010 UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, supra 
note 201, at 15. It is also true that only a few states are home to the largest concentrations of 
undocumented noncitizens. Id.  
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become top destinations over the past decade, and other states that were 
previously top destinations have become less attractive.258 Shifts in 
immigration policy and labor needs have an impact on where undocumented 
noncitizens settle, and settlement patterns are likely to change over time.259  
This Part provides a lens through which to understand how states have 
exercised their options to restrict noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded 
coverage in a way that weakens national health policy. It closes by 
examining the particularly salient, distortive role that racism plays in 
skewing health policy away from its normative goals. 
A. Goals Versus Drivers of Health Policy 
In one sense, PRWORA entrenched a national program of immigration 
restrictionism in public benefits eligibility by limiting the availability of 
federal funds for noncitizen recipients of public benefits. In another sense, 
PRWORA may be interpreted as an abdication of federal responsibility for 
making uniform federal policy on noncitizen eligibility for public benefits. 
In the current arrangement, states can make policies on eligibility for 
Medicaid along a spectrum from universally inclusive to nearly exclusive of 
noncitizens.260 
 Aside from state adoptions of the federal ICHIA and unborn child 
options, state policies relating to noncitizen access to health coverage have 
stagnated instead of responding to demographic changes since 1996. Most 
states have failed to use health policy changes to acknowledge the robust 
evidence indicating that inclusive approaches can improve population health 
outcomes and community well-being, reduce healthcare inequity, and 
benefit state and local economies in the long term.261 Very few states have 
 
 258 Id. (describing Georgia and North Carolina as new destination states); id. at 2 (noting a 
decline in the population of undocumented immigrants in Colorado, Florida, New York, and 
Virginia).  
 259 Id. at 17 (“State patterns differ widely, but generally states with large numbers or shares of 
unauthorized immigrants also have relatively large numbers or shares in the workforce.”); cf. Rob 
Paral et al., Growing the Heartland: How Immigrants Offset Population Decline and an Aging 
Workforce in Midwest Metropolitan Areas, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFF. (June 2014), 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/GrowingHeartland_June2014.pdf (noting that 
“[i]mmigrants play a key role in the Midwest economy because the Midwest’s Baby Boomers are 
moving into retirement and the native-born population as a whole is aging,” whereas “[i]mmigrants 
are predominantly young adults, and they help to fill precisely [these declining] age groups,” and 
asserting that “thousands of immigrants from around the globe choose the Midwest as the place 
they want to live”).  
 260 See supra notes 134–170 and accompanying text.  
 261 See CBPP REPORT, supra note 228, at 2 (describing the benefits of expanding health 
coverage to all children regardless of immigration status); Glen, supra note 46, at 221–24 
(discussing the system-wide cost savings that could be achieved by extending health coverage to 
unauthorized immigrants). Regarding state health policy’s effect on increasing healthcare inequity 
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engaged in serious efforts to address the health coverage needs of 
undocumented noncitizens.262 Predictably, the few states that have elected to 
use state funds to expand coverage to undocumented noncitizens tend to fall 
on the progressive end of the political spectrum.263 They also tend to have a 
more expansive view of the state’s responsibility for ensuring residents’ 
access to health coverage, as demonstrated by their decisions to expand 
Medicaid under the ACA.264 A larger number—and a more politically 
diverse collection—of states have chosen to take advantage of federal 
matching funds by electing options to expand Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully 
residing but excluded noncitizens.265 As described in Section I.B, even some 
states that would stand to benefit in terms of population health and net 
resource maximization by expanding coverage for noncitizens have chosen 
not to do so. 
State decisions to restrict or expand eligibility for Medicaid are 
influenced by several possible factors.266 Ideological polarization 
undoubtedly plays an important role.267 Researchers have also found that 
states’ economic circumstances, previous policy trajectories, and 
institutional capacity to implement health policy can affect their decisions to 
expand Medicaid.268 In some states, political actors and the electorate may 
favor restrictions on noncitizen eligibility that are based on racism,269 
nativism,270 and xenophobia.271 In others, economic or sovereignty-related 
concerns may be the dominant motivation for restrictive policy relating to 
noncitizens. Nevertheless, health policies that exclude noncitizens based on 
 
between citizens and noncitizens, one study found that restrictive alienage criteria in Medicaid had 
the biggest effect in states with the lowest levels of immigrant population density. Ling Zhu & Ping 
Xu, The Politics of Welfare Exclusion: Immigration and Disparity in Medicaid Coverage, 43 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 456, 457–58 (2015). 
 262  See supra Section I.C. 
 263  These states are California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington, as 
well as the District of Columbia. CBPP REPORT, supra note 228, at 15–16. 
 264  Parmet, supra note 6, at 234–35. 
 265  See discussion supra Sections I.B.1, I.B.3, I.B.4.  
 266  Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 179. 
 267  See Meyer-Gutbrod, supra note 205 (describing how national partisanship interacts with 
state politics to influence states’ decisions to expand Medicaid); Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 
179, at 1031 (describing how the “bubbling cauldron of party vitriol” in which the ACA was born 
spilled over into state implementation decisions).  
 268  Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 179, at 1031, 1033–40. 
 269  See Michener, supra note 205, at 551 (describing the racialized motivations of some states’ 
decisions to not expand Medicaid under the ACA and the disproportionate impact on people of 
color). 
 270  Nativism is defined as “the preference for native-born people of a given society.” Lilia 
Fernandez, Nativism and Xenophobia, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL HUMAN MIGRATION 1, 
1 (Immanuel Ness ed., 2013). 
 271  Xenophobia is defined as “the fear of foreigners or ‘others’ considered to be outsiders based 
on racial, ethnic, or national origin or religion.” Id. 
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the latter concerns are just as effective in impeding the advancement of 
health policy as those based on the former.272 
Even if one were to assume that states are well-motivated to advance 
health policy, there is considerable debate among academics and 
policymakers over what makes “good” health policy.273 In the decade since 
the passage of the ACA, however, certain frameworks have influenced 
academic and high-level political discussions of the goals of the U.S. health 
system. The Triple Aim framework, created by the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI), was designed to guide improvement efforts at the level 
of the healthcare organization, but it has been adapted for and integrated into 
national health system policy in the United States and other countries.274 The 
Triple Aim is the simultaneous pursuit of “improving the individual 
experience of care; improving the health of populations; and reducing the per 
capita costs of care for populations.”275 More pithily, the Triple Aim is 
“better care, better health, lower cost.”276  
Two common adaptations of the Triple Aim for national health system 
 
 272  See id. (describing how “purportedly economic concerns” can mask nativist and xenophobic 
policy); id. at 5 (describing how objections to illegal immigration are racially charged because of 
the overrepresentation of certain ethnic or national origin groups among the undocumented).  
 273  See Norman Daniels, The Ethics of Health Reform: Why We Should Care About Who Is 
Missing Coverage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (2012) (counseling that any discussion of how to 
allocate healthcare resources will involve reasonable disagreement based on differing values). 
 274  Gustavo Mery, Shilpi Majumder, Adalsteinn Brown & Mark J. Dobrow, What Do We Mean 
When We Talk About the Triple Aim? A Systematic Review of Evolving Definitions and Adaptations 
of the Framework at the Health System Level, 121 HEALTH POL’Y 629, 629–30 (2017) (“Despite 
numerous references by [IHI] about the implications of pursuing the Triple Aim for the healthcare 
system, the framework was proposed as the strategic organizing principle to guide improvement 
initiatives at the organization or local community level.”); John W. Whittington, Kevin Nolan, 
Ninon Lewis & Trissa Torres, Pursuing the Triple Aim: The First 7 Years, 93 MILBANK Q. 263, 
297 (2015) (“The concept of the Triple Aim is now widely used, both in the United States, where 
it has become a national model for implementing health care, and around the world.”). The Triple 
Aim was incorporated into the U.S. National Quality Strategy. See About the National Quality 
Strategy, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/workingforquality/about/index.html (last updated Mar. 2017) (describing the 
Strategy as building on the IHI’s Triple Aim); Maria Castellucci, Quality Experts Call for HHS to 
Revive the National Quality Strategy 10 Years after ACA, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 9, 2020, 1:00 
AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/safety-quality/quality-experts-call-hhs-revive-national-
quality-strategy-10-years-after-aca (stating that the “Strategy’s main objective was to achieve the 
Triple Aim: better care, healthier communities and lower costs”). The National Strategy has three 
similar aims: better care, healthy people/healthy communities, and affordable care. About the 
National Quality Strategy, supra; see also Mery et al., supra, at 634 (noting the similarity between 
the National Strategy and the Triple Aim and summarizing its goal as “to provide better, more 
affordable care for individuals and the community”). However, the Triple Aim’s creators made 
clear that it does not necessarily address all of the goals of a national healthcare system. Id. at 630. 
 275  Donald M. Berwick, Thomas W. Nolan & John Whittington, The Triple Aim: Care, Health, 
and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 760 (2008). 
 276  Donald M. Berwick, And We Said, “No,” in PROMISING CARE: HOW WE CAN RESCUE 
HEALTH CARE BY IMPROVING IT 249, 262 (2013). 
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policy are to replace the aim of “lower cost” with “better value” and include 
an additional aim of health equity.277 The first adaptation reflects the 
understanding that while reducing overall costs may be a worthwhile aim at 
the level of the healthcare provider, at the national health system level, a 
plateau or even an increase in expenditures may be justified by improved 
health outcomes.278 To achieve better value in a national health system is to 
become more cost-effective from a societal perspective.279 This means 
“achieving the best outcome at the lowest cost.”280 When all three aims are 
pursued simultaneously, the Triple Aim can itself be understood as a proxy 
for cost-effectiveness: The value of a particular reform is measured by its 
benefits of better health and better care divided by its cost.281 
Regarding the second adaptation, health equity may be defined as a state 
in which “everyone . . . [has] a fair opportunity to attain their full health 
potential.”282 It requires eliminating health inequities, which are “differences 
in health that are not only unnecessary and avoidable, but in addition, are 
considered unfair and unjust.”283 A related concept, healthcare equity, calls 
for the elimination of barriers to healthcare access that cause or exacerbate 
health inequities.284 Healthcare equity may be defined as “equal access to 
available care for equal need, equal utilization for equal need, equal quality 
of care for all.”285 Equity in access to high-quality healthcare is essential to 
 
 277  Mery et al., supra note 274, at 633. But see id. (noting that “replacing [‘lower cost’] with 
‘better value’ presents a problematic redundancy in the framework” because “[t]he Triple Aim is 
inherently a ‘value’ framework”).  
 278  See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Bradley & Amanda Brewster, Untangling The Relationship Between 
Social Service and Health Care Spending and Health Outcomes, HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Nov. 18, 
2019), 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191112.848045/full/?utm_source=Newsletter&u
tm_medium=email&utm_content=COVID-
19%3A+Prenatal+Care+And+Delivery%2C+Pricing+Vaccines+And+Therapeutics%3B+Improvi
ng+Birth+Outcomes+And+Lowering+Costs+For+Women+On+Medicaid&utm_campaign=HAT
+6-23-20 (suggesting that increased investment in social services may improve health outcomes 
but will not necessarily lead to a reduction in overall healthcare costs).  
 279  See, e.g., Joel Tsevat & Christopher Moriates, Value-Based Health Care Meets Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 329, 329 (2018) (explaining that cost-
effective analysis “considers costs and benefits from the societal or healthcare sector perspective” 
in order to assess value). 
 280  Kevin Fiscella, Confronting the Post-ACA American Health Crisis: Designing Health Care 
for Value and Equity, 42 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 202, 204 (2019).  
 281  Mery et al., supra note 274, at 633.  
 282  Margaret Whitehead, The Concepts and Principles of Equity and Health, 22 INT’L J. 
HEALTH SERVS. 429, 433 (1992).  
 283  Id.  
 284  Id. at 434–36.  
 285  Id. at 434. This definition aligns with the healthcare profession’s ethical norm of the 
“principle of need,” which holds that a provider should respond to a patient’s need based on sound 
medical judgment and without regard to any other consideration. See Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 
295–97 (discussing healthcare professionals’ ethical obligations to noncitizens guided by the 
principle of need).  
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achieving health equity.286 
These definitions make it clear that equity is a matter of ethics and 
values.287 Although the concept of equity is related to equality, it is not 
identical.288 Healthcare equity does not necessarily require that every person 
has equally unfettered access to healthcare for every health-related need.289 
Rather, it “requires that patients who are alike in relevant respects be treated 
in like fashion and that patients who are unlike in relevant respects be treated 
in appropriately unlike fashion.”290 These are the concepts, described earlier, 
of horizontal and vertical equity. If there is a relevant characteristic that 
makes unlike treatment of two people appropriate, such treatment may be 
considered equitable.291 Since healthcare equity is considered pluralist—or 
informed by many, sometimes overlapping values—a determination of what 
is equitable must balance these elements and minimize or reject those that 
contradict strongly held principles.292  
Several scholars have identified equity as an implicit element of the 
Triple Aim,293 and in 2016, the IHI described equity as “not a fourth aim, but 
rather an element of all three components of the Triple Aim.”294 In other 
words, pursuing health equity reinforces the aims of improving health, cost-
effectiveness, and quality. Because access to healthcare is an important 
determinant of health, and health coverage is the means of ensuring financial 
access to healthcare, it follows that pursuing healthcare equity also reinforces 
the Triple Aim.  
Based on the principles that guided the last health reform and that are 
still used by federal healthcare agencies,295 I identify two overarching goals 
of national health reform in the post-ACA era: equity and cost-
 
 286  Geoffrey W. Wilkinson et al., No Equity, No Triple Aim: Strategic Proposals to Advance 
Health Equity in a Volatile Policy Environment, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S223, S223–24 (2017) 
(“To achieve health equity and improve the overall health of the population, it is necessary to . . . 
ensure medical security to all US residents through universal access to affordable, high-quality 
health care.”). 
 287  Culyer, supra note 22, at 275. 
 288  Id. at 276. 
 289  Id. at 280. 
 290  Id. at 276. 
 291  Id. 
 292  Id. 
 293  See, e.g., Fiscella, supra note 280, at 204 (“Equity is presumed but not explicitly called 
out.”); Mery et al., supra note 274, at 634 (“[I]t can be argued that the aim of ‘equity’ may be 
implicit in the Triple Aim’s ‘better population health’ . . . .”); Wilkinson et al., supra note 286, at 
S224 (“Ultimately, population health goals cannot be achieved without a focus on equity.”); id. at 
S227 (describing health equity as “the guiding framework for achieving the Triple Aim”).  
 294  RONALD WYATT, MARA LADERMAN, LAURA BOTWINICK, KEDAR MATE & JOHN 
WHITTINGTON, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, ACHIEVING HEALTH EQUITY: A GUIDE 
FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2016).  
 295  See Castellucci, supra note 274 (indicating that the priorities of the National Quality 
Strategy still guide the work of both AHRQ and CMS, as well as the healthcare industry as a whole). 
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effectiveness.296 These goals should influence decisions about noncitizen 
eligibility for publicly funded health coverage in a universal system, 
regardless of the financing structure that is adopted. Cost-effectiveness as a 
principle of national health policy asks if the benefits of a particular reform 
are worth the cost. The question reveals that cost-effectiveness, like other 
principles that purport to be objective (such as “efficiency” or “utility 
maximization”) in fact rest on value judgments.297 What counts as cost-
effective depends on what one values.298 This is where equity comes in, and 
where the next Section begins: Equity supplies the baseline for determining 
what counts as cost-effective.299  
B. Equity 
A growing number of health law scholars now identify equity as the 
normative foundation of health law scholarship and healthcare regulation.300 
Professor Lindsay F. Wiley’s Health Justice model is a conceptual 
framework for understanding these changes and has generated a significant 
body of scholarship.301 Health Justice conceives of health law as a vehicle 
 
 296  Fiscella proposes a similar Dual Aim of “value (outcomes and processes desired by patients 
relative to costs) and equity (optimal outcomes and process regardless of disadvantaged status).” 
Fiscella, supra note 280, at 204.  
 297  See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and 
Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 5) (“[T]he very idea of efficiency is empty without a highly contestable set of value 
judgments.”); Guido Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald 
Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 558–59 (1980) (discussing wealth maximization in light of other 
values such as wealth distribution and justice); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth 
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 510–12 (questioning the value of the wealth maximization 
principle both in general and in legal theory). 
 298  See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 14) (“[W]here one starts as a baseline 
determines what counts as efficient and inefficient.”). 
 299  With this framing, I am attempting to avoid engaging in what Buchanan and Dorf term “the 
equity/efficiency debate,” in which scholars on both sides tacitly accept the coherence and 
objectivity of the term “efficiency.” Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 9). In the 
health systems literature, efficiency and cost-effectiveness are closely related concepts. See 
Ranjeeta Thomas & Kalipso Chalkidou, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, in HEALTH SYSTEM 
EFFICIENCY: HOW TO MAKE MEASUREMENT MATTER FOR POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 115 
(Jonathan Cylus et al. eds., 2016) (discussing the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to achieve health 
system efficiency). I do not argue that concern for equity should outweigh concern for efficiency, 
but that concern for equity should inform our understanding of efficiency.  
 300  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 301  Wiley, supra note 21; see, e.g., ELIZABETH TOBIN-TYLER & JOEL B. TEITELBAUM, 
ESSENTIALS OF HEALTH JUSTICE: A PRIMER, at x (2019) (contextualizing the concept of health 
justice in the United States); Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 285 (explaining how the Health Justice 
model is grounded in a communitarian conception of social justice); Emily A. Benfer, Health 
Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of Health Inequity and Social 
Injustice, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2015); Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health 
Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. 
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for social justice and identifies a shift in the way that health insurance is 
regulated post-ACA: from a system based on protecting individual interests 
toward one based on protecting collective interests.302 
A society’s willingness to tolerate health and healthcare inequities will 
depend to some extent on its time- and context-bound judgment of what is 
unfair.303 As a result, the strength of the health equity norm’s influence on 
health policy is also time- and context-bound. Post-ACA, a growing number 
of Americans recognize the benefits of a collective approach, facilitated by 
the government, to meet healthcare needs.304  
Equity in healthcare is the principle behind efforts to achieve universal 
health coverage.305 This is evident from health reform’s overwhelming focus 
on regulation of health insurance, “the financial and pragmatic point of 
access to care for most people.”306 The goal of the ACA was to make access 
to healthcare more equitable by expanding eligibility for Medicaid and by 
creating new programs to reach a larger portion of the nation’s uninsured.307 
With respect to the Medicaid expansion, Congress attempted to mandate that 
state Medicaid programs add a category of eligibility for people who were 
not traditionally considered “deserving poor.”308 Previously, Medicaid was 
available to low-income children, pregnant women, caretakers of dependent 
children, and people with disabilities.309 The ACA expanded Medicaid to 
 
REV. 833, 838 (2016) [hereinafter Wiley, Patient Rights] (describing how a new health justice 
model could transform healthcare); Lindsay F. Wiley, Applying the Health Justice Framework to 
Diabetes as a Community-Managed Social Phenomenon, 16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 191 
(2016) [hereinafter Wiley, Applying the Health Justice Framework to Diabetes]. 
 302  Wiley, Patient Rights, supra note 301, at 859. 
 303  Whitehead, supra note 282, at 433; Culyer, supra note 22, at 275 (“[A]ny idea of ‘equity’ 
must embody value judgments about what it is that makes for a good society.”).  
 304  Healthcare System, GALLUP HISTORICAL TRENDS, 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/4708/healthcare-system.aspx (last visited July 26, 2020) (indicating 
that 42% of respondents preferred a government-run healthcare system in November 2019, 
compared with 34% of respondents with the same preference in November 2010). 
 305  See Daniels, supra note 273, at 1058 (stating that the focus of the ACA was the question 
“[w]hy should we care about who is missing coverage?”).  
 306  McCuskey, supra note 21, at 312. While financial access to healthcare is necessary to ensure 
equity in healthcare, it is insufficient alone. See, e.g., Whitehead, supra note 282, at 440 (stating 
that equity in healthcare “means actively promoting policies in the health sector to enhance access 
to and control quality of care, rather than assuming that a universal service provided by law is 
equitable in practice”). Other barriers to access and overall quality of care must also be addressed. 
See id. at 436–37 (noting that “[b]ecause most of the present inequities in health are determined by 
living and working conditions, attempts to reduce them need to focus on these root causes, with the 
aim of preventing problems developing” and suggesting that “[t]his is potentially a more efficient 
approach than relying solely on the healthcare sector to patch up the ill-health and disability such 
inequities create”). 
 307  Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 179, at 1024. 
 308  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) § 2001(a)(1)(C) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(i)(VIII).  
 309  42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a). 
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include non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income up to 138% of the 
FPL.310 
Millions of people living in the United States gained access to health 
insurance by qualifying for the Medicaid expansion category, which does not 
depend on notions of “deservingness” that are unrelated to financial need. 
This success, shared by multiple constituencies with differing interests, was 
built on the understanding that all humans are vulnerable to illness and the 
financial devastation that can result from efforts to combat illness.311 
However, as discussed supra, the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. 
Sebelius hindered this goal by making Medicaid expansion optional for 
states.312 Because some states have chosen not to expand Medicaid, there is 
extreme geographic variability in Medicaid eligibility across the country 
even for citizens (and noncitizens whose immigration status does not bar 
them from eligibility).313 A 2015 study estimated that 3.1 million citizens and 
noncitizens who would have been eligible for Medicaid had the mandatory 
expansion provision survived are excluded because they live in states that 
have opted not to expand Medicaid.314 Therefore, the ACA’s aim of ensuring 
equitable access to health coverage for low-income citizens and eligible 
noncitizens is still incomplete. 
Similarly, because the ACA did not modify the federal framework 
 
 310  The pre-ACA eligibility categories remain as the statutorily mandated categories that 
determine the financial criteria for eligibility—i.e., individuals with income up to 138% of the FPL 
floor. For example, the minimum income threshold for the category of “pregnant women” ranges, 
depending on the state, from 133% to 185% of the FPL. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS 
COMM’N, FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATE OPTIONS: ELIGIBILITY 5 tbl.1, 14 n.2 (2017), 
http://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Federal-Requirements-and-State-Options-
Eligibility.pdf.  
 311  See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security After the 
Affordable Care Act, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (2014) (“[The ACA] attempted to ensure that 
Americans would have adequate health insurance, in part to reduce these threats to financial 
security.”); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y, & L. 287, 290 (1993) (“The politics of health insurance can only be understood as a struggle 
over the meaning of sickness and whether it should be a condition that automatically generates 
mutual assistance.”). 
 312  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 313  Historically, federal legislation and policymaking have served as the driving force behind 
equity reforms in healthcare. See McCuskey, supra note 21, at 311–12 (citing DAWES, supra note 
21, at 10–90). Only a few states have dabbled in cutting-edge policymaking to promote health 
equity. See id. at 312 (noting few states use health insurance regulation to promote health equity). 
This pattern aligns with the historical trends in other equity-based reforms, such as the civil rights 
movement. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1708–09 (2017) 
(describing how the Civil Rights Era shaped federalism theory’s assumptions about the roles of 
states and localities versus the federal government); id. at 1709 (“It is precisely to combat the evils 
of decentralization that equality scholars emphasize the need for nationally enforced constitutional 
rights in the first place.”).  
 314  See Tiffany D. Joseph, Still Left Out: Healthcare Stratification Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 43 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 2089, 2096 (2017).  
2020.11.09. MAKHLOUF. LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2020  10:25 AM 
December 2020] LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION  153 
 
governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid,315 states continue to wield 
broad authority to craft alienage restrictions, producing horizontal inequity 
in access to health coverage for low-income noncitizens and vertical inequity 
between noncitizens and citizens.316 Horizontal inequity occurs among 
noncitizens when noncitizen residents of different states with the same 
medical needs do not have the same access to health coverage. Vertical 
inequity occurs when noncitizen residents with great healthcare needs have 
less access than citizens with lesser needs.317 On account of this arrangement, 
each state has a unique set of alienage restrictions for the unique set of 
programs it offers.  
As an illustration of horizontal inequity among noncitizens, consider 
the difference between the types of noncitizens who fall within the category 
of excluded noncitizens in Texas versus in California—i.e., those who do not 
qualify for Medicaid or a comparable state-funded program.  
TABLE 2. NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID OR COMPARABLE STATE-
FUNDED COVERAGE IN CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS 
 
 California Texas318 
Ineligible Undocumented immigrants over 26 years of 
age.319 
Nonimmigrant visa holders age 21 and over 
who are not pregnant and not considered to be 
permanently residing in the U.S. under color 
of law (PRUCOL).320 Examples may include 
noncitizens with tourist visas and student 
visas. 
Everyone not listed in the 
box below. 
 
 315  See Daniels, supra note 273, at 1065–66 (questioning whether it was fair for the ACA to 
“leave[] out many immigrants and undocumented individuals”).  
 316  States’ decisions to restrict noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid under PRWORA entrenched 
healthcare inequities between citizens and noncitizens. A notable exception is Massachusetts, 
which has provided some form of subsidized health coverage to all noncitizen residents since it 
reformed its state healthcare in 2006. See Joseph, supra note 314, at 2097–98. By leaving states in 
charge of policymaking on noncitizen access to publicly funded health coverage, the ACA further 
entrenched the existing healthcare inequities. 
 317  See, e.g., Culyer, supra note 22, at 276–77 (defining horizontal and vertical equity in general 
terms and in relation to health, healthcare needs, and financial contributions to healthcare); 
Starfield, supra note 24, at 1 (summarizing the concept of equity in access to healthcare resources, 
including its horizontal and vertical dimensions). 
 318  Texas Works Handbook: A-300, Citizenship: A-342 TANF and Medical Programs Alien 
Status Eligibility Charts: Chart C, supra note 114. 
 319  S. 104, 2019-20 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2019). 
 320  PRUCOL noncitizens are eligible for Medi-Cal, California’s Medicaid program. CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 22, § 50301 (2020). For an explanation of the term “PRUCOL,” see discussion supra 
Section I.A. 
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Eligible Everyone not listed in the box above. Noncitizens who received 
SSI, Medicaid, or both on 
August 22, 1996, and 
lawfully resided in the 
United States on or before 
that date; 
LPRs with 40 or more 
qualifying work quarters or 
a military connection; 
Certain humanitarian 
immigrants; 
Non-citizen cross-border 
American Indians; and 
Lawfully residing children 
ages 18 and under. 
 
As an illustration of vertical inequity between low-income citizens and 
noncitizens—and an example of the distinctive health harms that uninsured 
noncitizens face—consider the following scenario: Jasmine is a 36-year-old 
DACA recipient whose parents brought her to live in the United States when 
she was one year old. She works as a caregiver for a family with four 
children. Approximately one year ago, Jasmine began feeling pain in her side 
and rapidly losing weight.321 She delayed seeking care due to the expense. 
She does not have health insurance and is ineligible for Medicaid because 
DACA recipients are beyond the ceiling of federally-funded Medicaid 
coverage and she does not live in a state that funds coverage for noncitizens 
who are excluded from Medicaid.322 When the pain became debilitating, 
Jasmine sought care at an FQHC, but the next available appointment was 
several months later. After her examination, Jasmine learned that she has 
Stage 4 renal cell carcinoma—a rare and terminal diagnosis because this 
condition is typically detected at an earlier stage.323 This scenario is certainly 
tragic, but it would be considered inequitable only if it is deemed unfair to 
treat Jasmine—a long-residing noncitizen—differently from a citizen with 
regard to Medicaid eligibility. 
Alienage restrictions in public benefits laws use citizenship as a proxy 
for community membership. The goal of healthcare equity is the equitable 
distribution of health in the community (however that community is 
 
 321  This scenario draws on the clinical profile of a patient described in a narrative by physician 
Cheryl Bettigole. Cheryl Bettigole, An Uninsured Immigrant Delays Needed Care, 34 HEALTH 
AFF. 2192, 2192 (2015) (detailing a physician’s first-hand experience with an uninsured immigrant 
who avoided care). 
 322  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 224 (noting that DACA recipients are ineligible 
for Medicaid); supra Section I.C. 
 323  Bettigole, supra note 321, at 2193 (“Stage 4 renal cell carcinoma is a diagnosis I’ve never 
seen before or since.”).  
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defined).324 Health enables members of the community to flourish; therefore, 
the subjects of healthcare equity are those who the community believes have 
an equal right to flourish.325   
In a prior Article, I argued that noncitizens’ interests should be 
considered in health law and policy efforts to improve health and healthcare 
equity. Drawing on the Health Justice model’s foundation in the social 
philosophy of responsive communitarianism, I identified broadly shared 
norms about the embeddedness of noncitizens in the healthcare sphere and 
in the broader community.326 For example, they are embedded in American 
society as neighbors, schoolmates, and colleagues at work. They live with 
and among U.S. citizens and contribute to the common good by paying taxes 
and supporting local and state economies.327 They play important roles in the 
healthcare and caregiving workforces.328 I also demonstrated how ethical 
norms within healthcare—namely, the principle of need and the concept of 
mutual aid—support inclusion of noncitizens in publicly funded healthcare 
programs.329 
The patchwork of noncitizen exclusion from Medicaid, which is 
enabled by PRWORA’s alienage restrictions, weakens national health policy 
by running counter to the larger trend of embracing health equity as the 
normative foundation of health policy. Alienage is a crude and imperfect 
proxy for community membership, which is what matters when it comes to 
health and healthcare equity. Therefore, any examination of social equity 
 
 324  See Culyer, supra note 22, at 276 (noting equity in healthcare necessitates similar patients 
be treated in a similar fashion). 
 325  Id. at 276. 
 326  Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 287–95. 
 327  See, e.g., Gretchen Frazee, 4 Myths About How Immigrants Affect the U.S. Economy, PBS 
(Nov. 2, 2018, 6:48 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4-myths-about-
how-immigrants-affect-the-u-s-economy. 
 328  See, e.g., Jeanne Batalova, Immigrant Health-Care Workers in the United States in 2018, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 14, 2020), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrant-
health-care-workers-united-states. The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn attention to the importance 
of the immigrant healthcare workforce in the United States as well as how immigration policy can 
create barriers to deploying this workforce effectively. See, e.g., Silva Mathema, Removing 
Barriers for Immigrant Medical Professionals Is Critical to Help Fight Coronavirus, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2020, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/04/02/482574/removing-
barriers-immigrant-medical-professionals-critical-help-fight-coronavirus (highlighting federal 
immigration barriers and state medical licensing barriers for noncitizen healthcare providers); 
Miriam Jordan & Annie Correal, Foreign Doctors Could Help Fight Coronavirus. But U.S. Blocks 
Many., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), http://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/us/coronavirus-foreign-
doctors-nurses-visas.html?referringSource=articleShare (same); Adam Liptak, ‘Dreamers’ Tell 
Supreme Court Ending DACA During Pandemic Would Be ‘Catastrophic,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 
2020), http://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/dreamers-supreme-court-daca.html (warning of the 
public health threat of ending DACA during the pandemic). 
 329  Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 295–99. 
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should consider the relative position of noncitizens.330 But, as the next 
Section illustrates, achieving healthcare equity is not merely an ethical 
imperative. It also contributes to healthcare-system efficiency.  
C. Cost-Effectiveness 
As discussed in Section II.A, the cost-effectiveness of a health policy is 
measured by the benefits of better health and better care produced by the 
policy divided by the cost of the policy.331 The meaning of cost-
effectiveness, however, rests on assumptions about what we value in terms 
of “better health” and “better care.” It also depends on the baseline against 
which “costs” are assessed.332 The previous Section described why the 
principle of equity should inform each of these terms. This Section describes 
how.  
The relationship between equitable access to health coverage and each 
of the three aims can be summarized as follows: (1) Improving health in 
populations that are disparately unhealthy is a strategy for improving 
population health overall. Access to health coverage is an important 
determinant of health. (2) Equitable access to health coverage improves 
health-system quality because it helps to ensure that patients receive care 
when they need it. Equity is a widely recognized measure of quality 
healthcare across the various frameworks that influence U.S. national health 
policy.333 (3) Addressing inequities in access to health coverage can be cost-
effective when it shifts spending from expensive healthcare venues like the 
emergency room to less expensive primary and preventive care. A detailed 
analysis of these relationships follows.  
The United States has long spent far more on healthcare than its peer 
countries but, perhaps paradoxically, has experienced a pervasive health 
disadvantage relative to other wealthy countries for nearly four decades.334  
 
 330  See Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 458 (suggesting that “social inequality in the U.S. states 
cannot be fully understood without considering the politics of [immigrant] exclusion in 
policymaking . . . at the subnational level”).  
 331  Mery et al., supra note 274, at 633. 
 332  Cf. Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 14) (“[W]here one starts as a baseline 
determines what counts as efficient and inefficient.”). 
 333  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NO. 19-0070-EF, NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT 2 (2019) [hereinafter NATIONAL HEALTHCARE 
QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT] (incorporating reporting on “disparities in care experienced by 
different racial and socioeconomic groups” as a component of healthcare quality); LINDSAY A. 
MARTIN, EUGENE C. NELSON, ROBERT C. LLOYD & THOMAS W. NOLAN, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE 
IMPROVEMENT, WHOLE SYSTEM MEASURES 4 (2007) (describing thirteen measures of overall 
quality of a health system (“Whole System Measures”) that are closely related to the Triple Aim, 
one of which is “equity”).  
 334  Steven H. Woolf & Heidi Schoomaker, Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in the United 
States, 1959-2017, 322 JAMA 1996, 1996 (2019).  
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For example, during that time, the United States has fallen behind in annual 
gains in life expectancy, a common indicator of a population’s health.335 
Troublingly, life expectancy at birth has stagnated over the last decade, even 
declining each year from 2014 to 2017.336  
However, increases in mortality rates have not burdened everyone 
living in the United States equally. Young and middle-aged adults in a lower 
socioeconomic class, with fewer years of education, and living “in rural areas 
or other settings with evidence of economic distress or diminished social 
capital” have suffered disproportionately.337 It is posited that “systemic 
deficiencies” in the healthcare system—including the lack of universal 
access to healthcare—may partially explain increased mortality from certain 
conditions, and that state policies affecting the social determinants of health 
could explain geographic inequities.338 The U.S. healthcare system is marked 
by significant inequity in access to healthcare in comparison to other wealthy 
countries.339 
Aside from ethical reasons to combat healthcare inequity, discussed in 
the previous Section, there are instrumental reasons to do so. If the United 
States seeks to keep pace with peer countries with respect to annual gains in 
population health indicators like average life expectancy, it must decide 
where to allocate its resources. This includes but is not limited to healthcare 
resources.340 Improving health outcomes for the most affluent groups is 
likely to require technological or scientific advances. By contrast, one 
strategy for improving health outcomes in the least affluent groups is low-
tech and straightforward: expanding access to health coverage.341 Addressing 
 
 335  Id.  
 336  See Sabrina Tavernise & Abby Goodnough, American Life Expectancy Rises for First Time 
in Four Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020), http://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/us/us-life-
expectancy.html. Each year from 2015 to 2017, the country experienced “rare and troubling” 
declines in life expectancy, attributed to “‘deaths of despair’ – younger people dying from 
overdoses, suicide, and alcoholism.” Id. 
 337  Woolf & Schoomaker, supra note 334, at 2009; see also Julia Belluz, What the Dip in U.S. 
Life Expectancy is Really About: Inequality, VOX (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/1/9/16860994/life-expectancy-us-income-
inequality (describing America’s worsening life expectancy wealth gap).  
 338  Woolf & Schoomaker, supra note 334, at 2010.  
 339  Fiscella, supra note 280, at 204. 
 340  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EXPLAINING DIVERGENT LEVELS OF LONGEVITY IN 
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES 118 (Eileen M. Crimmins et al. eds., 2011) (“[A] country with greater 
income inequality . . . may have worse average health and greater average mortality because the 
health benefits to the wealthy from their extra income are outweighed by the health deficits 
experienced by the poor”). 
 341  One of the main ways in which the ACA aims to improve population health is “by improving 
access to the health care delivery system, which is a critical component of a community’s 
population health production system.” Michael A. Stoto, Population Health in the Affordable Care 
Act Era, ACAD. HEALTH 1, 4 (2013), 
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health inequities is thus an implicit goal of national health policy.342  
From a societal perspective, the policies underlying the conditions that 
create marked health inequities can cause harm to all members of the 
community.343 Lack of access to affordable healthcare is a condition that 
contributes to health inequities. An obvious way in which the effects of this 
condition spill over to the general population is during an outbreak of an 
infectious disease. Uninsured members of the community with symptoms of 
illness may hesitate to seek care and therefore risk exposing the rest of the 
community to the infectious agent—a topic with increased salience during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.344 Less obvious are the health-related spillover 
effects of untreated substance abuse and mental illness, which may include 
higher rates of property and violent crimes.345 When pregnant women are 
unable to access prenatal care, opportunities to prevent harm to women and 
fetuses are lost.346 Finally, immigration restrictions on health coverage can 
have spillover effects on U.S. citizen family members and low-income and 
minority communities, exacerbating health inequities in already vulnerable 
populations.347 For example, undocumented noncitizen parents may decline 
 
http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/files/AH2013pophealth.pdf. To target low-
income populations specifically, the ACA created a new category of eligibility for low-income 
adults who were otherwise excluded from the historic “deserving poor” categorical eligibility in 
Medicaid. Huberfeld, supra note 208, at 51 (“Medicaid has covered only the deserving poor . . . . 
The ACA changed that standard by creating a new baseline, allowing non-elderly adults earning 
up to 133% of the FPL to enroll in Medicaid, regardless of the status of being ‘deserving.’”). 
 342  Stoto, supra note 341, at 2 (stating that reducing disparities is a goal of the population health 
perspective); see also Berwick et al., supra note 275, at 760 (“[T]he gain in health in one 
subpopulation ought not to be achieved at the expense of another subpopulation.”). Although the 
terms “health disparity” and “health inequity” are sometimes used interchangeably, I have elected 
to use the latter term to mean “differences in health outcomes that are systematic, avoidable, and 
unjust,” unless I am quoting directly from a source. WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 8. “Health 
disparity” is “the difference in health outcomes between groups within a population,” without the 
implicit judgment of such difference as unjust. Id.  
 343  Alistair Woodward & Ichiro Kawachi, Why Reduce Health Inequalities?, 54 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 923, 923 (2000). 
 344 See Karen Hacker, Maria Anies, Barbara L. Folb & Leah Zallman, Barriers to Health Care 
for Undocumented Immigrants: A Literature Review, 8 RISK MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL’Y 175, 
178 (2015); Makhlouf & Sandhu, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 345 See Hefei Wen, Jason M. Hockenberry & Janet R. Cummings, The Effect of Medicaid 
Expansion on Crime Reduction: Evidence from HIFA-Waiver Expansions, 154 J. PUB. ECON. 67, 
68 (2017) (finding the increase in substance abuse disorder treatment and decrease in substance use 
that result from state HIFA-waiver expansions may lead to reductions in crime).  
 346 See Krista M. Perreira & Juan M. Pedroza, Policies of Exclusion: Implications for the Health 
of Immigrants and Their Children, 40 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 147, 155–56 (2019) (noting that 
some studies show undocumented noncitizen “pregnant women are less likely to have adequate 
prenatal care visits and are more likely to experience complications during delivery, to have preterm 
births, and to have low-birthweight babies”). 
 347 Hacker et al., supra note 344, at 178 (describing spillover effects of documentation 
requirements on U.S. citizen family members); see also DONNA COHEN ROSS, CTR. ON BUDGET 
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to enroll their U.S. citizen children in Medicaid if they are required to 
provide information or documentation about themselves.348 And U.S. 
citizens who do not have ready access to birth certificates or passports—a 
problem that disproportionately affects children, the mentally ill, and people 
with dementia—are likely to experience documentation requirements linked 
to immigration restrictions as a barrier to healthcare.349 When health 
outcomes for the most vulnerable or disadvantaged members of a community 
are significantly worse than for others, the community as a whole is worse 
off. It follows that improving conditions for the most vulnerable or 
disadvantaged members of a community can improve the well-being of all. 
A large body of research has examined states’ immigration restrictions 
on Medicaid eligibility and their impact on noncitizen access to care and 
health outcomes. Some of these studies have found that exclusionary laws 
have negative impacts on individual and population health.350 Scholars 
theorize that legal barriers to accessing subsidized health programs are the 
major cause of health inequities between noncitizen and native-born 
children.351 A pair of researchers focused on young Latinx noncitizen 
children in Illinois who had lost public benefits post-PRWORA, finding that 
their general health status had declined significantly relative to their peers.352 
A subsequent expanded study of preschoolers in noncitizen families in 
Illinois found that loss of public benefits after PRWORA was associated with 
“substantial and significant declines in their health over time.”353 These 
 
& POLICY PRIORITIES, MEDICAID DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENT DISPROPORTIONATELY 
HARMS NON-HISPANICS, NEW STATE DATA SHOW 3–4 (2007), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-10-07health.pdf (noting that documentation 
requirement has led to decline in Medicaid enrollment among citizen children in several states).  
 348  See Hacker et al., supra note 344, at 178. 
 349  See Meredith A. Devlin, When Policies Collide: Citizenship Documentation Requirements 
and Barriers to Obtaining Photo Identification—The New Medicaid Citizenship Requirements as 
a Case Illustration, 41 IND. L. REV. 451, 462–63 (2008) (discussing how a Medicaid requirement 
to provide documentation of citizenship will negatively impact disabled citizens’ access to 
healthcare). Documentation requirements linked to immigration restrictions are found to pose a 
“special risk” to Black children, who are both more likely to lose Medicaid because of a 
documentation requirement and more likely to be diagnosed with conditions that are difficult and 
expensive to treat without health coverage, such as asthma. COHEN ROSS, supra note 347, at 4 
(finding the largest declines in Medicaid enrollment after implementation of the documentation 
requirement in Black children). 
 350  See TIM O’SHEA & CRISTOBAL RAMÓN, IMMIGRANTS AND PUBLIC BENEFITS: WHAT DOES 
THE RESEARCH SAY? 1, 9 (Bipartisan Pol’y Ctr. 2018), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Immigrants-and-Public-Benefits-What-Does-the-Research-Say.pdf. 
 351  Fernando S. Mendoza, Health Disparities and Children in Immigrant Families: A Research 
Agenda, 124 PEDIATRICS S187, S192 (2009).  
 352  Ariel Kalil & Danielle A. Crosby, Welfare-Leaving and Child Health and Behavior in 
Immigrant and Native Families, in IMMIGRANTS AND WELFARE: THE IMPACT OF WELFARE 
REFORM ON AMERICA’S NEWCOMERS 193 (Michael E. Fix ed., 2009).  
 353  Ariel Kalil & Danielle Crosby, Welfare Leaving and the Health of Young Children in 
Immigrant and Native Families, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 202, 212 (2010). 
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findings spanned multiple health dimensions, including parental ratings of 
children’s health, number of sick days, frequency of respiratory illness, and 
emergency room visits.354 Such studies support the proposition that 
exclusionary health policies are associated with poor health outcomes among 
noncitizens and health inequities between noncitizens and U.S. citizens. This 
evidence demonstrates the ways in which exclusionary laws create health 
inequities. Conversely, inclusionary laws may reduce health inequities and 
their associated spillover effects on other members of the community.355 
Moreover, laws that limit noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid can 
negatively affect national health system efficiency. Congress has recognized 
this, and has passed legislation to partially ameliorate those impacts. After 
the passage of PRWORA, observers noted that many lawfully present 
noncitizens, including children and pregnant women, would be cut off from 
Medicaid coverage, reducing their access to preventive care and increasing 
their reliance on Emergency Medicaid for treatment of emergency medical 
conditions.356 Such concerns about PRWORA’s impact on healthcare system 
efficiency and health outcomes for children and pregnant women were the 
motivation behind Congress’s creation of the ICHIA options.357 Congress 
understood that by eliminating the arbitrary five-year delay on children’s and 
pregnant women’s access to subsidized health coverage, the ICHIA options 
would reduce the risk of negative health impacts and developmental delays 
for future U.S. citizens.358 This reasoning may be extended to all noncitizens 
who are considered members of the community: Health policies that 
ameliorate vertical health inequity between U.S. citizens and a subset of 
noncitizens will be more effective at reducing inequity when applied to all 
noncitizen residents.  
“Better care,” the second component of the numerator of the cost-
 
 354  Id. at 209–10.  
 355  See Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 923; id. at 926 (“[I]f governments’ social and 
economic policies can widen health inequalities, then it is plausible that different policies could 
reduce them.”); CBPP REPORT, supra note 228, at 13–14 (describing the growing body of evidence 
showing that immigrant-inclusive policies improve individual and population health outcomes). 
 356  See Jane Perkins, Medicaid Coverage of Emergency Medical Conditions, 38 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 384, 385–86 (2004) (noting that PRWORA’s 
restrictions would cut the number of noncitizens who qualify for full Medicaid while expanding 
the number of people who can rely on Emergency Medicaid).  
 357  See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S1028 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“The 
policy [of restricting noncitizen eligibility for public benefits under PRWORA] was instated over 
10 years ago, and almost immediately we started changing it, realizing it really did not work as 
planned. . . . [E]xtending health insurance to this population actually saves the health care system 
of America a lot of money.”); id. at S1050 (stating that the five-year bar under PRWORA has 
“severely undermined the health status of immigrant families across the Nation”); 155 CONG. REC. 
H230 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 2009) (describing the purpose of the ICHIA options as “promot[ing] the 
health of needy children and pregnant women residing lawfully in the United States”). 
 358  See Youdelman, supra note 170, at 4.  
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effectiveness equation, involves the quality of care provided in a national 
health system.359 Equity is a goal of both the Triple Aim and the National 
Quality Strategy, the leading frameworks guiding U.S. national health policy 
on quality improvement. These frameworks draw on an influential 2001 
report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) which proposed a strategy for 
improving the quality of healthcare in America in the twenty-first century.360 
The committee that authored the report recommended that “all health care 
constituencies . . . commit to . . . a shared agenda of six aims for 
improvement that can raise the quality of care to unprecedented levels.”361 
In summary, healthcare should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, 
efficient, and equitable.362 By “equitable” care, the committee meant 
“providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and 
socioeconomic status.”363 The goal is to reduce differences in patient 
experience that are based on personal characteristics, which could include 
actual or perceived immigration status.364  
In addition, as discussed earlier, the IHI has recognized that equity is an 
element of each component of the Triple Aim, including better care.365 The 
IHI has developed a system of metrics that is linked with the Triple Aim and 
designed to measure health-system quality.366 One of the Whole System 
Measures is equity, which examines stratification of quality measures among 
subpopulations and aims to “drive the difference in [health] outcomes 
between subpopulations to zero.”367   
Likewise, the National Quality Strategy, established in 2011 as a 
requirement of the ACA, builds on the Triple Aim.368 Its purpose is to 
 
 359  See Berwick et al., supra note 275, at 760 (arguing that the United States will not “achieve 
high-value health care unless improvement initiatives pursue a broader system of linked goals”). 
 360  INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2001) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]; see also NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & 
DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 333, at 67 (discussing the IOM report’s identification of 
healthcare disparities as a quality issue); WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 4–5 (discussing progress 
on the IOM report’s equity aim and its relationship to the Triple Aim); Castellucci, supra note 274 
(noting that the National Quality Strategy goals were strongly influenced by the IOM report). 
 361  IOM REPORT, supra note 360, at 5. 
 362  Id. at 5–6.  
 363  Id. at 6.  
 364  See, e.g., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 333, at 
113, 119–20 (noting that immigration status is a barrier to health coverage). 
 365  WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 5.  
 366  MARTIN ET AL., supra note 333, at 1 (noting that the purpose of the paper is to promote a 
system of metrics that measure the overall quality of health systems). 
 367  Id. at 38. 
 368  42 U.S.C. § 280j(a)(1) (2018) (“The [HHS] Secretary . . . shall establish a national strategy 
to improve the delivery of health care services, patient health outcomes, and population health.”); 
The National Quality Strategy: Fact Sheet, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
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coordinate quality improvement strategies in the public and private 
healthcare sectors in order to improve health and healthcare nationwide.369 
Each year, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, an agency 
within HHS, reports on “the quality of healthcare received by the general 
U.S. population and disparities in care experienced by different racial and 
socioeconomic groups.”370 This focus on disparities reveals the importance 
of equitable access to healthcare as an element of the National Quality 
Strategy. 
State policies that exclude noncitizens from subsidized health coverage 
negatively affect several of the widely recognized measures of health-system 
quality, including equity.371 Without access to affordable health coverage, 
low-income noncitizens are less likely to seek healthcare in a timely manner. 
When uninsured low-income noncitizens do seek care, they are often limited 
to a small number of providers who are willing to provide uncompensated 
care or to charge affordable rates. Such providers are often overextended and 
have long wait times for appointments.372 In order to stay financially viable, 
they may have to see a large volume of patients, which means patients 
receive less individualized attention and providers are more likely to miss 
signs and symptoms. Insured patients, on the other hand, can typically 
choose among various providers and withdraw from a provider’s care if they 
are not receiving high-quality care. This serves as an indirect regulation of 
quality control that is absent in the pool of providers that serve uninsured, 
low-income patients.  
In addition, because a majority of excluded noncitizens are members of 
 
http://www.ahrq.gov/workingforquality/about/nqs-fact-sheets/fact-sheet.html (last updated Nov. 
2016). 
 369  Id. 
 370  NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY & DISPARITIES REPORT, supra note 333, at 2. 
 371  See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 333, at 18–19 (briefly describing each of these quality 
measures). The rate of adverse events measures “injury or harm to [a] patient related to (or from) 
the delivery of care.” Id. at 20. A landmark publication on the effects of uninsurance on health 
found that uninsured hospitalized patients are more likely to be injured due to substandard care than 
insured patients. INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 72–73 
(2002) [hereinafter CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE], 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK220639/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK220639.pdf. Unadjusted 
raw mortality percentage is “a measure of acute care inpatient mortality” and is computed by 
dividing the number of in-hospital deaths in the acute care inpatient population by the number of 
acute care inpatient discharges. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 333, at 24. Uninsured patients who are 
hospitalized are more likely to die in the hospital than insured patients. CARE WITHOUT 
COVERAGE, supra, at 72. The functional health outcomes score is measured using the Functional 
Health Survey and is a measure of a system’s patient population’s physical and mental health status. 
MARTIN ET AL., supra note 332, at 25. Uninsured adults are more likely to have “worse overall 
functional and health status” than similar insured adults. CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE, supra, at 81. 
 372  See Bettigole, supra note 321, at 2192 (noting that even had one of her patients discovered 
her clinic earlier, they likely would have experienced a wait time of several months because the 
clinic was struggling to keep up with existing demand). 
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already disadvantaged social groups, policies that exclude noncitizens from 
access to subsidized health coverage exacerbate—rather than ameliorate—
existing health inequities by reducing opportunities to be healthy.373 For 
example, laws that bar noncitizens from eligibility for Medicaid 
disproportionately affect people of color.374 
States’ health policies are undoubtedly influenced by cost, which is the 
denominator in the cost-effectiveness equation. For some politicians, 
limiting eligibility for healthcare subsidies by citizenship and immigration 
status in order to cut costs in the short term is more palatable than limiting 
benefits based on some other criteria that would affect citizens. There is no 
doubt that expanding access to subsidized health coverage costs money. 
However, even if expanding access results in healthcare spending that is 
higher than current spending, it does not necessarily mean that such a reform 
is not cost-effective.375 Exclusionary policies may save costs in the short term 
but not over the long term.  
Any attempt to calculate the costs of restrictive versus inclusive health 
policy is informed by value-laden assumptions. The ACA provides an 
example of health policy that recognizes the cost-effectiveness of equitable 
access to health coverage even if absolute healthcare spending increases as 
a result. The high cost of healthcare in the United States is an oft-cited barrier 
to achieving universal health coverage.376 However, efforts to achieve 
universal health coverage are based, in part, on the understanding that 
expanding access can reduce inefficient healthcare spending and otherwise 
 
 373  See Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 460 (“[B]ecause of immigrants’ particularly vulnerable 
legal and social status, the immigrant-specific provisions of welfare reform may have increased 
immigrants’ confusion about their eligibility for welfare benefits . . . .”) (quoting Jennifer Van 
Hook, Welfare Reform’s Chilling Effects on Noncitizens: Changes in Noncitizen Welfare 
Recipiency or Shifts in Citizenship Status?, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 613, 613–14 (2003)); Paula Braveman, 
Health Disparities and Health Equity: Concepts and Measurement, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 
167, 187 (2006) (“[H]ealth disparities reflect unequal opportunities to be healthy, making 
disadvantaged groups even more disadvantaged with respect to their health; correspondingly, 
reducing health disparities means giving disadvantaged social groups equal opportunities to be 
healthy.”). 
 374  See Samantha Artiga, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, Changes in Health Coverage by 
Race and Ethnicity Since the ACA, 2010-2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/changes-in-health-coverage-by-
race-and-ethnicity-since-the-aca-2010-2018 (“[U]ninsured Hispanics and Asians are less likely 
than Whites to be eligible for financial assistance with coverage, in part, reflecting higher shares of 
noncitizens who face immigrant eligibility restrictions among these groups compared to Whites.”). 
 375  See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 297 (manuscript at 14). Buchanan and Dorf describe how 
arguments based on finding “efficient” solutions are incoherent if one does not acknowledge the 
normative priors on which the term “efficiency” rests. Id. The same could be said about arguments 
for the “cost-effective” solution.  
 376  See, e.g., David E. Bloom, Alexander Khoury & Ramnath Subbaraman, The Promise and 
Peril of Universal Health Care, 361 SCIENCE 766, 766 (2018) (noting that the high costs of new 
healthcare technologies and meeting the healthcare needs of older populations are a barrier for 
achieving universal health coverage in wealthy industrial countries). 
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improve national prosperity by improving health—a goal deemed 
worthwhile even if overall public spending increases.377 
Opponents of expanding Medicaid for excluded noncitizens may argue 
that subsidizing primary and secondary healthcare for noncitizens is not cost-
effective because it would increase overall public healthcare expenditures on 
noncitizens. This argument rests on an assumption that high-priority medical 
needs of noncitizens are “covered” by Emergency Medicaid (severe, acute 
conditions) and public health agencies (vaccinations, screening and 
treatment for communicable diseases), and that treatment of chronic disease 
among noncitizens should not be a priority. It also relies on the “right now” 
baseline rather than a baseline of equitable access to health coverage. What 
it overlooks, however, is that it can be more cost-effective to cover non-
emergent than emergent care, e.g., covering routine versus emergency 
dialysis, and that people are less likely to seek screening and treatment for 
communicable diseases if they do not have a primary care provider, even if 
those services are covered financially.378 Insurance enables people to 
establish care with a provider. Another consequence that this argument does 
not consider is the absurd and cruel result of prioritizing the subsidization of 
life-saving versus life-enhancing healthcare for uninsured noncitizens: 
Those with chronic diseases must delay seeking care until their lives are in 
jeopardy before they can qualify for subsidized care in a hospital emergency 
room.379 
What is cost-effective for U.S. citizens and Medicaid-eligible 
noncitizens is likely cost-effective for excluded noncitizens. Therefore, if a 
future health reform is guided by the principle of equity, as the last health 
reform was, inclusion of a broader range of noncitizens in publicly funded 
healthcare should be considered cost-effective if it meets more healthcare 
needs per dollar spent, particularly when it reduces inequitable suffering and 
 
 377  See David E. Bloom, Alexander Khoury & Ramnath Subbaraman, The Promise and Peril 
of Universal Health Care, 361 SCIENCE eaat9644, Aug. 24, 2018, at 1 (“These economic arguments 
[in support of universal health coverage] are bolstered by evidence that committing resources to 
health care is associated with a high return on investment, rivaling, or even surpassing, other high-
return investments like those in primary and secondary education.”). 
 378  See, e.g., K. Tom Xu, Usual Source of Care in Preventive Service Use: A Regular Doctor 
versus a Regular Site, 37 HSR 1509, 1509–10 (2002) (discussing studies finding that having a 
regular doctor is a stronger predictor of timely care-seeking than having health insurance and that 
“individuals with a usual source of care were more likely to receive timely immunizations”); cf. 
Access to Primary Care, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-
objectives/topic/social-determinants-health/interventions-resources/access-to-primary (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2020) (noting that people residing in rural areas may face geographical barriers to having 
a primary care provider, and in turn, “may be less likely to seek preventive care”). 
 379  See Culyer, supra note 22, at 279 (discussing and criticizing the argument that “[w]e should 
first allocate resources to those areas where they are immediately needed to save life and only when 
this is done should the remainder be allocated to alleviating non-fatal conditions”). 
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morbidity.380 Addressing vertical inequity between citizens and noncitizens 
in access to publicly funded health coverage, therefore, has the potential to 
be cost-effective.381  
Some scholars have pointed to the ways in which restricting 
noncitizens’ access to health coverage—and, by extension, affordable 
preventive healthcare—may even increase net costs.382 Researchers have 
found that excluded noncitizens are disproportionately likely to seek care in 
the most expensive healthcare venue: hospital emergency rooms.383 This is 
because uninsured immigrants often delay seeking care for health problems 
that could have been detected or treated effectively at an earlier time.384 Such 
delay can lead to unnecessary complications from common chronic diseases 
such as diabetes and asthma,385 and remedial treatment of these 
complications, especially in emergency situations, is much costlier than 
preventive care.  
The federal government ultimately absorbs much of the costs of 
treatment for emergency conditions affecting excluded noncitizens through 
Emergency Medicaid funding, Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital 
payments, and other supplementary funding for states burdened by these 
costs.386 Most Emergency Medicaid expenditures are for services provided 
to undocumented noncitizens, who make up the largest category of excluded 
noncitizens nationwide.387 A 2011 article states that the program “has long 
paid about $2 billion a year for emergency treatment” for noncitizens.388 
 
 380  See Daniels, supra note 273, at 1067 (explaining why efficiency and cost are ethical—and 
not simply economic—concerns).  
 381  See Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 926 (“[R]educing inequalities will lead to 
larger gains in health status than might be achieved by similar expenditures elsewhere.”).  
 382  See, e.g., Arijit Nandi, Sana Loue & Sandro Galea, Expanding the Universe of Universal 
Coverage: The Population Health Argument for Increasing Coverage for Immigrants, 11 J. 
IMMIGRANT & MINORITY HEALTH 433, 435 (2009).  
 383  Id.  
 384  See Gostin, supra note 43, at 1438; Nandi et al., supra note 382, at 435 (noting that 
undocumented immigrants are relatively more likely to have preexisting disease and wait longer 
before seeking medical care). 
 385  Nandi et al., supra note 382, at 435. 
 386  See, e.g., Nathanael J. Scheer, Comment, Keeping the Promise: Financing EMTALA’s 
Guarantee of Emergency Medical Care for Undocumented Immigrants in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1413, 1421–23 (2003) (discussing the various sources of federal funding that Arizona hospitals 
use to defray the cost of providing emergency medical care to undocumented noncitizens). 
 387  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-472, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS: QUESTIONS 
PERSIST ABOUT THEIR IMPACT ON HOSPITALS’ UNCOMPENSATED CARE COSTS 10 (2004) (noting 
that several states have indicated that “most of their emergency Medicaid expenditures were for 
services provided to undocumented aliens”); id. (reporting that five of ten states polled reported 
that labor and delivery services for pregnant women made up at least half of their Emergency 
Medicaid expenditures).  
 388  Phil Galewitz, Medicaid Helps Hospitals Pay for Illegal Immigrants’ Care, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 12, 2013), http://khn.org/news/medicaid-illegal-immigrant-emergency-care. 
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Costs were one of the concerns motivating Congress’s passage of the 
ICHIA options, which restored Medicaid eligibility for lawfully present 
children and pregnant women who had been excluded by PRWORA.389 
Congress recognized that many treatable conditions affecting children and 
pregnant women can be addressed in a cost-effective manner through 
primary and preventive care, which Medicaid enables.390 When pregnant 
women do not receive prenatal care, costs associated with postnatal and 
pediatric care can be twice as high.391 This example illustrates that “the goal 
of increased equity need not be incompatible with the goal of maximising 
efficiency.”392 
Another often overlooked cost of restrictionist subsidized health 
coverage laws is the increased administrative burden for government 
agencies and healthcare providers that must determine whether a patient 
qualifies for benefits or services. These determinations, which are often 
complicated, divert resources to government agencies and can increase the 
cost of providing publicly funded coverage.393 Lack of certainty about 
whether care will be covered can also lead healthcare providers to delay 
treatment, which can increase costs and reduce effectiveness. For example, 
 
In addition, DSH payments totaled about $16.5 trillion in FY2018, with Texas, New York, and 
Louisiana receiving the largest amounts. Distribution of Medicaid Spending by Service, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., http://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/distribution-of-medicaid-spending-
by-
service/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%
22asc%22%7D (last visited Aug. 9, 2020). 
 389  See 155 CONG. REC. S1028 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2019) (statement of Sen. Durbin) 
(“[E]xtending health insurance to this population actually saves the health care system of America 
a lot of money. . . . Avoiding . . . pregnancy complications is not only the humane thing to do, it is 
the economic thing to do. . . . ER care is expensive, sometimes unnecessary.”). 
 390  See Youdelman, supra note 170, at 3 (explaining how ICHIA’s expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility can reduce emergency room visits and prevent expensive exacerbation of preventable 
conditions).  
 391  See Gostin, supra note 43, at 1438.  
 392  Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 927 (describing how a policy to schedule Pap 
screening for cervical cancer every three years instead of annually saved resources that could be 
devoted to reaching women who were screened only every ten years, resulting in fewer cases of 
cervical cancer at the population level).  
 393  See Hacker et al., supra note 343, at 178 (reviewing studies identifying bureaucratic barriers 
for healthcare providers created by policies excluding undocumented noncitizens from healthcare); 
Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to Health Services: The 
Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1630, 1632 (2003) 
(“Sorting through immigration documents for each patient, and turning away those who lack 
sufficient documentation but are unable to pay for the full cost of services, would increase 
administrative costs and waiting times, reducing the efficiency of already overburdened safety-net 
institutions.”); Michael E. Fix & Karen Tumlin, Welfare Reform and the Devolution of Immigrant 
Policy, in NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPINIONS FOR STATES 1997, at 1, 5–6 (Urban Inst., Ser. 
A., No. A-15, 1997) (describing how PRWORA forces states “to bear new administrative costs 
from expanded verification and reporting requirements” such as new systems to enforce the 
affidavit of support signed by an immigrant’s sponsor). 
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a dentist diagnoses a noncitizen patient with a tooth infection and 
recommends surgery. The patient does not have health insurance and is 
unable to pay for the surgery out of pocket. The patient tells the dentist that 
they “overstayed” a tourist visa and are afraid of applying for public benefits. 
Based on their experience treating other noncitizen patients, the dentist 
assumes that the patient is ineligible for publicly funded coverage. Several 
months later, the dentist learns that the patient, as an applicant for asylum 
whose application has been pending for more than six months, is eligible for 
state-funded health coverage comparable to Medicaid.394 By the time the 
patient has coverage, it has been eight months since the infection was 
diagnosed, and the surgery is much more complicated and expensive than it 
would have been had the patient received timely care.395 
Laws excluding noncitizens from the ACA Marketplaces also create 
inefficiency in health insurance financing by preventing risks from being 
spread across a broader population.396 This causes instability and 
unpredictability in health insurance risk pools. It is likely that noncitizens are 
relatively healthy compared with citizens.397 Permitting undocumented 
noncitizens to purchase subsidized insurance on the Marketplaces could 
result in insurers lowering premiums for all participants.398 Consumers who 
 
 394  See supra Section I.C. 
 395  Cf. Robin E. Canada, Best Practices for Teaching Care Management of Undocumented 
Patients, 21 AMA J. ETHICS E44, E45 (2019) (describing the different standard of care provided 
to undocumented patients treated at a low-cost clinic versus at an academic medical practice); Peter 
Ellis & Lydia S. Dugdale, How Should Clinicians Respond when Different Standards of Care Are 
Applied to Undocumented Patients?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS E26 (2019) (describing the ethical conflict 
faced by providers who lack the resources to provide optimal care); Meredith Van Natta, First Do 
No Harm: Medical Legal Violence and Immigrant Health in Coral County, USA, 235 SOC. SCI. & 
MED., Aug. 2019, at 1, 3 (2019) (finding that since the 2016 election providers have started to 
weigh the risk of untreated illness or injury against the risk of immigration surveillance and 
enforcement when treating undocumented noncitizens or noncitizens who are subject to public 
charge determinations). 
 396  Makhlouf, supra note 49, at 270. Although federal law restricts participation in the ACA 
Marketplaces to lawfully present noncitizens, states can apply for waivers to permit residents to 
purchase coverage on state-run exchanges or create state-funded exchanges that do not discriminate 
based on immigration status. See, e.g., Ana B. Ibarra & Chad Terhune, California Withdraws Bid 
to Allow Undocumented to Buy Unsubsidized Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://khn.org/news/california-withdraws-bid-to-allow-undocumented-immigrants-to-buy-
unsubsidized-obamacare-plans (describing California’s filing and withdrawal of a Section 1332 
ACA state innovation waiver to permit excluded noncitizens to purchase unsubsidized coverage on 
its exchange). However, states may have legitimate concerns about the federal government’s use 
of information gathered from the exchanges for immigration enforcement purposes, which was one 
of the concerns cited by Sen. Ricardo Lara, the California state senator who spearheaded that state’s 
authorizing legislation for the waiver. Id. 
 397  See Glen, supra note 46, at 222 (describing research indicating that recent immigrants and 
those who have resided in the United States for an extended period tend to be healthier than natural-
born U.S. citizens).  
 398  See id. (explaining how adding undocumented noncitizens to the insurance risk pool could 
lead to cost savings for all of the insured participants).  
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are eligible for little or no subsidy would benefit from lower premiums. The 
federal government could share in these savings through a reduction in the 
subsidies it pays to insurers. 
Finally, in the absence of subsidized insurance for excluded 
noncitizens, physicians and hospitals may shift the costs of treating 
uninsured excluded noncitizens to insurers and insured patients.399 
Healthcare providers are ethically400—and in some cases legally401—
obligated to treat patients in need. For example, federal law obligates 
hospitals participating in Medicare (nearly all hospitals)402 to provide 
emergency care to all patients who need it, regardless of their ability to pay, 
immigration status, or any other factor unrelated to medical need.403 When 
states foreclose reimbursement for care that hospitals provide to uninsured 
noncitizens, they leave those hospitals and their physicians vulnerable to 
financial losses from the provision of uncompensated care. In turn, 
physicians and hospitals may seek to shift these costs to insurers and insured 
patients by increasing charges. This is a perennial topic of interest in health 
policy, and there is no good reason to distinguish cost shifting generated by 
uninsured excluded noncitizens from that generated by any other population. 
Subsidizing insurance for excluded noncitizens can prevent this wasteful 
cost shifting. 
As described here, expanding health coverage for noncitizens would 
certainly shift health system costs and may save costs overall, in addition to 
improving population health outcomes and healthcare quality.404 Taking a 
wider lens, some researchers have examined how expanding health coverage 
 
 399  See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89 
MILBANK Q. 90 (2011) (reviewing the literature on cost shifting in response to public payment 
policy). 
 400  See The Refusal of Care, HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT. REV. (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.hrmronline.com/article/the-refusal-of-care (“Healthcare providers have legal, ethical 
and professional duties to address a patient’s needs that fall within the provider’s scope of 
practice.”).  
 401  See infra note 403 (obligating hospitals to treat patients in emergencies, regardless of their 
eligibility for health insurance). 
 402  See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET 1 
(Dec. 2017), http://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-01/medicaremedicaidunderpmt%202017.pdf 
(explaining that while hospitals can elect not to participate in Medicaid or Medicare, conditions on 
federal tax exemptions prompt most hospitals to participate). 
 403  Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(b) 
(2010). 
 404  See Gostin, supra note 43, at 1438 (“Shifting toward prevention and early diagnosis and 
treatment would avoid or reduce costs over time.”); Nandi et al., supra note 382, at 435 (noting that 
offering noncitizens the same standard of care as citizens may save costs); see also Makhlouf, supra 
note 49, at 269–70 (describing research on how expanding immigrants’ access to health coverage 
could decrease total healthcare expenditures).  
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could improve state and local economies over the long term.405 This is based 
on the observation that untreated health issues reduce worker productivity,406 
increasing the economic costs of restricting noncitizens’ access to 
healthcare: “From an economic standpoint can any country afford to have 
the talent and performance of sizeable sections of the population stunted to 
such an extent?”407 Additionally, low-income families with health insurance 
experience greater economic security than those without because they are 
not subject to high out-of-pocket medical costs.408 Health insurance and the 
household economic security it promotes make it more likely that children 
will succeed in school, earn higher incomes, and amass more wealth.409 For 
these reasons, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has called 
extending health coverage regardless of citizenship status “a smart 
investment in a state’s long-term health and prosperity.”410  
This Section has demonstrated how state decisions to exclude 
noncitizens from eligibility for subsidized health coverage in order to cut 
costs undermine the national health policy goal of improving cost-
effectiveness. Whether the goal is to have a fairer or more efficient national 
health system—or, ideally, both—the answer is inclusion. 
D. Racial Dynamics 
National health policy seeks to eliminate the influence of 
antidemocratic values, such as racism, in Medicaid.411 Historically, 
federalism arrangements regulating public accommodations, voting, 
housing, healthcare, and other areas were proxies for the preservation of 
states’ rights to discriminate based on race. In particular, state control of 
means-tested social assistance programs is a legacy of racial politics.412 
 
 405  See, e.g., Woodward & Kawachi, supra note 343, at 925 (“[H]ealth is an exquisitely 
sensitive mirror of social circumstances. . . . [R]educing the social and economic inequalities that 
lie behind the uneven distribution of disease will bring a wide range of benefits.”); CBPP REPORT, 
supra note 228, at 13–14 (noting that extending health coverage, regardless of citizenship status, 
can lead to better long-term economic outcomes). 
 406  WYATT ET AL., supra note 294, at 9 (noting how “higher rates of absenteeism and 
presenteeism (i.e., working while sick)” can reduce worker productivity).  
 407  Whitehead, supra note 282, at 431. 
 408  CBPP REPORT, supra note 228, at 13. 
 409  Id. at 13–14. 
 410  Id. at 13; see also Gostin, supra note 43, at 1439 (“[E]xpanding coverage for undocumented 
immigrants could save costs over all.”).  
 411  See, e.g., Michener, supra note 205, at 557–61 (summarizing ACA provisions supporting 
the goal of reducing racial and ethnic inequities and discrimination); id. at 549 (describing Medicaid 
expansion as “one of the ACA’s boldest and most promising mechanisms for reducing racial 
inequities”). 
 412  See, e.g., ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, TRAPPED IN AMERICA’S SAFETY NET: ONE 
FAMILY’S STRUGGLE 72–75 (2014) (explaining the links between the tradition of state control of 
social assistance programs and efforts to maintain the racial and class structure of the South). 
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Scholars adopting a nationalist perspective blame federalism for weakening 
norms underlying the federal government’s goal of promoting racial 
equality.413 
Racism plays a particularly ugly role in the development of federal 
health policy414 and, in particular, Medicaid’s cooperative federalism 
arrangement. Congress agreed to devolve authority to states to make critical 
decisions regarding their Medicaid programs in order to appease Southern 
Democrats, who wished to avoid federal scrutiny of racist policies.415 The 
racist belief that Black people are undeserving of public benefits has long 
influenced social welfare policy.416 In health policy, this belief, along with 
the racist trope of the “welfare queen” taking advantage of taxpayer 
contributions, has motivated the development of stringent eligibility criteria 
and unforgiving, punitive policies.417 Racial inequities in healthcare access 
are attributed in part to state control of Medicaid eligibility policies.418 As 
Professor Evelynn Hammonds stated, “There has never been any period in 
American history where the health of blacks was equal to that of whites . . . . 
Disparity is built into the system.”419 
The ACA was designed to implement a uniform national standard for 
Medicaid eligibility that would stealthily reduce healthcare inequities 
affecting low-income Black and Latinx people.420 Because the NFIB v. 
 
 413  See Gerken, supra note 313, at 1710 (“Academics often unthinkingly blame decentralization 
for shortfalls in our equality norms.”). 
 414  See Jeneen Interlandi, Why Doesn’t the United States Have Universal Health Care? The 
Answer Has Everything to Do with Race., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/universal-health-care-racism.html (“In 
the United States, racial health disparities have proved as foundational as democracy itself.”).  
 415  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1710 n.82 (describing the racist origins of 
Medicaid’s devolution to states); see also Interlandi, supra note 414 (describing how Southern 
Democrats obtained key concessions during negotiations over the Hill-Burton Act, enabling states 
to control the disbursement of funds for hospital construction and ensuring that they remained 
segregated).  
 416  See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS 
OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICY (1999) (positing that white Americans oppose welfare because 
recipients have often been portrayed through the lens of racial stereotypes, casting recipients as 
lazy and undeserving people of color); Madison Allen, Racism in Public Benefit Programs: Where 
Do We Go from Here?, CTR. FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y (July 23, 2020), 
http://www.clasp.org/blog/racism-public-benefit-programs-where-do-we-go-here (discussing the 
connection between racism and the history of public benefit programs and welfare reform in 
America). 
 417  See, e.g., Michener, supra note 205, at 557.  
 418  Id. at 550–51; Interlandi, supra note 414 (“Federal health care policy was designed, both 
implicitly and explicitly, to exclude black Americans. As a result, they faced an array of inequities 
. . . .”). 
 419  Interlandi, supra note 414.  
 420  See Michener, supra note 205, at 548 (“[T]he ACA was viewed as a stealthy civil-rights 
achievement of the Obama presidency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 550 (“Though 
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Sebelius decision devolved the issue of the new Medicaid expansion to the 
states, however, the ACA did not reach its potential to achieve this goal.421 
Most of the thirteen states that have not adopted the Medicaid expansion are 
in the South.422 Given the existing racial demographics of these non-
expansion states, low-income Black people are disproportionately impacted 
by state decisions to not expand Medicaid; as a result, they 
disproportionately lack access to health coverage.423 
Some scholars have linked citizenship dynamics in social policy with 
racial dynamics, suggesting that programs with decentralized administrative 
structures devolving power and discretion to local authorities are more prone 
to immigration politics.424 Because most noncitizens are people of color, the 
structural discrimination of alienage restrictions in Medicaid eligibility 
layers on to existing race-based institutional discrimination in the public 
benefits system.425 Many scholars have explored the ways in which negative 
attitudes toward Latinx and Asian people have shaped anti-immigrant 
provisions of welfare laws.426 More generally, scholars have identified a link 
between growing racial and ethnic complexity attributed to immigration and 
a decrease in generosity in social policy at the state level.427 As Professor 
Kevin Johnson has written, “[a]ntipathies for benefit recipients and 
immigrants are not completely unrelated. Indeed, one could view the ability 
 
the planned expansionary tack was not explicitly race based, the outsized presence of blacks and 
Latinos among the population of Americans living in or near poverty . . . meant that uniform 
national expansion of Medicaid would have had inequality-reducing racial effects.”). 
 421  See id. at 551 (discussing Sebelius’s “negative implications for the racial equitability of 
health resources”).  
 422  See Interlandi, supra note 414 (“Several states, most of them in the former Confederacy, 
refused to participate in Medicaid expansion. And several are still trying to make access to the 
program contingent on onerous new work requirements.”). 
 423  Michener, supra note 205, at 551. 
 424  See Brown & Kahn Best, supra note 26, at 793 (discussing research suggesting that 
decentralized programs may see stronger immigration effects); see also Reese et al., supra note 26, 
at 98–99 (“[M]any scholars suggest that the policies towards [legal immigrants] were shaped by 
wider attitudes toward the foreign-born population and its racial and ethnic make-up. . . . Various 
studies thus highlight the role of anti-Latino and anti-Asian sentiment in contributing support for 
PRWORA’s anti-immigrant provisions.”).  
 425  Daniel E. Dawes provides a simple, clear definition of these types of discrimination: 
“[S]tructural discrimination advantages one group to the disadvantage of another, whereas 
institutional discrimination employs seemingly facially neutral policies that have a disparate impact 
on racial and ethnic groups, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and people with disabilities, among 
others.” DANIEL E. DAWES, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 65–66 (2020). 
 426  See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration 
Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 17 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 457, 465 (1995) (“[T]he 
ethnicity of ‘illegal aliens’ is often a subtext to the debate about the availability of public benefits 
and services to noncitizens, as well as to the entire immigration debate.”); Reese et al., supra note 
26, at 98–99; Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 459 (noting that PRWORA “was driven by a wave of 
strong anti-immigrant sentiment along with the resurgence of nativism”). 
 427  See Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 458–59 (reviewing the literature on this relationship). 
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to immigrate . . . as one of the scarcest, and most highly sought after, public 
benefits.”428 Noncitizens, like low-income Medicaid recipients, are 
politically marginalized.429 Therefore, their ability to oppose state policies 
that restrict their access to publicly funded health coverage and other public 
benefits is attenuated.430 
Scholars have noted that some state-driven policies are designed to 
include noncitizens.431 However, it is unlikely that the decentralization trend 
in immigration law will lead to inclusive health policy because of health 
policy’s increasingly national character and because expanding noncitizen 
access to subsidized health coverage is more about health policy than it is 
about immigration policy. While it may be said that one principle of 
immigration policy is integration of noncitizens into society at large and 
especially the political community,432 the normative goal of integration in 
this context is narrower: integration into the U.S. healthcare system. In 
addition, eligibility changes in subsidized health coverage programs are only 
tangentially related to the core aspects of immigration law, admission and 
removal of noncitizens.433 
Though the nuances of immigration politics are distinct from racial 
politics because of sovereignty-related concerns, the history of alienage 
restrictions in Medicaid has racial overtones that should not be ignored by 
policymakers concerned with eliminating the influence of racism in the 
healthcare system.  
III 
FEDERALISM’S INFLUENCE 
Noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health coverage from state to state 
may be characterized as “predictable variability.”434 But what explains the 
fact that, even though all states host undocumented noncitizens, very few 
 
 428  Johnson, supra note 426, at 458–59. 
 429  Id. at 486 (discussing how noncitizens may be in fact more marginalized than low-income 
citizens); see also MICHENER, supra note 19, at 57. 
 430  Johnson, supra note 426, at 486 (“The idea that undocumented persons are not part of the 
community carries great weight in the political process.”). 
 431  See, e.g., Burch Elias, supra note 6, at 706 (discussing inclusive state-level policies such as 
expanding noncitizens’ access to drivers’ licenses, in-state tuition rates, and financial aid); see also 
Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 581–82, 591 (detailing local governments’ role in integrating 
noncitizens into public life). 
 432  See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 378–
79 (2008). 
 433  See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
 434  Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism Under the ACA: Implementation, 
Opposition, Entrenchment, in THE TRILLION DOLLAR REVOLUTION: HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT TRANSFORMED POLITICS, LAW, AND HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 176, 190 (Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel & Abbe R. Gluck eds., 2020); see also Zhu & Xu, supra note 261, at 457 (describing 
state-level policy on immigrant access to Medicaid as “show[ing] mixed promises”). 
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have engaged in serious efforts to address these individuals’ health coverage 
needs?  
This Part describes how Medicaid’s structure can influence states’ 
policymaking on noncitizen access to health coverage. It explains how 
federalism enables states to make or maintain policy that entrenches the 
“othering” of noncitizens in healthcare and undermines national health 
policy goals;435 and how it frustrates other states’ attempts to enact 
inclusionary policy that would advance those goals. This analysis is inspired 
by leading scholars from the progressive federalism school who urge others 
to bring “focused attention to historical realities and policy specificities” in 
order to understand the relationship between federalism and equality in a 
given context.436 
A. Enabling Exclusionary Policymaking 
The laws governing noncitizen access to subsidized health coverage are 
situated at the intersection of health law and immigration law. History 
demonstrates the uneven but steady progress toward centralizing the 
regulation of matters related to health.437 Immigration law, on the other hand, 
is the traditional domain of the federal government.438 Immigration laws 
govern matters relating to the admission and expulsion of noncitizens, which 
sometimes take into consideration a noncitizen’s use of public benefits in the 
United States.439 Alienage laws govern matters relating to the lives of 
 
 435  See generally Edna A. Viruell-Fuentes, Patricia Y. Miranda & Sawsan Abdulrahim, More 
Than Culture: Structural Racism, Intersectionality Theory, and Immigrant Health, 75 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 2099, 2101 (2012) (describing the concept of “othering” as “processes [that] produce and 
reproduce marginalization, disempowerment and social exclusion”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 436  MICHENER, supra note 19, at 33; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1308 (2009) (describing the usefulness of case 
studies for illuminating their account of uncooperative federalism); Heather K. Gerken, Our 
Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2012) (encouraging context-specific 
examinations of institutional arrangements); Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1703 (criticizing 
federalism scholarship for being “high on abstraction and low on concreteness”); Hammond, supra 
note 19, at 1724–27 (2017) (describing the need for a case-specific approach as opposed to a trans-
substantive and theoretical approach to federalism). But see Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 
1694 (arguing that assessing the success of structural arrangements in healthcare is impossible until 
the field of health law establishes first principles). 
 437  For example, in 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could regulate health 
insurance under the Commerce Clause, because insurance is national commerce. Gluck & 
Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1707 (citing United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 
552–53 (1944)). In 1945, Congress legislated to return that power to the states, so long as Congress 
has not explicitly regulated in that space. Id. at 1707–08 (citing McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 
Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2018)). 
 438  See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing the plenary power doctrine). 
 439  Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 201, 202 (1994).  
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noncitizen residents once they are within the United States.440 
The federal government’s authority to impose alienage restrictions on 
eligibility for public benefits is well-established under its broad 
constitutional powers over immigration-related matters.441 So long as 
alienage restrictions are supported by a rational basis, they will generally be 
upheld.442 Because of this low bar, only rarely have courts invalidated federal 
laws discriminating against noncitizens as unconstitutional.443 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has interpreted state authority to 
impose alienage restrictions on eligibility for public benefits differently.444  
In Graham v. Richardson, the Court considered an equal protection 
challenge brought by lawfully residing immigrants against state welfare laws 
that discriminated between citizens and noncitizens.445 After considering 
whether the state laws violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court looked 
to whether the state laws were preempted by the exclusive federal 
immigration power.446 A state alienage restriction on public benefits 
eligibility is considered immigration policy because it imposes an auxiliary 
burden on lawfully present noncitizens that is stricter than the conditions that 
Congress has imposed on their residence.447 If it is not preempted, equal 
 
 440  Id. 
 441  See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (noting that “the fact that Congress has 
provided some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens” 
and suggesting that “[n]either the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, 
the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to 
a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some 
of its guests”); Wishnie, supra note 6, at 506–07 (describing how the plenary power doctrine 
explains the Court’s deference to the federal government’s decisions to discriminate between 
citizens and noncitizens in the administration of public benefits).  
 442  See Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 501, 511–14 (2018) (summarizing case law on challenges to disparate treatment of 
noncitizens in welfare programs). Courts have recognized several rational bases for discriminating 
between citizens and noncitizens in the administration of public benefits in the many unsuccessful 
legal challenges to PRWORA’s alienage restrictions. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 
598, 606–07 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he citizenship requirement is still rationally related to the goal of 
encouraging aliens to rely on private, not public, resources to meet their needs.”); Rodriguez ex rel. 
Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1999) (“the legitimate purpose of 
reducing the cost of [] welfare programs [food stamps and Supplemental Security Income]”); Kiev 
v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (D. Minn. 1998) (“promoting naturalization and placing the 
highest priority for limited welfare funds to provide for citizens”); Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
598 N.W.2d 887, 892 (S.D. 1999) (“legitimate interest in implementing the nation’s immigration 
policy and its uniform rules with respect to alien eligibility for public benefits”). 
 443  Wishnie, supra note 6, at 501. 
 444  See generally Ava Ayers, Discriminatory Cooperative Federalism, 65 VILL. L. REV. 1 
(2020) (analyzing doctrines governing Congress’s authority to devolve its power to discriminate 
against noncitizens). 
 445  403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 446  Id. at 376–78.  
 447  See id. at 378–79 (“[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority 
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protection principles apply because states lack a like power to regulate.448 
The Court struck down the alienage restrictions because the states’ cost-
based rationales did not satisfy strict scrutiny.449 
The legacy of Graham v. Richardson prior to the passage of PRWORA 
was that state public benefit laws that discriminated against lawfully present 
noncitizens were upheld only if they satisfied strict scrutiny.450 On account 
of the exclusive federal power over immigration, courts analyzed equal 
protection claims brought by noncitizens differently depending on whether 
they were challenging state or federal laws.451 With the passage of 
PRWORA, Congress largely eliminated the divergent treatment of state and 
federal alienage restrictions on federal public benefits by explicitly 
authorizing states to enact discriminatory public benefit laws in a way that 
does not withstand strict scrutiny. As Professor Parmet notes, “PRWORA 
attempts to protect states that discriminate against non-citizens in a manner 
that would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.”452 
Post-PRWORA, courts’ analyses of discriminatory state laws have 
focused on whether the state is merely implementing federal law—in which 
case rational basis review applies—or whether it is governing a state-funded, 
state-administered program—in which case strict scrutiny would still 
apply.453 In essence, in the area of public benefits, Congress has devolved its 
authority to discriminate against noncitizens with limited judicial review to 
states.454 As a result, states have faced very few barriers to excluding 
 
in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . states cannot, inconsistently with the 
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce 
additional or auxiliary regulations.” (alteration in original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 66–67) (1941)).  
 448  See id. at 377–78. LPRs have long been considered “persons” protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 
U.S. 410, 419 n.7 (1948) (citing several Supreme Court cases dating back to 1886 recognizing this 
principle). State discrimination against undocumented immigrants, on the other hand, has not been 
subject to heightened scrutiny except for in one case, Plyler v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a Texas law restricting public education access to undocumented 
immigrants. Cf. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the 
free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be 
justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made 
here.”). 
 449  Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. 
 450  Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?, 73 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 77, 93, 102–03 (2016). 
 451  See Parmet, supra note 6, at 226.  
 452  Id. at 233 n.81.  
 453  See Conn. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2004-002, Opinion Letter on Constitutionality of 2002 
Conn. Pub. Acts No. 02-07 (Feb. 24, 2004). As described in note 448, supra, this bifurcated 
standard does not apply to state discrimination against undocumented noncitizens.  
 454  In Massachusetts and New York, courts have determined that alienage restrictions for 
subsidized health coverage that apply to lawfully present immigrants violate their state 
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noncitizens from Medicaid, regardless of their reasons for doing so. Racism, 
nativism, and xenophobia are among the motivations driving social welfare 
policy in the states. 
B. Creating Barriers for Inclusionary Policymaking 
For states desiring to enact health policies that are inclusive of low-
income noncitizen residents, the decentralized structure of the laws 
governing noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid represents a barrier. In this 
Section, I describe the fiscal and political barriers that frustrate state efforts 
to enact inclusionary policies that address the healthcare needs of 
noncitizens.  
Any expansion of health coverage, whether it is at the state or federal 
level, requires the infusion of public funds. For states, Medicaid is both a 
major expenditure and the largest source of federal funding.455 In terms of 
fiscal capacity, states begin at remarkably different baselines. In addition, 
states have varying ratios of noncitizen residents to citizen residents. These 
factors can limit their ability to self-fund health coverage programs or even 
to take advantage of federal options to expand Medicaid coverage, since 
states are responsible for a portion of the costs.456 Indeed, Medicaid’s 
cooperative federal-state financing arrangement does not effectively address 
states’ fiscal difficulties because “the states most in need of help will be those 
least able to claim it.”457 In the broader health reform context, we see that 
some states have cited fiscal concerns as one reason for declining to adopt 
the ACA Medicaid expansion, even though federal support for expansion is 
exceptionally generous.458 Because federal funding for Medicaid expansion 
to noncitizens is less generous or nonexistent, we can expect fiscal concerns 
to be an even greater consideration in state policymaking. For example, 
PRWORA imposed a five-year bar on LPR eligibility for Medicaid, with 
limited exceptions.459 Immediately post-PRWORA, states had to consider 
 
constitutions. See Parmet, supra note 6, at 234 (citing Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012) and Fayad ex rel. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 
N.E.2d 1085, 1098–99 (N.Y. 2001)).  
 455  Robin Rudowitz, Kendal Orgera & Elizabeth Hinton, Medicaid Financing: The Basics, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2019), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-
financing-the-basics/view/print.  
 456  Cf. ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 4 (“States with higher per capita incomes 
are also generally more likely to provide assistance than states with lower per capita incomes.”). 
 457  David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2587 (2005).  
 458  See David K. Jones, Phillip M. Singer & John Z. Ayanian, The Changing Landscape of 
Medicaid: Practical and Political Considerations for Expansion, 311 JAMA 1965, 1966 (2014) 
(describing state officials’ concerns that the federal government will not sustain its increased share 
of Medicaid funding, further burdening states in the long term). The federal share of the cost of 
Medicaid expansion was 100% from 2014 to 2016, phasing down to 90% in 2020. Id. at 1965.  
 459  See supra notes 151–55, 158 and accompanying text. 
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the fiscal implications of devoting state funds to restoring Medicaid 
eligibility to certain LPRs for whom expansion was optional. More 
dauntingly, states were faced with the decision of whether to use state funds 
only to restore publicly funded health coverage for LPRs during their first 
five years in the United States. It is likely that some states concluded that it 
was infeasible to do so.460 After the ICHIA options became available, 
providing states with the opportunity to expand Medicaid to a subset of 
noncitizens who had lost coverage under PRWORA, states once again 
weighed the decision of devoting significant state funds to expanding access 
to health coverage for low-income noncitizens against other fiscal needs.  
Most states, unlike the federal government, are constitutionally required 
to balance their budgets every year.461 This means that during economic 
recessions, states must find ways to cut spending. Often, these cuts 
disproportionately affect countercyclical spending programs such as 
Medicaid, which increase spending when revenues are down.462 As more 
residents become eligible for Medicaid due to income loss, there is pressure 
for the state to restrict eligibility criteria and services in order to limit 
spending. Since eliminating programs due to budget constraints is always 
unpopular, politicians may be wary of committing funding to covering 
groups that are not required to be covered by Medicaid—which includes 
many noncitizens. 
Even if a state had elected federal options to expand Medicaid to some 
noncitizens and then cut coverage of these groups during a recession, it is 
unlikely that the former level of coverage would be restored after the 
recession. During economic recoveries, states rarely restore eligibility and 
services back to their prior level due to competition for resources from other 
programs. Spending generally declines as the economy improves and fewer 
residents qualify.463 Therefore, state balanced budget requirements, among 
other structural influences, have the effect of systematically ratcheting down 
state spending on countercyclical programs over time.464 With fewer 
resources to devote to subsidizing health coverage overall, programs 
covering the least politically appealing groups such as low-income 
 
 460  See ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 46 (“States with higher per capita incomes 
are generally more likely to provide assistance than states with lower per capita incomes. States 
with the lowest per capita incomes almost uniformly provide fewer benefits . . . .”); Reese et al., 
supra note 26, at 117 (“[L]egal immigrants’ welfare rights partly depend on economic 
conditions. . . . [S]tates adopted more exclusive policies when they had a higher poverty rate (and 
hence a larger demand for welfare).”). 
 461  Super, supra note 456, at 2608–09. 
 462  See id. at 2632–33. 
 463  Id. at 2635–36 (“[T]hese programs’ budgets are vulnerable to budget-driven cuts in bad 
economic times and demand-driven reductions in good ones.”). 
 464  Id. at 2615.  
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noncitizens, are deprioritized.465 For example, post-PRWORA, most states 
were not persuaded to maintain the status quo of coverage for lawfully 
present but non-qualified noncitizens.466 Programs that cover populations 
that are ineligible for Medicaid matching funds, such as undocumented 
noncitizens, may be considered the most expendable from both fiscal and 
political perspectives.  
By 1998, only fourteen states had used state funds to restore publicly 
funded health insurance comparable to Medicaid for noncitizen groups 
affected by PRWORA’s five-year bar.467 Some states initially restored 
eligibility for state-funded health coverage to only a subset of noncitizens 
affected by the five-year bar. For example, within two years of PRWORA’s 
passage, Illinois and Rhode Island provided coverage to noncitizen children 
and pregnant women; Maryland provided coverage to noncitizen children, 
full-time students expected to complete high school before the end of the 
calendar year, and pregnant noncitizens; Virginia provided coverage to 
noncitizen children and noncitizens receiving Medicaid and living in long-
term care facilities on June 30, 1997; and Washington and Connecticut 
imposed new residency requirements of twelve months and six months, 
respectively, for noncitizens who were no longer eligible for Medicaid 
because of the five-year bar.468  Since then, at least fifteen more states have 
used exclusively state funds to provide publicly funded health coverage to 
categories of noncitizens excluded by PRWORA.469  
These state-funded programs differ significantly in terms of the eligible 
noncitizen categories,470 reflecting different priorities about how best to fill 
the gaps that federal law leaves behind. This variability is a function of 
PRWORA’s new federal floor of noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid and its 
devolution of authority to states to determine noncitizen eligibility for groups 
above that floor. Even some states that had provided relatively generous 
benefits to lawfully present noncitizens in the past “reset” their floor during 
 
 465  See id. at 2565–66 (noting that the federal government, in healthcare financing, “commonly 
takes the most politically appealing functions for itself, leaving the less desirable ones to uncertain 
fates at the hands of the states”).  
 466  Wishnie, supra note 6, at 514–16. 
 467  See ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 59 tbl.4.  
 468  See id. at 64 tbl.8. 
 469  See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note 
29, at 1–5. In addition to the six states (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and 
Washington) and the District of Columbia, whose programs are discussed in Part I.B, they are 
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 
Part I.B.4 reviewed how states have taken advantage of the ICHIA and Unborn Child options to 
jointly fund coverage for some categories of noncitizens who lost eligibility post-PRWORA. 
 470  See id. For example, Minnesota uses state funds only to provide coverage to DACA 
recipients and individuals who receive services from the Center for Victims of Torture, while New 
Mexico provides coverage to qualified battered noncitizens and PRUCOL noncitizens who resided 
in the United States before PRWORA was enacted.  
2020.11.09. MAKHLOUF. LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2020  10:25 AM 
December 2020] LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION  179 
 
this period of public benefits retrenchment in order to maintain high benefit 
levels for the mandatory coverage groups.471 
Since fiscal and political concerns are typically two sides of the same 
coin, a related way in which the federalism arrangement governing 
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid creates a barrier for inclusionary 
policymaking is by siloing state-level advocacy. In consequence, it becomes 
harder for organizations to harness synergies and pool knowledge and 
resources to advance equitable policy.472 Since states have wide discretion to 
make policy in this area, every state is a unique piece of the patchwork of 
immigration exclusion from Medicaid.473 When each state has a different 
baseline of coverage for immigrants, advocates for inclusionary policy must 
focus their energy and resources on different goals.  
Despite these political and cost-related barriers, recent state efforts to 
expand coverage for noncitizens are making incremental progress toward 
coverage for all residents.474 California has taken the lead in this effort by 
expanding Medi-Cal to undocumented children in 2016 and to young adults 
up to the age of twenty-six in 2020.475 Still, in 2019, a proposal to expand 
Medi-Cal to all undocumented adults was vigorously debated and ultimately 
defeated over cost-related concerns.476 A modified proposal to cover 
undocumented senior citizens was defeated on the same grounds.477 
California governor Gavin Newsom continues to support an expansion of 
Medi-Cal to undocumented senior citizens, maintaining that universal health 
 
 471  Cf. Reese et al., supra note 26, at 105–06. 
 472  See Michener, supra note 14, at 119 (describing the “‘many-headed’ [Medicaid] policy that 
takes very different forms in different places” and thus makes it harder for advocates to coordinate 
efforts across state lines).  
 473  See supra Section I.B (describing the patchwork of exclusion).  
 474  See, e.g., Odette Yousef, Undocumented, Low-Income Illinois Seniors Can Soon Get 
Publicly Funded Health Coverage, NPR (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/local/309/2020/06/11/874985727/undocumented-low-income-illinois-
seniors-can-soon-get-publicly-funded-health-coverage (describing how Illinois became “the first 
state in the country to expand publicly funded health care coverage to undocumented seniors and 
seniors who have held green cards for less than five years,” although fiscal concerns limited the 
initial proposal to expand state-funded health coverage to all Illinois residents who qualified 
financially); Rosanna Carvacho, Charlie Iovino, Sage Schaftel & Gianna Setoudeh, Expansion of 
Medicaid Eligibility for Undocumented Young Adults, JD SUPRA (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/expansion-of-medicaid-eligibility-for-55794 (describing 
proposals by California and Washington to expand Medicaid eligibility for undocumented young 
adults and related fiscal considerations). 
 475  SB 75 - Full Scope Medi-Cal for All Children, DHCS, 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Pages/SB-75.aspx (last updated July 19, 
2019); Young Adult Expansion, DHCS, http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-
cal/eligibility/Pages/YoungAdultExp.aspx (last updated July 21, 2020). 
 476  See, e.g., Caiola, Promise of Health Benefits, supra note 240. 
 477  Id. 
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coverage will ultimately save money.478 In January 2020, he proposed to 
allocate $80.5 million from the state general fund for that purpose in the 
2020-21 budget.479  
Meanwhile, in Georgia, undocumented and lawfully present but non-
qualified noncitizens are excluded from Medicaid, as are most qualified 
noncitizens for the first five years after obtaining that status.480 The state has 
not elected any of the federal options to expand Medicaid or CHIP to 
additional noncitizens.481 Nor, unsurprisingly, has it created state-funded 
programs to expand noncitizen access to health coverage.482 In 2015, the 
executive director of Georgians for a Healthy Future, an advocacy group 
dedicated to closing the coverage gap for low-income Georgians, observed: 
“We are having a very different conversation . . . I think we are really far 
away as a state from where California is.”483 Health advocacy efforts are 
currently focused on supporting Medicaid expansion for low-income citizens 
and otherwise eligible immigrants.  
This is a sign of a larger flaw in Medicaid’s structure. Jamila Michener 
writes that “[f]ederalism can fragment the politics of Medicaid, splinter 
policy coalitions and interest groups, raise barriers to political coordination 
across locales, impede democratic accountability, and differentially 
demobilize policy beneficiaries as well as those who live in communities 
alongside them.”484 These effects are particularly acute in the post-ACA, 
polarized health policy space in which state-level advocates must funnel 
resources toward defending against attacks and maintaining the status quo 
 
 478  See, e.g., Angela Hart, Newsom Proposes Medicaid Benefits for Undocumented Senior 
Citizens, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2020, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2020/01/10/newsom-proposes-medicaid-benefits-
for-undocumented-senior-citizens-1248937 (noting that “Gov. Gavin Newsom is proposing that 
California provide Medicaid benefits to undocumented senior citizens” and citing the Governor’s 
remarks that doing so “is the right thing morally” and also “financially responsible”). 
 479  Id. 
 480  See Laura Harker, Five-Year Waiting Period Is a Barrier to Immigrant Health Care Access, 
GA. BUDGET & POL’Y INST. (Oct. 21, 2019), http://gbpi.org/2019/five-year-waiting-period-barrier-
immigrant-health (“Georgia children and pregnant women who are lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs or ‘green card’ holders) typically must wait five years after they gain this status to be eligible 
for Medicaid or PeachCare.”). 
 481  See id. (“When the CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2009 was signed into law on February 4, 
2009, it included several policies to get more children enrolled in health care coverage. . . . 
Georgia’s Medicaid agency can take [these options] . . . .”). 
 482 See MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR IMMIGRANTS IN VARIOUS STATES, supra note 
29 (listing states that provide access to health coverage to noncitizens beyond the federal floor of 
Medicaid and CHIP coverage and enumerating the programs offered, but excluding other states, 
such as Georgia, that offer no such access).  
 483  Anna Gorman, California Has Novel View of Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2015/01/17/california-dramatically-different-approach-to-health-care-for-undocumented-
immigrants/21871167.  
 484  Michener, supra note 14, at 119. 
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rather than imagining a more inclusive future.485 For example, in states like 
Georgia that are proposing to adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion only if a 
waiver imposing work requirements on recipients is approved, advocacy 
organizations are divided on whether to support the effort.486 One can 
imagine how immigrant-inclusionary policy would meet a similar fate, 
dividing healthcare consumers who would otherwise stand to benefit from 
joint advocacy.487 
IV 
THE LIMITS OF DECENTRALIZED POLICY 
As described in Part I, federalism arrangements in healthcare are not 
constitutionally required.488 Therefore, Congress must have had other 
reasons for designing Medicaid as a cooperative federalism program. 
Scholars have explored many possible reasons why Congress devolves 
regulatory authority to states on matters which it indisputably possesses the 
power to regulate.489 However, the overarching justification for federalism 
in Medicaid is the assumption that state-run programs will result in better 
policy outcomes: better quality, lower costs, and more competition and 
innovation.490 
Policy experimentation is the federalism value that is most often used 
to justify cooperative federalism arrangements in the regulation of healthcare 
 
 485  See id. at 120 (“Although [health policy advocates] continue to push back as each new hurdle 
is erected, doing so absorbs energy that might otherwise be useful for mobilizing more broadly and 
deeply, thinking beyond the most immediate political challenges and organizing affirmatively—
not just against regressive change but for positive change.”).  
 486  See Michener, supra note 14, at 120–21; Georgia Proposal to Partially Expand Medicaid 
Would Disproportionately Jeopardize Patients with Cancer, ASCO (Jan. 21, 2020), 
https://www.asco.org/practice-policy/policy-issues-statements/asco-in-action/georgia-proposal-
partially-expand-medicaid; Jill Nolin, Commenters Question State Medicaid Waiver Plan for Work 
Requirements, GA. RECORDER (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://georgiarecorder.com/2019/12/13/commenters-question-state-medicaid-waiver-plan-for-
work-requirements. 
 487  Id. at 125–26 (“[T]hese negative feedback processes can dampen coalitional possibilities by 
straining the organizations that might work to forge coalitions and dividing those with the most at 
stake.”).  
 488  See discussion supra notes 78–81. 
 489  For example, Abbe Gluck has described four ways in which state implementation of federal 
law can benefit federal lawmaking: It can do so by (1) encouraging and influencing experimentation 
at the state level; (2) entrenching federal statutory norms; (3) easing entry into a field of lawmaking 
that is traditionally governed by the states; and (4) effectuating traditional federalism values such 
as autonomy, policy variation, and political participation. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory 
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform 
and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 565 (2011). Although this discussion focuses on the policy 
experimentation rationale, it should not be read to exclude these and other factors that may have 
influenced Congress’s decision to devolve authority over immigrant eligibility for Medicaid to the 
states. 
 490  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1799.  
2020.11.09. MAKHLOUF. LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2020  10:25 AM 
182 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:XXX 
 
and is the focus of this discussion.491 In theory, federalism arrangements 
enable states to engage in policy experimentation.492 These experiments are 
considered valuable because they produce useful knowledge in a contained 
environment, provide templates for other states to replicate successful 
experiments, and result in the enactment of optimal policy, i.e., policies that 
accomplish their intended effects and that do not have counterproductive 
side effects. This is Justice Brandeis’s well-known depiction of states as 
“laboratories of democracy.”493  
However, federalism arrangements do not always produce optimal 
experimentation. This Part explores the limits of decentralization for 
producing optimal policy, showing why the current structure of Medicaid 
fails to meet the goals of federalism itself. I identify the mechanisms that 
stifle state policy experimentation and that impede replication by other 
states. Although this Part focuses on the devolution of policy governing 
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, the insights described extend beyond this 
context. Federalism scholars may use this analysis to inform broader 
investigations of the relationship between decentralization of policy and its 
effects on equality.  
A. Sluggish Experimentation 
In the ideal conception of states as laboratories of democracy, states 
would compete to test hypotheses about the effects of expanding or 
restricting noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded health coverage. But 
states have not done this in practice. Rather, experimentation has been 
sluggish, and immigrant-inclusive policy diffusion is nearly nonexistent. 
 One of the challenges of policy learning across states in this context is 
undoubtedly ideological polarization on issues relating to noncitizens’ rights. 
Restrictionist ideology can cloud state officials’ judgment even in the face 
of empirical evidence contradicting their views. For example, in popular and 
scholarly discourse, a principal argument against offering generous 
healthcare or other benefits to noncitizens is the fear of creating a “welfare 
magnet” for low-income noncitizens.494 The welfare magnet hypothesis 
 
 491  Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 457.  
 492  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (“It is one of the happy incidents 
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 493  See id. 
 494  See, e.g., Corrado Giulietti, The Welfare Magnet Hypothesis and the Welfare Take-up of 
Migrants, 37 IZA WORLD LAB. 1, 3 (2014) (“There is a widespread perception in developed 
countries that immigrants from less-developed areas . . . potentially decide to migrate to countries 
offering more generous welfare programs.”); Peter Nannestad, Immigration and Welfare States: A 
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predicts that low-income noncitizens will cluster in nations or states with the 
most generous benefits.495 Despite the dominance of this justification for 
immigration restrictionism, theoretical and empirical social science literature 
on the relationship between welfare states and immigration is surprisingly 
sparse.496 Existing empirical support for the welfare magnet hypothesis is 
mixed, and there is some evidence against it in the Medicaid context.497 One 
recent study examining interstate migration of noncitizens between 2000 and 
2016 found that state expansions of Medicaid or CHIP to lawfully present 
children or pregnant women under the ICHIA options were not associated 
with migration in pursuit of health insurance.498 The authors suggest that this 
conclusion has important implications for states considering expanding 
health coverage for noncitizens, particularly as they estimate the short- and 
long-term costs of expansion.499 Despite the lack of evidence supporting the 
welfare magnet hypothesis, it is among the most common objections to 
expanding public benefits for noncitizens.  
Conversely, state-level executive officials like governors and 
healthcare agency heads may already be persuaded that expanding access for 
noncitizens is good health policy, but they may be unwilling to enact such 
policy if they feel it is the federal government’s responsibility to remedy the 
disparity in noncitizen access to health coverage. Communities with large 
populations of excluded noncitizens have sued the federal government in 
order to obtain reimbursement for the cost of providing healthcare benefits 
to them.500 Their argument is that since the federal government is responsible 
 
Survey of 15 Years of Research, 23 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 512, 516–17 (2007) (reviewing scholarly 
literature on the welfare magnet hypothesis). 
 495  Nannestad, supra note 494, at 516–17 (citing George J. Borjas, Immigration and Welfare 
Magnets, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 607 (1999)).  
 496  See id. at 513 (noting that most research on the welfare state and immigration has only been 
done within economics).  
 497  See id. at 516–17 (reviewing the mixed findings in the literature on the welfare magnet 
hypothesis); Giulietti, supra note 494, at 4 (reviewing the same body of literature, but concluding 
that any welfare magnet effect that may exist is “limited compared with other determinants of 
migration”); Neeraj Kaushal, New Immigrants’ Location Choices: Magnets Without Welfare, 23 J. 
LAB. ECON. 59, 79 (2005) (finding that the availability and generosity of welfare programs have 
little effect on the location choices of newly arrived immigrants); Madeline Zavodny, Determinants 
of Recent Immigrants’ Locational Choices, 33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1014, 1028 (1999) (finding 
“little evidence that recent recipients of LPR status base their locational choices within the United 
States on the generosity of welfare benefits,” but noting that new refugees and asylees are more 
likely to settle in states with more generous welfare programs providing cash and nutrition 
benefits). 
 498  Vasil I. Yasenov, Duncan Lawrence, Fernando S. Mendoza & Jens Hainmueller, Public 
Health Insurance Expansion for Immigrant Children and Interstate Migration of Low-Income 
Immigrants, 174 JAMA PEDIATRICS 22, 27 (2020). 
 499  Id.  
 500  See Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th 
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for both making immigration policy and barring certain noncitizens from 
eligibility for federal public benefits, it should be responsible for the results 
of its policies.501 Although these lawsuits were ultimately unsuccessful,502 
they reflect the normative argument that the federal government should 
indemnify or compensate state governments when federal policies—
particularly those that are exclusively within federal authority—create costs 
for states.503 At times, the federal government has recognized a responsibility 
to compensate states for such costs, as when it created State Legalization 
Impact Assistance Grants to assist states with the costs of providing social 
services to formerly undocumented noncitizens who obtained status through 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.504 In the absence of such 
recognition and assistance, states may be driven to make suboptimal 
policy.505 When states fail to enact the policies that they deem optimal for 
their populations, federalism is not producing useful knowledge from the 
state laboratories.  
 More broadly, PRWORA crippled meaningful state experimentation on 
immigrant-inclusive Medicaid policy by making exclusion, rather than 
inclusion, the norm at the federal level. It is an example of how federal 
legislation can “influence the direction of state experiments in ways that state 
experimentation in the absence of federal law does not.”506 By imposing new 
restrictions on the use of federal funds to cover many previously eligible, 
lawfully present noncitizens, PRWORA made it much harder for states to 
experiment with inclusive Medicaid policy. States are unable to function as 
autonomous laboratories because, in the current federalism arrangement, 
they are heavily beholden to federal funds and, therefore, federal laws 
dictating how those funds must be spent. Moreover, the reality is that most 
states are not in a good position to self-fund expansions of publicly funded 
 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996); Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1471 (describing state 
lawsuits against the federal government to recover social service costs associated with 
undocumented immigration). 
 501  See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 436, at 1267 (explaining that one of the main 
arguments against commandeering is the belief that the federal government should cover the costs 
of its policies); Calvo, supra note 73, at 411 (describing how Florida senators successfully 
advocated for making PRUCOL noncitizens eligible for SSI in 1972 based on the disproportionate 
economic burden they would face if eligibility for the benefit were more restrictive).  
 502  All were dismissed as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. 
 503  See Super, supra note 456, at 2572 (describing the compensatory model).  
 504  See id. (naming the State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants as one of the few times the 
federal government has compensated states for costs resulting from federal policies). 
 505  See, e.g., Angela M. Elsperger, Florida’s Battle with the Federal Government over 
Immigration Policy Holds Children Hostage: They Are Not Our Children!, 13 LAW & INEQ. 141, 
147 (1995) (telling the story behind Chiles v. United States, in which Florida claimed that it must 
deny foster care to undocumented noncitizen children in response to the federal government’s lack 
of enforcement of immigration laws and reimbursement for program costs).  
 506  Gluck, supra note 489, at 568.  
2020.11.09. MAKHLOUF. LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2020  10:25 AM 
December 2020] LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION  185 
 
health coverage to noncitizens because of variability in resources 
(complicated by the requirement in most states to balance the budget each 
year) and in where excluded noncitizen populations reside.507  
Finally, the existing structure of federal exclusion of noncitizens from 
Medicaid, the state patchwork of coverage, and federal mechanisms to 
reimburse healthcare providers for treating excluded noncitizens depress 
state experimentation and produce suboptimal policy. When states 
undersupply the optimal level of subsidized health coverage for noncitizens, 
they increase the likelihood that noncitizens will delay care until there is an 
emergency. Rather than seek treatment for health conditions from a primary 
care provider, where it is likely they can be treated relatively effectively and 
inexpensively, uninsured people tend to seek treatment when the condition 
has progressed to the point that it is too painful or debilitating to bear. And 
they seek it in the emergency room, the most expensive place to receive 
care.508  
 The federal government has committed to bearing a significant portion 
of these costs through programs to partially reimburse states such as 
Emergency Medicaid,509 Disproportionate Share Hospital payments,510 and 
supplemental funding for healthcare provided to undocumented 
noncitizens.511 By stepping in to cushion the costs of bad policy, the federal 
government creates another disincentive for state innovation. When states 
are shielded from bearing the full cost of inefficient policies—and instead 
externalize a significant portion of the costs on to the federal government—
they do not have the incentive to improve those policies. Centralizing 
funding and decisions about noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid would avoid 
this scenario.  
On the other hand, if the federal government did not absorb some of the 
costs of healthcare for excluded noncitizens, there would be a risk of creating 
a “race to the bottom” in which states that are concerned about the welfare 
magnet effect and the associated fiscal burden of expanding healthcare 
 
 507  See discussion supra Section III.B.  
 508  See supra notes 383–84 and accompanying text.  
 509  See supra notes 386–88 and accompanying text.  
 510 See Teresa A. Coughlin, Leighton Ku & Johnny Kim, Reforming the Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Program, 22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 137, 137, 139 
(2000); Super, supra note 227, at 8–9; see also discussion supra Section I.B.2. 
 511  See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1470 (describing Congress’s authorization of “state 
legalization impact assistance grants” in 1986 to partially reimburse states for costs associated with 
providing services to previously undocumented immigrants who obtained status under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act); Perkins, supra note 356, at 392 (describing Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 funding to subsidize emergency Medicaid for twelve states with the greatest 
number of undocumented immigrants and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 funding for providers in all states for emergency health services to 
undocumented immigrants).  
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benefits would enact policies that are less generous than those of their 
neighbors.512 Specifically, in this context, states would select more restrictive 
alienage criteria for Medicaid.513 From both the state and national 
perspectives, the race to the bottom would produce suboptimal policy for 
residents who would benefit from health coverage.  
B. Incidental Health Policy 
Another theoretical benefit of the laboratories of democracy concept is 
that states should replicate successful healthcare policy experiments.514 As 
described in the previous Section, few states have been able to engage in 
meaningful policy experimentation to expand health coverage to noncitizens. 
The successful experiments that have been conducted have, with few 
exceptions, not been replicated. Take coverage of kidney transplants as a 
case study: Illinois is the first and only state to fund kidney transplants for 
people with ESKD regardless of citizenship or immigration status.515 In order 
to pass the authorizing legislation, physician advocates joined forces with 
community activists to explain to state legislators that, “[f]or patients with 
renal failure, a kidney transplant represents the only path to full recovery.”516 
They assembled evidence that undocumented noncitizens donate a 
disproportionate share of transplanted organs.517 Although humanitarian and 
fairness concerns did play a role in persuading legislators to support the bill, 
the most persuasive rationale was related to costs, because the cost of 
providing standard dialysis treatment begins to exceed the cost of a kidney 
transplant at two years and nine months.518 Despite this compelling 
pragmatic and moral case for why states should fund kidney transplants for 
excluded noncitizens, no other states have followed Illinois’s example. In 
fact, some states do not even cover regular dialysis treatment for excluded 
noncitizens with kidney failure.519  
This example demonstrates that even if a state’s policy experimentation 
produces useful information from a social welfare perspective, other states 
 
 512  See Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence, 
66 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 505, 507 (2000) (explaining the race-to-the-bottom argument in favor of 
federal welfare contributions in the form of matching grants). Even though the evidence does not 
support the existence of a welfare magnet effect, states may rely on it out of fear or xenophobia.  
 513  See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 1471 (explaining how state-level cuts to public benefits 
could create a race to the bottom if the welfare magnet hypothesis is accepted). 
 514  See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1689 (2014) 
(explaining that many theories about state policy experimentation expect states to copy the policies 
of other states when there is accessible information about the policy). 
 515  See Ansell et al., supra note 120, at 782.  
 516  Id. at 782–83.  
 517  Id. at 783–84. 
 518  Id. at 784. 
 519  See supra text accompanying notes 119–23. 
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may not use that information to inform their own policy content.520 Rather, 
state policies on subsidizing healthcare for noncitizens—like state policies 
on subsidizing healthcare generally—track other factors (demographic, 
fiscal, political, etc.) more closely than any useful indicator of “good” health 
policy.521 Scholars have also observed a remarkable degree of path 
dependence in healthcare policy: poorer, southern states tend to decline 
options to expand cooperative federalism social welfare programs while 
wealthier states cash in on such options to the maximum extent.522  
A tradition of welfare generosity to residents may also influence a 
state’s decision to provide public benefits to noncitizens. Some scholars have 
theorized that “states with more generous welfare spending in the past would 
be more likely to spend more subsequently and to be more inclusive.”523 In 
line with this hypothesis, one study found that states with the most generous 
welfare benefits for the general population were more likely to restore 
benefits for noncitizens after PRWORA.524  
Studies that have examined the effect of immigration on state social 
welfare policies do not reach consistent conclusions about the direction and 
extent of the relationship.525 For example, they do not establish a relationship 
between the size of a state’s foreign-born population and the inclusivity of 
social welfare policies for noncitizens.526 Reese et al. have proposed various 
 
 520  See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 
955 (2016) (describing how, on some policy issues, state action seems to be motivated more by 
ideological preference than by the desire to achieve federal policy outcomes in cooperative 
federalism arrangements); Wiseman, supra note 514, at 1718 (2014) (noting that states may 
produce inadequate information regarding their policy experimentation in part as a result of their 
“political views”). 
 521  See Reese et al., supra note 26 (describing the relationship between states’ decisions to 
restore public benefits eligibility to authorized noncitizens after PRWORA and various other 
factors).  
 522  See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 1717 (discussing poorer, southern states’ reluctance 
to expand Medicaid and wealthier states’ embrace of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion). 
 523  Reese et al., supra note 26, at 105 (describing the “institutionalist perspective”). 
 524  ZIMMERMANN & TUMLIN, supra note 156, at 46. Some studies have found that states with 
more immigrant-inclusive welfare policies tend to provide less generous TANF benefits. Rodney 
E. Hero & Robert R. Preuhs, Immigration and the Evolving Welfare State: Examining Policies in 
the U.S. States, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 498, 510 (2007) [hereinafter Hero & Preuhs, Immigration and 
the Evolving Welfare State]. However, this could be explained in at least two different ways: that 
immigrant-inclusive policies erode support for TANF or that they signal support for equitable 
eligibility criteria over maximization of TANF grants for a more exclusive group of recipients. 
Reese et al., supra note 26, at 106 (citing Rodney E. Hero & Robert R. Preuhs, Black-Latino 
Political Relationships: Policy Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 38 AM. POL. RES. 531 
(2010) for the first explanation and Ybonne Zylan and Sarah A. Soule, Ending Welfare As We Know 
It (Again): Welfare State Retrenchment, 1989–1995, 79 SOC. FORCES 623 (2000) for the second 
explanation). 
 525  Brown & Kahn Best, supra note 26, at 789.  
 526  Hero & Preuhs, Immigration and the Evolving Welfare State, supra note 524 (finding no 
relationship); Reese et al., supra note 26 (finding a positive relationship). 
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theories to explain the causal mechanisms behind the relationships identified 
in these studies;527 however, additional research is needed to determine the 
precise mechanisms by which these relationships operate.528 
State policies on the subject of noncitizen eligibility for publicly funded 
health coverage are motivated more by factors unrelated to good health 
policy. Rather, they are what I term “incidental health policy,” untethered to 
the normative goals of efficiency and equity. Since states in this context are 
not functioning as effective laboratories of experimentation for health policy, 
this justification for federalism does not apply.   
CONCLUSION 
A decade after the passage of the ACA, prominent Democratic 
lawmakers have co-sponsored “Medicare for All” bills in the House and 
Senate that would transform the U.S. healthcare system into a single-payer 
system for “[e]very individual who is a resident of the United States,” 
including, potentially, currently excluded noncitizens.529 Others, including 
the Democratic nominee for president Joseph R. Biden, Jr., support more 
modest plans that would build on the ACA and herald a new standard of 
inclusion of noncitizens in publicly funded health insurance programs.530 
Although there is substantial popular support for preserving the ACA’s 
coverage expansions and protections, the idea of including more noncitizens 
in national health insurance programs is deeply contested.531  
 
 527  Reese et al., supra note 26, at 104–05. 
 528  See id. at 119 (describing the types of data and future research that are needed to establish 
the causal mechanisms behind these relationships). 
 529  Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. § 102(a) (2019); Medicare for All Act 
of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. § 102(a) (2019). The bills do not define the term “U.S. resident” 
with enough specificity to guarantee that currently excluded noncitizens would be eligible to enroll; 
rather, they delegate this responsibility to the HHS Secretary. S. 1129, § 102(a); H.R. 1384, § 
102(a). However, the primary sponsors of the bills publicly support the inclusion of noncitizens—
including undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., Paulina Firozi, Jayapal’s Medicare-for-All Bill 
Reflects Influence of Hard-Line Progressive Groups, WASH. POST: THE HEALTH 202 (Mar. 11, 
2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2019/03/11/the-
health-202-jayapal-s-medicare-for-all-bill-reflects-influence-of-hard-line-progressive-
groups/5c82a8d61b326b2d177d6037; Bernie Sanders (@BernieSanders), TWITTER (June 21, 
2019, 12:31 PM), http://twitter.com/BernieSanders/status/1142107691671859200 (“If you are a 
human being, regardless of your immigration status, you have a right to health care. 
#MedicareForAll.”). 
 530 See Medicare for America Act of 2019, H.R. 2452, 116th Cong. § 111 (2019) (stating that 
all residents who would be eligible for Emergency Medicaid, which has no alienage restriction, 
would qualify for coverage); Larry Levitt, Trump vs. Biden on Health Care, JAMA HEALTH 
FORUM (Sept. 3, 2020) (describing Biden’s proposal to expand Medicaid and CHIP to a broader 
group of noncitizens and to allow undocumented noncitizens to purchase unnsubsidized coverage 
on the ACA Marketplaces).  
 531  Compare Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991 (Oct. 9, 2019) (restricting the entry 
 
2020.11.09. MAKHLOUF. LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2020  10:25 AM 
December 2020] LABORATORIES OF EXCLUSION  189 
 
Why should the United States subsidize the healthcare of noncitizens, 
especially if they are undocumented? Not only is it morally imperative to 
provide coverage to all who need it, but it is also directly beneficial to the 
community as a whole. The entire community benefits along a number of 
measures when all receive access to health coverage. Moreover, because 
taxpayers already subsidize healthcare for some excluded noncitizens, the 
question more accurately is how to realize these benefits in the most efficient 
way, where greater efficiency has a substantial connection to greater equity. 
Through various safety net programs, federal subsidies to healthcare 
providers that treat a disproportionate share of uninsured people, hospital 
charity care programs, higher insurance premiums, and the patchwork of 
state and local policies on noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health 
coverage, the United States spends approximately $18.5 billion to subsidize 
the healthcare of noncitizens who are currently excluded from Medicaid.532  
When Congress passed PRWORA in 1996, it devolved authority to the 
states to make policy about noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, thus relieving 
the federal government of pressure to address a national problem and 
contributing to political stasis. The existing patchwork of noncitizen 
exclusion from Medicaid is counterproductive to our national health policy 
goals of improving population health outcomes, cost-effectiveness, and 
quality; it cuts against the emerging norm of healthcare equity within health 
law scholarship and healthcare regulation; and it undermines efforts to 
eliminate the influence of antidemocratic values like racism in health policy. 
Making access to federal health insurance programs more equitable for 
noncitizens is a fiscally responsible option that also helps to safeguard public 
health and align policy with ethical norms in healthcare.  
This Article analyzes the role of federalism in shaping states’ policy 
decisions about noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid. Although federalism 
theory has coalesced around the idea that federalism has no political 
valence,533 scholars have called for research to understand the effects of 
federalism on fragmentation, inequity, and exclusion in practice. Scholarship 
analyzing federalism arrangements across a range of subjects opens the door 
to deeper insights about how federalism shapes policy. This Article makes a 
 
of immigrants “who will financially burden the United States healthcare system”), with N.Y. Times 
Editorial Board, Opinion, With Coronavirus, ‘Health Care for Some’ Is a Recipe for Disaster, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), http://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/opinion/coronavirus-immigrants-
health.html (noting doctors’ and immigration advocates’ concerns that the Trump Administration’s 
public charge rule “could deter millions of noncitizens . . . from using programs like Medicaid, 
WIC and SNAP or from seeking medical care of any kind”). 
 532  Conover, supra note 45. 
 533  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A User’s Guide 
to Progressive Federalism, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2017) (“[F]ederalism doesn’t have a 
political valence.”). 
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unique contribution to this effort by synthesizing insights from three fields 
that rarely comment on one another: health law, immigration law, and 
federalism theory.  
For states that wish to expand noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid, the 
current federalism arrangement poses legal, fiscal, and political obstacles. Of 
these, fiscal concerns likely represent the greatest barrier: PRWORA 
restricts the use of federal funds to enact inclusionary Medicaid policy. The 
federal ceiling of Medicaid coverage excludes a substantial population of 
noncitizens residing in the United States, such as all but a few categories of 
LPRs during their first five years of residence, DACA recipients, and 
undocumented noncitizens—including those noncitizens with pending 
immigration applications. Although there are federal options to expand 
Medicaid coverage to select groups of noncitizens, state fiscal concerns can 
pose an insurmountable barrier to electing those options, as well as to 
creating state-funded programs to expand coverage for noncitizens.  
By examining the role of federalism in shaping state policies that 
exclude noncitizens from Medicaid, this Article helps to explain why some 
social policies are linked to fragmentation and inequity. Although, in theory, 
fragmentation should equally enable states that support inclusionary health 
policy to expand coverage for noncitizens, this Article demonstrates the 
uphill battle they face. Under an administration that is hostile to progressive 
health policy embodied by the ACA, advocates for inclusionary health 
reform are looking to state-based solutions. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge that, for some issues, the potential for large-scale reform at the 
state level is weak.  
This Article provides a case study for understanding the efficacy of 
federalism arrangements in achieving equity for those who were left behind 
by health reform. It offers insights to federalism scholars generally and to 
advocates seeking to advance healthcare equity. It links evidence about the 
uneven patchwork of subsidized health coverage for noncitizens to the 
federalism literature on laboratories of experimentation. In this context, 
Medicaid’s structure has failed to incentivize the type of state policy 
experimentation and replication that justifies federalism arrangements. 
Rather, it has skewed state “experimentation” toward exclusionary policy 
and limited states’ ability to experiment with inclusive policy.  
The implications of this analysis are clear: centralization of noncitizen 
eligibility for Medicaid could correct or reverse the existing imbalance. It 
would also promote uniformity, transparency, and equity in noncitizen 
access to healthcare among the states.534 Centralization does not necessarily 
require federalizing the entire healthcare system or even Medicaid. 
 
 534  See Huberfeld, supra note 34, at 473.  
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Thoughtful federal reforms to Medicaid that create a more unified and 
inclusive national policy on noncitizen eligibility could be just as effective.  
Potential approaches to immigrant-inclusive reform run the gamut from 
radical to incremental. For example, Congress could raise the federal floor 
of Medicaid eligibility by mandating coverage of all otherwise qualifying 
U.S. residents. This would eliminate states’ ability to enact immigrant-
exclusionary Medicaid policies, which may be justified by evidence 
indicating that inclusive policy is cost-effective in the long term. A more 
modest—yet still impactful—reform could be to raise the federal floor of 
noncitizen eligibility for Medicaid by eliminating the five-year bar for LPRs. 
Alternatively, Congress could remove the federal ceiling on noncitizen 
eligibility for Medicaid by eliminating the citizenship and immigration status 
criterion entirely.535 This would have the effect of enabling states to make 
inclusionary policy while not requiring states to expand coverage. By both 
raising the floor and removing the ceiling, Congress could reverse the 
existing imbalance by making it easier for states to expand coverage for 
noncitizens than to restrict coverage. 
In order to ward off uncooperative behavior by states, Congress might 
consider giving states some flexibility—“microspheres of autonomy”—to 
make policy choices that best serve their populations within a federal scheme 
that promotes national goals.536 There are ways to structure a mostly 
federalized regime in order to preserve values typically associated with 
decentralization, such as competition and experimentation. Giving states 
some flexibility with federal guardrails may enable policy experimentation 
just as well as (and possibly better than) totally decentralized approaches 
because it provides states with the federal funds they typically need to engage 
in true experimentation. One way to do this could be to provide states with a 
limited menu of options for expanding noncitizen eligibility for subsidized 
health coverage with different funding mechanisms attached to each option. 
For example, each of the following would be an improvement on the status 
quo of noncitizen exclusion from publicly funded health coverage: (1) 
Medicaid expansion to all income-qualifying state residents, regardless of 
citizenship or immigration status, based on the existing per-capita funding 
 
 535  For Congress to do this without affecting noncitizens’ eligibility for other public benefits 
under the PRWORA bar, it could list Medicaid as an exception to the general rule barring non-
qualified noncitizens from eligibility for federal public benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2018) 
(general rule); id. at § 1611(b) (exceptions). The reason why undocumented and other excluded 
noncitizens are currently able to access Emergency Medicaid, public health services such as 
immunizations, and some emergency disaster relief programs providing medical services is that 
they were carved out as statutory exceptions to the general rule. Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401(b), 110 Stat. 
2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)). 
 536  Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 436, at 1268.  
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structure with, perhaps, an eFMAP in the initial years as in the ACA 
Medicaid expansion; (2) elimination of the citizenship and immigration 
status criterion for purchasing insurance from the Marketplaces; and (3) a 
categorical grant to finance health coverage for excluded noncitizens that 
meets federally established standards of creditable coverage. This strategy 
would allow states to retain some autonomy, preserve some of the 
experimentation benefits of decentralized policymaking, and still potentially 
achieve universal health coverage.537 These are just some of the potential 
approaches and issues that are worthy of further investigation as the United 
States reexamines its commitment to sharing healthcare costs and risks, 
achieving univeral coverage, and financing health reform.  
A possible objection to centralizing policy on noncitizen access to 
Medicaid is that an anti-immigrant Congress could just as easily roll back 
noncitizen eligibility for subsidized health coverage, defunding existing 
programs or restricting coverage to a smaller group of noncitizens.538 This 
would be unfortunate and would make terrible health policy, but Congress 
can do that today with the current federalism scheme. The political 
entrenchment of Medicaid eligibility for at least some noncitizens would 
hopefully protect against dramatic new alienage restrictions under a 
politically conservative administration. If not, this would certainly be an 
issue around which a broad-based, national coalition of groups could 
organize in opposition.  
During the next round of health reform, whether policymakers start 
from scratch or use Medicaid as a building block for universal coverage, it 
is imperative to consider the ways in which the patchwork of noncitizen 
exclusion is economically inefficient, medically ineffective, and morally 
damaging. This patchwork arises from the governing structure of noncitizen 
eligibility for Medicaid, which enables states to become “laboratories of 
exclusion” rather than experimentation. In this historical and policy context, 
federal leadership is needed in order to enact inclusive policy on noncitizen 
eligibility for health coverage. 
 
 
 537  Some might argue that, on this issue, there are no real differences among the states that 
justify offering these options. After all, there are excluded noncitizens living in every state and they 
all have bodies that can contract diseases, malfunction, age, or be injured (regardless of whether 
they live in California or Wyoming). On a topic as polarized and racialized as immigration, the 
only reason states might choose one option over the other is ideology. I do not necessarily disagree; 
I offer this as a proposal that may placate various constituencies while still moving our national 
health system toward greater efficiency and equity.  
 538  See Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage 
Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 369 (2002) (explaining how, in a 
slightly different context, if Congress is “required to impose a uniform rule nationwide, [i]t could 
respond to these concerns with a nationwide rule of exclusion, imposed even on those states that 
would prefer to be more generous”).  
